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PHILOSOPHY: IN SEARCH FOR KNOWLEDGE AND WAYS OF LIFE

Guest-Editor: Emiliya A. Tajsina

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Vladimir Przhilenskiy — Suspicion and Method: Towards the Post-Theoretical Lifeworld

Igor Gasparov — Spiritual Exercises as an Essential Part of Philosophical Life

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PHILOSOPHY: IN SEARCH FOR KNOWLEDGE
AND WAYS OF LIFE

Guest-Editor: Emiliya A. Tajsina

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Editors' Note

PHILOSOPHY: IN SEARCH FOR KNOWLEDGE AND WAYS OF LIFE (1)

Recently social reality in the almost global scale is shaped not only by vulgar practicality, but also by—what goes with such practicality hand in hand—hostility and disrespect to authentic, so free and deep intellectual life, and to those intellectual values which are not useful according to pragmatic cultural standards.

The importance and pertinence of Max Horkheimer's diagnosis presented in *The Critique of Instrumental Reason* still grow. By various means, more and more cruelly, reason is set an instrument subordinated to economical-political systems infiltrating the whole human world. Intellectuals are enslaved, inter alia by administrative and financial regulations in academic life, and by media which with paralyzing intensity favour and promote anti-intellectual values, man's needs, styles of life etc. Those intellectuals, who are not temporarily and superficially useful, are barely tolerated, and relegated to secondarily important social niches. Scholars are no longer free thinkers, but to a great extent hired labourers in academic industry. Subordination and even concealed slavery destroy intellectual creativity, kill human autonomous rational spiritual life.

Alarmingly large social groups, keeping abreast of the time, contest the importance of the humanities. Especially, the very sense of philosophy is discredited. What even more appalling, some philosophers proclaim—as a normative postulate to be realized—the death of philosophy. The most celebrated glorifiers of this view are Richard Rorty, an American neo-pragmatist, and postmodernists. Likewise the currently spread tendencies to naturalize philosophy are self-destructive, aiming to transform it into a secondary non-autonomous field.

The present situation of philosophy, at least in Europe, is a result of that anti-intellectual attitude. Philosophy existed non-threatened for 28 centuries. It has offered the majority of intellectual ideas, constituted foundations for various human activities. It gave rise for special sciences, and forever takes part in inspiring them. From antiquity till now philosophy has been the crown of the intellectual apprehension of reality—universalizing, fundamental, revealing

depths and fields not imagined in commonsense nor in science. It teaches thinking which everlastingly transcends its own limits in approaching essential truths. In spite of all its attainments, philosophy must now defend itself, demonstrate its importance and necessity. Not only to save itself, but also to protect humanity against mental self-degradation, against vanishing rational, non-religious spirituality.

Nowadays, when philosophy is scattered into numerous philosophical schools, thematic threads, and positions, its general range and importance is, paradoxically, hidden, and eventually lost for collective consciousness. The essence of philosophy and its prominence can be adequately seen from a far perspective in which all the differences between schools and positions disappear. Then philosophy reveals itself as a realm breaking on through the doors of the mind to the side where all the reality appears as it is not seen outside it—in deeper a way, cleansed of contingencies, in its very fundamentals.¹ Philosophy is just an amazing pursuit of intellectual, universalizing apprehending the very foundations of reality. It seems to be one of the highest means of forming and enriching pure humankind's spiritual sphere. At the same time, trials to define its scope or its methods result in limiting it. As regards its problems and methods philosophy is an open project.

By their intended thematic plurality the papers included in this *Dialogue and Universalism* issue entitled PHILOSOPHY: IN SEARCH FOR KNOWLEDGE AND WAYS OF LIFE show the indispensability, potential, as well as the today's vastness of philosophers' activity. They also demonstrate that the primary philosophical task is to set and freely solve problems, and not to hang onto on a chosen philosophical school; at least the programs of schools should not be treated as rigid barriers of thinking.

The title of the issue defines the scope of philosophy by its two basic pursuits: the pursuit of knowledge and the pursuit of disclosing foundations of men's life. The title should not be treated as indicating two disjunctive paths of understanding and doing philosophy. Knowledge and ways of life are conditioning each other. Cognition arises from human life which is its constituting basis. The ways of aware human life are grounded on and shaped by what the man knows about himself and reality.

The issue PHILOSOPHY: IN SEARCH FOR KNOWLEDGE AND WAYS OF LIFE is determined by its national and hence thematic specificity. The majority of the authors are Russian scholars. The papers are shorter than those normally put out in *Dialogue and Universalism*. It is so because we have tended—along with other tasks of the issue, and in agreement with the guest-editor

¹ This sentence is closely inspired by a verse from William Blake's poem *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*: "If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it is, infinite."

Emilyia Tajsina—to present a representative panorama of main directions in the recent Russian philosophical researches. A relatively large part of the content of the issue is devoted to the problems of the human spiritual sphere, in its mixed individual–social (collective) dimension. It may be cautiously claimed that their extended presence is characteristic of the current Russian philosophizing.

The *Dialogue and Universalism* Editors are grateful to the guest-editor Professor Emilyia Tajsina for preparing this issue—so manifold, so informative. We also thank Dr. Shane Ryan for his assistance in copyediting the issue.

The last part of this *Dialogue and Universalism* issue contains two texts concerning the International Society for Universal Dialogue (ISUD). The first one discusses the ISUD founding ideas, and announces the ISUD intention (being already realized) of the return to its intellectual roots. The second paper is a review of the ISUD World Congress in Craiova (Romania).

Małgorzata Czarnocka, full professor
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences
Dialogue and Universalism Deputy Editor

Editorial

PHILOSOPHY: IN SEARCH FOR KNOWLEDGE AND WAYS OF LIFE (2)

Philosophers of the world are still discussing the most important philosophical event that was held in August 2013, in Athens, the birthplace of all European culture and wisdom: the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy. The World Congresses of Philosophy occur only every five years.

In preparing for this truly historic event, as a prelude to the Congress, the Kazan Branch of the Russian Philosophical Society (Kazan is the capital of Tatarstan Republic, Russia) held in April 26–27, 2013, the International Conference “Towards the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Philosophy as Inquiry and Way of Life.” The hosting institution was the Department of Philosophy of the Kazan State Power Engineering University. The conference was attended by over 170 scholars, mainly Russians.

This *Dialogue and Universalism* issue contains materials, sometimes modified, selected from those presented at the Kazan Conference, and also some papers whose authors did not participate personally, but which suit well the theme.

The conference program included presentations by scholars from all over Russia, from Yakutsk to Makhachkala (North – South) and from Tver to Khabarovsk (West – East). Kazan welcomed Russian and foreign guests, especially the key-note speakers Marc Lucht, Panos Eliopoulos, and Vladimir Przhilenskiy.

Numerous countries and cities participated in the conference: besides Bulgaria (Sofia), Greece (Athens, Tripoli), and USA (Blacksburg) those were Azerbaijan (Baku, Nakhchivan), Belarus (Minsk), Uzbekistan (Tashkent, Navoi), Kazakhstan (Kostanay), Ukraine (Kiev, Kharkiv, Mariupol), and of course Russia. Big cities like Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Ekaterinburg, Rostov-on-Don, Nizhny Novgorod, Saratov, Krasnoyarsk, Samara, Yaroslavl, Barnaul, Voronezh, Krasnodar, Kursk, Tyumen, Chelyabinsk and Omsk sent their scholarly emissaries. Likewise, representatives of smaller ones as Balashikha, Yelabuga, Izhevsk, Yoshkar-Ola, Naberezhnye Chelny,

Yakutsk, Nerungri, Nizhnekamsk; Grozny, the capital of Chechnya; Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan; Nukus (Karakalpakstan) participated in the Conference.

I am deeply convinced that philosophy had always been and still remains a teaching about the means of creating worldviews in accordance with laws of nature, society, and cognition, in a systematic, mainly scientific way, thus shaping ways of living. The organization of the conference sessions has followed this idea:

— Section 1. Ontology, theory of knowledge, epistemology. Activity in these most sophisticated theoretical areas of philosophy is a key feature of the Kazan academic life, where two philosophical schools engaged in ontological and gnoseological researches function.

— Section 2. Social and political philosophy. Social philosophy is one of the most actively developed philosophical fields in today's Russia.

— Section 3. Ethics, aesthetics, axiology.

Since, in my view, philosophy is not based only on scientific results but involves also religious views

— Section 4 was dedicated to dialogue between philosophy, science and religion.

This panorama reflects the situation in contemporary Russian philosophy. Looking back today, we can ascertain that the Kazan Conference "Towards the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Philosophy as Inquiry and Way of Life." was a valuable contribution to the universal task of attaining philosophical knowledge in order to find and elaborate ways of better human life in the world we dwell.

This *Dialogue and Universalism* issue has been organized according to those ideas which lie in the foundation of the Conference. However, we decided to set a different division of its contents in order to highlight the leading ideas as clearly as possible. Thus, two parts of the collection correspond to two main philosophy's tasks and at the same time two areas of philosophical activity signaled both in the title of the conference and in the title of the Dialogue and Universalism issue.

Emiliya Tajsina, coordinator of the conference,
full professor, ISUD General Secretary,
Kazan, Tatarstan, Russia

Marc Lucht

PHILOSOPHY AS A WAY OF LIVING

ABSTRACT

Oriented by the philosophical work of Kant and Heidegger, this paper reflects upon some of the ways in which philosophy can inform every day living. First briefly sketching some of the connections between philosophical practice and the cultivation of autonomy, critical rationality, personal responsibility, and attitudes conducive of peace, this paper then turns to the capacity for philosophical contemplation to enrich a life by cultivating sensitivity and attentiveness to meaning and inherent worth.

Keywords: way of living; ethics; definition of philosophy.

Often in our scholarly efforts we have a tendency to become preoccupied with fairly narrow, abstract, and remote problems. Perhaps it is strange, but philosophical discussion can be quite divorced from ordinary life when professional philosophers deal even with questions of ethics, which one might expect to be as concrete and urgent as possible. Perhaps it is worthwhile to take some time to return to one of the questions that preoccupied some of the earliest philosophers: in what ways can philosophy inform and orient the living of one's life? One venerable approach to the question about the connection between philosophy and living would begin by defining philosophy. As we know, however, one could devote a career to trying to define philosophy and perhaps never finish. Professional philosophers themselves are notorious for their vehement disagreements precisely about the nature, true subject matter, and proper methods of their own discipline.

Even bracketing the question of the nature or definition of philosophy, there is a great variety of ways in which philosophy can shape a life or perhaps constitute a form of life. One could, for instance, reflect upon the Socratic linking of philosophy with self-knowledge and the pursuit of virtue. One could explore the Kantian idea that self-knowledge and knowledge of the principles flowing from one's reason make possible autonomy and the capacity to take responsibil-

ity for one's self—and conduct oneself responsibly towards others. Insofar as philosophy cultivates one's critical rationality as well as a skeptical drive to challenge and test entrenched dogmas and unexamined biases, one could explore its connection with political liberty and personal intellectual maturity. Thus Martha Nussbaum, for instance, says:

“In order to foster a democracy that is reflective and deliberative, rather than simply a marketplace of competing interest groups, a democracy that genuinely takes thought for the common good, we must produce citizens who have the Socratic capacity to reason about their beliefs. It is not good for democracy when people vote on the basis of sentiments they have absorbed from talk radio and have never questioned [...]. In such an atmosphere bad arguments pass for good arguments, and prejudice can all too easily masquerade as reason [...]. [All too often, however, people allow themselves to be controlled.] Words come out of their mouths, and actions are performed by their bodies, but what those words and actions express may be the voice of tradition or convention [...]. They are like instruments on which fashion and habit play their tunes, or like stage masks through which an actor's voice speaks. The Stoics hold, with Socrates, that this life is not worthy of the humanity in them [...]. Critical argument [as cultivated by philosophical education] leads to intellectual strength and freedom ...”¹

There is more. Philosophy as a professional discipline is ever concerned with its own history, and much work within philosophy moves within the history of ideas, helping us understand and recognize the continuing relevance and influence of ideas from our past. Thus one might reflect upon the way in which philosophical thinking can shed light upon our own history, that is, on how we came to think what we think and to be who we are, and therefore on both the promise and limits of the possibilities bequeathed us by our tradition. Philosophy often involves reflecting upon the ideas and achievements of other disciplines, such as painting, music, architecture, physics, and the social sciences; in this way, philosophy can provide one with an orientation in the wider world of culture. And those of us who suspect that there is wisdom to be found in the writings of thinkers such as Kierkegaard, Sartre, Heidegger, and Tolstoy, might be inclined to talk about the ways in which philosophy can provoke one into recognizing one's own tendency to conform unreflectively to the conventional ways of thinking, valuing, and acting characteristic of one's society; we might be inclined too to talk about the ways in which philosophy can attune one to the importance of striving to become an autonomous individual by facing up to the implications of one's own finitude and mortality. Not to

¹ Nussbaum, M. 1997. *Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 19, 28–29.

be discounted, in addition, are the sheer intellectual pleasures philosophy affords through the wrestling with complex, often intractable, paradoxes and problems.

In 1975, UNESCO released a statement asserting that by “training free, reflective minds capable of resisting various forms of propaganda, fanaticism, exclusion and intolerance, philosophical education contributes to peace.” I think this is right. Philosophy also contributes to peace because of its emphasis on engaging with different points of view through dialogue. Kant, for example, refers to the dangers associated with what he calls “logical egoism.” Because the logical egoist “considers it unnecessary to test his judgment by the reason of others, as if he had no need of a touchstone, the logical egoist risks falling into a dogmatic self-assurance that blinds him or her to error as well as isolates himself or herself from the larger community.”² The logical egoist’s pretension that his or her point of view is the only correct one and requires for its certainty no appraisal from others, threatens peace because of the ways in which such self-righteousness can motivate intolerance and lack of regard for the interests of (or objections advanced by) others. However, as Kant recognized, human reason is rarely self-correcting, and we must engage in dialogue with others in order to uncover and correct our mistakes. And philosophy, of course, involves precisely this sort of constant dialogical testing of our ideas against the ideas of others. Kant therefore enjoins upon us the task of engaging with perspectives very different from our own. He recommends the importance of “broadening” one’s thinking, that is, learning to think from alien points of view. Such a broadened way of thinking enables us to transcend “the private subjective conditions of [...] judgment” in which we all too often are confined, and helps us envision a more objective perspective from which we can reflect critically on the

² Kant, I. 1978. *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. Trans. Dowdell, V. L. Southern Illinois University Press, 128 – 9/11. Expressing a similar distrust of dogmatic self-assurance, Nietzsche remarks: “A very popular error: having the courage of one’s convictions; rather it is a matter of having the courage for an attack on one’s convictions.” (Nietzsche, F. 2000 (1920–1929). *Werke XVI*. Munich: Musarion, 318, quoted in Kaufmann, W. 2000. *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*. Trans. Kaufmann, W. New York: The Modern Library, 226). Nietzsche urges one to beware the steadfast, uncompromising, and dogmatic defense of one’s convictions, for doing so “spoils all the innocence and fine neutrality of your conscience; it makes you headstrong against objections and red rags; it stupefies [... There] might be a more laudable truthfulness in every little question mark that you place after your special words and favorite doctrines (and occasionally after yourselves) than in all the solemn gestures and trumps before accusers and law courts.” (Nietzsche, F. 2000. “*Beyond Good and Evil*.” In: *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, op. cit., 226). As does Kant, Nietzsche realizes that the project of coming to understand and temporarily think from the point of view of perspectives other than one’s own is an especially effective way of making possible the critique of ourselves that will help us avoid dogmatism (cf. Nietzsche, F. 2000. “The Genealogy of Morals.” In: *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, op. cit., 555, and idem. 1986. *Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits*. Trans. Hollingdale, R. J. New York: Cambridge University Press, section 483).

strengths and weaknesses of our own more usual point of view.³ Such dialogue with new and alien perspectives promotes peace because it works against the propensity to dogmatic and perhaps imperialist self-righteousness. (Indeed, reflecting upon the limits of our own perspective already should promote the kind of humility that makes us less likely to pursue our aims employing violent means; more often than not, the more we learn about others, the more we discover that they also have good reasons for their views.) Dialogue promotes peace too simply because it creates opportunities for us to listen to and acknowledge claims made by others, and because it encourages understanding and appreciation of others who may be very different from us.

Perhaps I should recall that the ways in which philosophy can shape a life are not always so beneficial. Philosophers, as do many humanists, often affect a sort of bookishness which can distract from an appreciation for the many other dimensions of a richly lived experience. In a discussion of the way in which Husserl's phenomenological indication of the importance of perceptual meaning to the constitution of experience serves as a counterweight to various kinds of over-emphasis on language that are characteristic of recent philosophy, David Carr notes that for many thinkers:

“Human existence and activity are conceived as the use of and understanding of language [...]. Perception is either neglected altogether or viewed metaphorically as itself being a special version of the deployment of the concepts of our language. Against this view, Husserl reminds us of the concretely and sensuously given, indeed *pregiven* reality of the world around us [...]. One wonders if the overemphasis on language is not merely the self-centeredness and even elitism of philosophers and literary critics who spend all their time reading and writing, and project their bookish world onto everyone else.”⁴

Maybe even worse, the time philosophers spend reflecting on those questions and ideals they take to be of overriding importance can contribute to attitudes of superiority towards and disdain for other disciplines and for those dimensions of life which are not strictly speaking philosophical. Plato has Socrates point to this sort of aloofness in the *Republic*. Socrates asks, “To an understanding endowed with magnificence and the contemplation of all time and all being, do you think it possible that human life seem anything great?”⁵ (His in-

³ Kant, I. 1987. *Critique of Judgment*. Trans. Pluhar, W. S. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 295/161, cf. Lucht, M. 2009. “Towards Lasting Peace: Kant on Law, Public Reason, and Culture.” *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, January, 303–326.

⁴ Carr, D. 1989. “The Life-world Revisited.” In: *Husserl's Phenomenology: A Textbook*. McKenna, W. R., J. N. Mohanty (Eds.). Washington, D.C.: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, University Press of America, 301. Carr has in mind thinkers as diverse as Gadamer, Derrida, Dreyfus, and Foucault, as well as recent trends within “analytic” philosophy.

⁵ Plato. 1968. *Republic*. Trans. Bloom, A. New York: Basic Books, 486a.

terlocutor Glaucon, as usual, misses the point, forgets large parts of their earlier conversation, and answers that it would indeed be impossible.) Similarly, Socrates asserts (I think ironically), that “a man who has his understanding truly turned toward the things that are has no leisure to look down toward the affairs of human beings ...,” for, the assumption is, when compared to the eternal, divine, and perfectly ordered ideals that are the proper subject matter of philosophical reflection, the matters preoccupying us in our ordinary lives appear unworthy of attention.⁶ This is why Socrates’ disciple Apollodorus, who, in the *Symposium*, is portrayed as laboring under a similar misunderstanding of philosophy and thereby demonstrates that he still has a lot to learn, tells his friend Glaucon that all talk other than philosophy, «especially the talk of rich businessmen like you, bores me to tears, and I’m sorry for you and your friends because you think your affairs are important when really they’re totally trivial.”⁷ Sadly, such disdain sometimes seems to evolve into precisely the dogmatic self-righteousness that philosophical dialogue should subvert. I suspect we all are acquainted with professional philosophers who are utterly certain of their own grasp of the truth and the good, and treat people who disagree with them accordingly.

Probably I should reflect upon all of this, but doing so would require much more space than is possible here. At the risk of being embarrassingly simplistic, I propose to focus more narrowly on just one idea. This idea has to do with the manner in which philosophical reflection can enable one to recognize—and begin to resist—the sorts of existential dangers arising from our all too common preoccupation with objectivity, efficiency, and instrumental rationality. Philosophy can facilitate the recognition that certain kinds of merely instrumentalist thinking and valuing threaten to impoverish a life, and can point one to alternative kinds of thinking. A long line of thinkers, from Kant to Karl Marx to Jürgen Habermas, has highlighted dangers associated with instrumental rationality. I would like to follow briefly Martin Heidegger’s path of reflection about these dangers.

As Heidegger sees it, we live in a time in which enormous authority is invested in the natural sciences. Heidegger is not the Luddite that some portray him as being, but he is very troubled by our tendency to think of the natural sciences as the model for all legitimate modes of inquiry. For him, the more it is

⁶ *Ibid.*, 500 c.

⁷ Plato. 1989. *Symposium*. Trans. Nehamas, A., Woodruff, P. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 173 c–d. Apollodorus’ philosophical immaturity is made evident not only by his denigration of ordinary life, a denigration most likely grounded in a “two worlds” misunderstanding of the relation between the forms and the spatiotemporal world, but also by his poor memory, evident at 178a. It is the “two worlds” theory, for which the forms are held to be entirely transcendent (and in comparison to which the temporal world can only seem unimportant), that Plato ascribes to “young Socrates” and that is corrected over the course of young Socrates’ discussion with Parmenides in the eponymous dialogue.

that scientific and technical modes of thinking are taken to be the sole legitimate modes of access to truths about the world, the less it is that anything not subject either to quantitative representation or technological subjection to practical ends will be regarded as anything more than the correlate of mere subjective interpretation or preference.

Heidegger traces the genesis of the prevailing ways of thinking to a metaphysical shift initiated by Galileo and Descartes. The legacy with which they left us is that nature comes to be defined *a priori* as sheer material objectivity and its motion. Nature is conceived *a priori* as “the self-contained system of motion of units of mass related spatiotemporally” or, basically, matter and energy.⁸ As Descartes knew, the equivalence of the real with extended matter (and with determinate quanta of energy) makes possible the mathematical representation of nature in terms of quantitative magnitudes. Science proceeds on the foundation of this rigorous objectification of nature. Only those phenomena conforming to this schema are taken to be at all, and any concrete empirical investigation will proceed on the basis of this *a priori* presupposition about the nature of the real and the correlative purview of legitimate inquiry.

Now, Heidegger argues that beings are represented as objects ultimately so that they are appropriate material for technological manipulation and control. His claim is that modern European metaphysics has sought to universally objectify the natural world with the final aim of securing dominion over it. The objectivity of a being allows for the measurability and calculability presupposed by the project of acquiring mastery over that being. (This is why Descartes says in the *Discourse* that the new philosophy will enable us to become the masters and possessors of nature). Objectivity and mastery are connected in part because quantitative measurement and mathematical calculation enable us to fix and know the properties of a being with a definiteness and precision impossible in the flux of ordinary perceptual experience, and thus enable us to predict that being’s future states and behavior. Objectivity and mastery are connected also because modern theory proceeds analytically, determining the various components of an object, the way in which those components fit together, and the dynamic laws governing the behavior of those components; once one knows all that, in principle one already knows how those components can be assembled differently, that is, how the thing can be re-made or altered.⁹ What this means, is that modern thought is not a “pure knowing for its own sake,” but is technological in its very structure. With modern metaphysics, then, nature comes to be represented as raw material or resource that is available for human use, consumption, and manipulation. Theory’s aim, Heidegger famously says, has been to convert

⁸ Heidegger, M. 1988. “The Age of the World Picture.” In: idem. *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*. Trans. Lovitt, W. New York: Harper & Row, 119.

⁹ cf. Jonas, H. 1966. “The Practical Uses of Theory.” In: *The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology*. New York: Harper & Row.

nature into a “gigantic gasoline station.”¹⁰ Theoretical reflection, even though it purports to be normatively neutral, in fact aims at power.

As did Husserl before him, Heidegger thinks that our theoretical commitments and biases end up guiding common sense. The technical interpretation of being as object and resource increasingly regulates our unreflective, pre-theoretical ideas about, and even ordinary experience of, the world. (I have found that when one asks those representatives of common sense, undergraduate students, about whom one should turn to if one wants to know what is real, they invariably suggest physicists and chemists, but never poets.) If Heidegger is right, then even in the course of ordinary experience we increasingly encounter little but the uniformity of material quantity and functionality. The world is taken to be, and is encountered as, object and resource. In other words, we encounter the world primarily in terms of its capacity to contribute to the satisfaction of our goals. Attending primarily to those features of the things that bear upon our projects, we allow ourselves to be responsive to the world merely in its possible instrumentality, that is, in its relation to us and what it can be **for** us.

Another way of putting this point is to say that modern metaphysics has disaggregated thing and meaning, or fact and value, and only side of these distinctions is taken to be fully real. Once the real is taken to be nothing but quantity, it can contain no significance of its own. The real is just matter and energy. Any significance it may have will arise out its connection to our needs and desires. Significance then comes to be taken as a subjective artifact of our judgments and interpretive activity, and is to be found just in the way in which we take things and in what it is that we take them to be for. As Kant puts the point, “without man all of creation would be a mere wasteland, gratuitous and without a final purpose.”¹¹

Thus, as for Descartes, for whom secondary qualities such as purple do not inhere as real properties in the thing that appears purple, so for us phenomena that initially do not appear to be either matter or energy are either subject to the attempt to be reduced to and understood in terms of quantitatively measurable primary qualities, or else are passed over as “merely subjective.” Increasingly we tend to think that phenomena such as hope and humor are reducible to the disposition of neurons in brains, and phenomena such as the frightening, the good, the fitting, and the vile are conceived not as real properties of objects or situations, but as mere artifacts of judgments we make and feelings we have about things. To take an example of the implications of such a view, in the American education system there is increasing emphasis placed on quantitative assessments of student learning. These assessments are accomplished mostly

¹⁰ Heidegger, M. “Memorial Address.” *Discourse on Thinking*. Trans. Anderson, J. M., E. Hans Freund. New York: Harper & Row, 50.

¹¹ Kant, I. 1987. *Critique of Judgment*, op. cit., 442/331.

using multiple-choice exams. The implication is that even the learning of something like Socratically inspired philosophy, with its emphases on one's recognition of one's own ignorance, on wonder, on intellectual liberty and the critique of convention, on openness to new perspectives, on dialogical relations with others within a community, on tenacity, and on virtue, is reducible to determinate bits of data and measurable "outputs." For the contemporary view, what is real in learning, or real learning, must, it seems, be measurable quantitatively. It seems to me that this approach overlooks a great deal, including what is most important about education. To take another example, with the advent of modern industrial agriculture, what used to be called "animal husbandry" has come to be referred to as animal science or meat science. Animals that once were thought of as requiring at least some degree of care, now are thought of and written about merely as meat production units. Accordingly, the only issues that show up as requiring attention relate to the most efficient means of production and delivering consistency of product. Such efficiency, as put in a presentation for the meat industry, requires,

"highly coordinated flows of sophisticatedly [sic] produced raw materials arriving at a huge processing facility [...] the movement to a more attribute specific raw material [...] economies of scale in larger production and processing facilities [and] the need to reduce inefficiencies originating in hogs."¹²

No longer is there incentive for any care for the animal at all; all that matters is correcting for the natural "inefficiencies" arising in animals in order to ensure the most reliably consistent and least expensive product. And of course such correction typically requires creating living situations of the most horrendous suffering, as well as the application of techniques such as genetic engineering, utilized in order to re-design these meat delivery devices to enhance their efficiency. Life itself is subject to technical mastery.

Instrumental reasoning is the kind of thinking corresponding to a world in which what matters are instrumentalities, and for which other sorts of concerns simply do not arise. Heidegger says:

"The willing of which we speak here is the putting-through, the self-assertion, whose purpose *has already* (e.g., *a priori*) posited the world as the whole of producible objects [...]. Correspondingly, human willing too can be in the mode of self-assertion only by forcing everything under its dominion from the start, even before it can survey it. To such a willing, everything, beforehand and thus subsequently, turns irresistibly into material for self-assertive production [...]. At bottom, the essence of life is supposed to yield itself to technical

¹² Hurt, Ch. 2002. "Staying Competitive in Today's Pork Business." Quoted in: Scully, M. *Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 251.

production [...]. In place of all the world-content of things that was formerly perceived [...] the object-character of technological dominion spreads itself over the earth ever more quickly, ruthlessly, and completely. Not only does it establish all things as producible in the process of production; it also delivers the products of production by means of the market. In self-assertive production, the humanness of man and the thingness of things dissolve into the calculated market value of a market which not only spans the whole earth [... but] subjects all beings to the trade of a calculation that dominates most tenaciously in those areas where there is no need of numbers.”¹³

Heidegger does not think that this sort of technical or instrumental approach to the world is wrong, nor does science provide a false disclosure of the world. But he does think that the ontology of material presence is partial and reductive; our attention is narrowed to those aspects of the world that are controllable, and we overlook what is not representable as object and resource. In other words, when we gaze at the world only through the lens of our own interests, focusing only on what it can do for us, our gaze is narrowed, and our selfishness blinds us to what Heidegger thinks of as the manifold rich abundance of being. It is for this reason that Heidegger says that objectifying science “already had annihilated things as things long before the atom bomb exploded,”¹⁴ for things “can no longer pierce through the objectification to show their own.”¹⁵ We fail to attend to the richness of a thing, instead seeing only those aspects of it relating to our aims. As Matthew Scully puts the point,

“when you look at a rabbit and can see only a pest, or vermin, or a meal, or a commodity, or a laboratory subject, you aren’t really seeing the rabbit anymore. You are seeing only yourself and the schemes and appetites we bring to the world ...”¹⁶

Imagine looking at a forest and seeing in it only potential toothpicks. This seeing must overlook a great deal. And the technical approach is not only reductive. When allowed to become authoritative and exhaustive, it is dangerous. There are several dangers to which Heidegger points, from the obvious ecological dangers, to ethical dangers (namely, the more habituated we are to treating everything around us as mere resource, the more likely it is that we shall treat other people and other sentient creatures merely as things to be used, valuing

¹³ Heidegger, M. 1989. “What are Poets for?” In: idem. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Trans. Hofstadter, A. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 111–115.

¹⁴ Heidegger, M. 1989. “The Thing.” In: idem. *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Trans. Hofstadter, A. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 170.

¹⁵ Heidegger, M. 1989. “What are Poets For?”, op. cit., 133.

¹⁶ Scully, M. 2003. *Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy*. New York City: St. Martin’s Griffin, 3.

them solely for their possible utility), to what he thinks of as a sort of blasphemy connected with approaching the cosmos in such a reductive and objective manner. Heidegger's language about the impiety associated with reductive and self-assertive scientific approaches echoes that of the Franciscan Platonist St. Bonaventure, who already in the 13th century was troubled by the project of "speculation without devotion, investigation without wonder, observation without joy, work without piety, knowledge without love, understanding without humility, endeavor without grace."¹⁷

Here, however, I want to reflect upon an existential danger connected with the over-emphasis on technical ways of thinking.

Charles Taylor says that the primacy accorded to instrumental reasoning is threatening in part because choices "that ought to be determined by other criteria will be decided in terms of efficiency or 'cost-benefit' analysis." However, such thinking is threatening also because the over-emphasis on instrumental reasoning contributes to what he calls a "narrowing and flattening of our lives ..."¹⁸ Characteristic of the instrumentalist attitude is the sensitivity to only one kind of meaning—that attitude encounters things merely in terms of their capacity to further or frustrate our projects. We only attend, as it were, to the sides of things facing us, those aspects of things bearing upon our practical interests. Attending solely to instrumentality blinds us to the multiplicity of other kinds of significance incorporated into the world.

As Taylor suggests, attending only to utility can lead to a sort of dreary gray-ing or flattening of one's life. Why? One reason is because the more we engage in practices that are important to us only for instrumental reasons, the more it is that we defer our satisfaction. If going to school is only important insofar as it can help us get a good job, for instance, if the significance of our endeavors is external to the endeavors themselves, then we are always deferring what we care about and value—the payoff—until the future. The present, and our present experience, is experienced not as important for its own sake, but merely as a transition to an ever receding and perhaps never reached future state of satisfaction or reward. Instead of living, we plan, and we wait. A deeper reason why preoccupation with utility can lead to the impoverishment of a life is simply because a life replete with a multiplicity of different kinds of significance or worth is fuller—more meaningful—than a life containing only one mode of meaning. Attending to only one sort of value blinds us to a range of other sorts of worth that can make our endeavors rewarding and worthwhile. Seeing things only in terms of their practical benefit to us blinds us to a host of other ways that things can matter. Joseph P. Fell illustrates the problem with a series of rhetorical questions. What would be missed or lost,

¹⁷ Bonaventure. 1978. *The Soul's Journey into God, The Tree of Life, and the Life of St. Francis*. Trans. Cousin, E. New Jersey: Paulist Press, 55.

¹⁸ Taylor, Ch. 1991. *The Ethics of Authenticity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 5–6.

“If travelling were regarded simply as the use of the most efficient means of getting from one point to another. If learning were regarded simply as picking up skills, as a means to productivity [...]. If forests were regarded simply as a ‘national resource’ [...]. If adjusting the snapshot or movie camera as a means of re-producing the present in the future were to become more important than appreciating the scene now [...]. If sex education manuals for our school-children were considered simply an antiseptic and clinically-neutral way to keep kids out of future trouble. If vacations were to be considered primarily as a way of ‘recharging the batteries’ [...]. If college were seen as simply a means to grad-school or a ‘preparation for life’ rather than life itself. If human communication were seen primarily as the use of ‘media’ for data transmission.”¹⁹

A focus on mere instrumentality and practical benefit would deprive many of these things and practices of their point, and of their potential for enriching human conduct and cultural life. Sexuality is not important to think about solely in order to help us regulate it with the goal of avoiding unwanted infections or pregnancy. It is not the case that education is important only for its capacity to train students for a job. Education is not good merely for the sake of something *else*, something other than education. Both sexuality and education are worthwhile for their own sakes. What is good about them is not only external to them (though certainly they do make possible other, external goods as well), but their goods are internal to the practices themselves.

Because philosophy involves rigorous thinking about the nature of values, because it involves investigation of the nature of representation, of the promise and limitations of scientific approach to the world, of different modes of rationality, and of the history of ideas, and because it involves disengaging ourselves from our habitual modes of conduct and then reflecting on them and their legitimacy, it is especially well suited to uncover the dangers of our preoccupation with the instrumental, as well as to help us begin to envision alternative ways of thinking. Philosophical reflection in part includes the process of making distinctions. One of the most fundamental distinctions in philosophy is that between instrumental and inherent worth. Philosophical reflection can remind us that instrumental value is not the only kind of meaning, that some things are significant not just relative to us, and that some things are important not solely for their practical bearing on our endeavors. Philosophy can help us recognize that at least some things and practices might possess an inherent worth and be important for their own sakes, thereby helping prepare us to appreciate an array of different kinds of meaning. One sort of inherent worth is to be found in pleasure. (I think the contribution made by pleasure to living a full life all too often is

¹⁹ Fell, J. P. 1990. “What is Philosophy?” *Eidos: The Bucknell Academic Journal*. Lewisburg, PA: A Publication of the Bucknell Student Government, 68–69.

overlooked.) We pursue pleasure not for the sake of something external to the pleasurable experience, or for the sake of some sort of practical utility, but we pursue it for its own sake. We pursue it because it matters to us, and it is its own justification; it is its own point. The appreciation of beauty is similar. The beautiful is not important for something else, it is not important instrumentally. As Kant taught (or maybe reminded) us, we love the beautiful in a disinterested way, for its own sake. Surely goodness is the same. Goodness is not good because it is good for something. Goodness is just good. Perhaps forests and pigs too possess a worth independent of their relation to human desires and practical needs. Perhaps forests, like music and virtue, are not just important for something, but are just important. Perhaps worth is not to be determined solely in connection with human interests. As Fell suggests, perhaps it is the case that the meanings we all too readily seek “in the subject’s interiority, in immanence, have not originated there, but have occurred antecedently *in the world*.”²⁰

Earlier I chose the word “appreciate” deliberately. Thinkers such as Kant and Heidegger argue that significance is encountered in attitudes of responsiveness and receptiveness, in attitudes such as appreciation, wonder, love, and awe, rather than in a more assertive and active ordering of all things according to their relation to our purposes. Kant, for instance, thinks of the aesthetic regard for the world as disinterested, that is, as a non-covetous or non-appropriative vision. This vision does not seek to impose categories on the world, or to master it either in thought or deed, but arises with the suspension of our more normal drive to organize the world according to our practical purposes. The appreciation of the beautiful presupposes the bracketing of my more typical practical engagement with the world. This vision is receptive and responsive. It is attentive and contemplative, and requires us to open ourselves to the possibility of being touched by something. Such a vision, as Heidegger puts the point in a discussion of Kant’s aesthetics, enables “what encounters us” to “come before us in its own stature and worth.”²¹ Perhaps were we to suspend our usual focus on achieving our practical aims, our normal approach of actively ordering and assigning value to things on the basis of their relation to us, perhaps if instead we were to adopt more open and responsive attitudes, allowing ourselves to encounter things as they come before us, we then would discover a wealth of different kinds of meaning already surrounding us, and different kinds of worth whose determination is not given merely by their relation to our interests.

What I want to suggest to you is that a life spent attending to the abundance of manifold kinds of significance to be found within the world, a life spent, at least in great part, in the pursuit of practices whose goods are internal to them,

²⁰ Fell, J. P. 1994. “Seeing a Thing in a Hidden Whole: The Significance of *Besinnung* in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*.” *Heidegger Studies*, 10, 91–109, 95.

²¹ Heidegger, M. 1995. *Nietzsche*, vol. 1. Trans. Krell, D. F. San Francisco: Harper Collins, 109.

that are good for their own sakes, will be more richly lived than would be a life spent preoccupied more narrowly with only practicality and efficiency. It strikes me that philosophical contemplation, which at its best is precisely the disclosure of and attentiveness to meaning, can help us cultivate a sensitivity to inherent worth. Philosophy offers a way to resist the homogenization of meaning to the kind of utilitarian value that is the correlate of instrumental rationality. In this way, philosophy—living philosophically—is the enriching of a life.

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SUSPICION AND METHOD: TOWARDS THE POST-THEORETICAL LIFEWORLD

ABSTRACT

The article analyzes the historical and philosophical roots of the art of suspicion and its role in the development of modern philosophy and its method. Particular attention is paid to the issues of the comparison of philosophical suspicion and conspiracy theories as a special state of mass consciousness. The article also specifies the dependence of the art of suspicion on the sociology of knowledge and post-theoretical thinking.

Keywords: suspicion; doubt; *philoiponia*; sociology of knowledge; post-theoretical lifeworld.

Last decades have given us a good many surprises, one of which is a mass and involuntary, to a large extent, acquisition of those kinds of activity that in the past were practiced by a very narrow circle of the select few. If giving the general population access to culture shocked philosophers as far back as the middle of the 20th century, then gaming with our own identity is a comparatively new “kind of sport.” And now everyone is getting access to the technologies which let one construct one’s own past and take part in a virtual project competition for the preferred future. That is how one can try to take part in policy making today, offering initially active and imaginary political actors a constructed set of mythologies, ideologies, an action program, aimed at the creation/revival of any states, ethnic groups, tribal alliances sunk into historical oblivion. The identity which was considered to be a kind of natural property has turned out to be a variable quantity and an option or even an object of construction. But at the same time only few remember that it was the philosophers who were the first that felt the burden of the ethnic, social, religious and other identities. It was they who for the first time wanted to break away from the wheel of birth, live life in a way such that they would not be dependent on anything fortuitous and “attendant” both in their thoughts and in their deeds.

No less interesting is an effect of the *nouveau*, in the swift and impetuous spreading of conspiracy theories—convictions that there are clandestine organizations which rule the world, and that there are hidden agendas of authorities which are drastically different from those that are proclaimed. Common sense dictates that every secret is therefore a secret because it can bear a definite if not a mortal threat to those who are not among the conspirators. Now entire treatises are being written where one is setting out in writing or interpreting corresponding phenomena, myths or ideologies. More and more books appear which by style and as well as content resemble tutorials and scientific monographs. But here as well philosophers have taken the lead over the rest having smelt a rat first.

It goes without saying that the philosophical conspiracy theory cannot be understood like a more refined and delicate form of the popular, that is folk conspiracy theory, just the same way Martin Heidegger's horrorology cannot be considered a prototype of the horror-punk. But the unity of the object cannot help raising a question about general genetics, and it is also necessary to think about other interrelations and interdependences. Since philosophers first suspected that the world was in fact other than it seemed, a sufficient amount of time has passed. The basic difference between the philosophical conspiracy theory and the popular one is that philosophers suspected as the source of the deception not the authorities or clandestine organizations but very being itself, very things themselves, very nature itself. And people sometimes had a lot to endure—but then only teachers, philosophers and researchers were accused of cheating.

“My writings have been called ‘a schooling in suspicions,’ or even ‘contempt,’ but fortunately also in courage, indeed in audacity. And in fact I myself do not believe that anyone has ever before looked into the world with an equally profound degree of suspicion, and not merely as an occasional devil's advocate, but, to speak theologically, just as much as an enemy and an indictor of God.” (Nietzsche, 1996, 5)

Is there anything else in Friedrich Nietzsche's words except for a scandalous desire to shock the reader and attract his attention by all means? Is there anything else except for a desperate hope to explode from the inside the universe of the European bourgeoisie with its “decrepit” Christianity and “devaluated” Socratism? And how can one grasp this idea, transform suspicion into a method or a discipline, embody the art of suspicion in the form of some programme, make it a technological base? Such attempts exist and are well known. Thus, Oswald Spengler wrote that his method was borrowed from Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, and his method of problem statement was borrowed from Nietzsche. “Sociology of knowledge represents a specific application of what Nietzsche aptly called the ‘art of mistrust’”—Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann noted later. (Berger, Luckmann, 1991, 19)

Nietzsche's texts are literally overfilled with fear and indignation. The German philosopher is afraid to be deceived by pseudo-values, and he is indignant at the educators who have imposed these values. And he exposes them. Not only is Socrates exposed who identified the good with the truth, but Plato is also exposed for imposing the doubling of the world, as well as Christ who identified weakness with virtue. Nietzsche exposes philosophers and philologists, prophets and their followers, educators and their adherents. Moreover, he declared then that he suspected them of imposing these values not just for fun, but applying a special art—the art of suspicion. But, as is any other art, the art of suspicion must possess its own method, its own discipline, its own set of cognitive and expressive means. In order to designate the art of suspicion, I propose to use a new word *philoiponia*, from the Greek φιλοῦπόνοια—“love for suspicion.” (Przhilenskiy, 2010)

Nietzsche suspected that he had maliciously been deceived, he tried to expose, unmask a lie, having made the art of suspicion his main method. It is no accident that the author of the values revaluation project has chosen cognitive resources of philology, but not those of traditional reasoning as the means of exposure. The representatives of philosophical hermeneutics, structuralism, and sociology of knowledge have demonstrated a special attitude to the art of suspicion. May Nietzsche have experienced just only a professional nightmare of an interpreter who can never be completely sure in the rightness of his judgment? Is it a kind of occupational disease of an exegetic which is gaining ground when identities are mixing up: an oracle, a theologian, a philologist? The transition from geometry to philology which more than once has been a symbol of the philosophical mainstream, generates a deep feeling of disillusionment because of the impossibility to know—by contrast, geometricians can measure and even double-check their measurements, make them more accurate and calculate a likely error having eliminated *ipso facto* all possible suspicions. Philologists are doomed to be left alone with their suspicions.

I would venture to suggest that the transformation of suspicion into a method did not happen suddenly, and, moreover, is not a natural stage of philosophical thought development; it is caused by a number of “external” circumstances. It is caused first of all by the philosophers who started to explore one more sphere which had not previously been worthy of attention. They started exploring it and correspondingly making themselves familiar with it, because to get accustomed to strange lands is possible only when you cardinaly change. And this sphere is the post-theoretical lifeworld.

Such are the ways of the world that being in the sphere of *a priori* knowledge has been presented with great pomp, and one could enter it only as does one enter a temple; the capability (or the right) to dwell there has almost constantly been considered to be a real thinkers' lot. Ranging from extravagance and absent-mindedness to provocation and intellectual aggression—that is the arsenal of socially significant means by which the sanctification of theoretical

space occurs. And if all of a sudden a notion of something on-theoretical or even extra-theoretical occurs, then only for the illustration of the theory or as auxiliary means. In the beginning it is spoken about an application filed of the theory in practice, that is about the sphere of practice, commonness or daily routine. Then daily routine transforms into such a place to which the theory goes back originally. As everyone knows, Edmund Husserl introduced the concept of lifeworld just as a pre-theoretical formation, intersubjectivity and other qualities of which guarded it safely against transformation into something theoretical. And the fact that sociologists have introduced a completely different way of considering the lifeworld, having transformed it into a symbolic universe, has changed nothing in its temporal explication: the lifeworld is always the world which is pre-theoretical.

Today, some representatives of the sociology of knowledge have taken an interest in theoretical knowledge's fate split up into fragments, built into constructs, discarded or just overlooked by scientists. And the technique of the lifeworld description itself, discovered by phenomenologists, could not help lead to a question whether theoretical knowledge falls within the lifeworld space, whether knowledge plays by rules written for the notions of the lifeworld. It is this fact that Bruno Latour, Patrick A. Heelan and D. Ghinev wrote about.

Having returned to the lifeworld and found it in a completely different—post-theoretical quality—philosophers tried to operate in this new environment. It is not surprising that their actions started resembling that of how a man behaves when he finds himself in a strange unknown world. And in this world suspicion is the main food for intuition. Thus, Heelan criticized what he had defined as “a received view”:

“Since the lifeworld is where all inquiry begins and ends, philosophy also begins and ends there, and it is in relation to the contemporary lifeworld that philosophy is itself a resource. In contrast, the ‘received view’ begins in the lifeworld and ends in a meaningful construction about the lifeworld that takes the form of an ideal representational model of nature. The gap between the lifeworld and the scientific model of nature is bridged by a postulate, let me call it the ‘mirroring postulate,’ one of the same kind that is commonly thought to link geometry and the lifeworld. Just as geometrical objects float, as it were, off the page or blackboard and take their place in the ideal realm of the mind, so too do scientific models or theories. The ‘received view’ as a philosophy is, then, no more than a hypothetical-deductive theory like scientific theories and ‘invented’ likewise on the basis of a postulate, as Brisson and Meyerstein (1995) so cleverly show in their comparison between the Big Bang Theory and Plato’s *Timaeus*. This, of course, does not lessen the value of a theory as the resource it has proved to be, but it limits the validity of philosophical claims often made for a theory.” (Heelan, 2002, 49)

One more interesting observation about the turn in thinking was made by Nancy Murphy when noting that along with a great number of philosophical turns of the 20th century among which the most famous one is the linguistic turn, there was a turn from individualism towards collectivism in epistemology as well. While transiting from Cartesian Nouveau to post-Cartesianism or post-modernism there was in fact a collectivization of intellectual activity, or rather collectivization in the conception about it.

“Holism in epistemology and the theory of meaning as use both work against the individualism of the modern period. Moderns suppose that any individual (given the basic sensory and intellectual equipment) is as competent as any other to form justified beliefs and speak the language. Society’s knowledge and language are merely the collection of the individuals. In postmodern thought, on the other hand, the community plays an indispensable role. It is the community that must decide when to take anomalous facts seriously, and where to make changes in the Quinian network of beliefs. The language games and conventions in which one participates precede individual speech and determine what can and cannot be said. In short, language and the search for knowledge are communal achievements. So, escape from either of the modern epistemological or linguistic axes calls for a corresponding detachment from the individualist axis as well.” (Murphy 1990, 295)

Such a socialization of epistemology could not help affecting a scholar’s internal state who felt his dependence in his thoughts and beliefs on others straight away, including both strangers and that very crowd Augustine wrote about. But now this is not “the crowd of everything,” it is a human crowd, though it can in full accordance with Le Bon’s research act as a depersonalized conspirator, constitute a menace, but have neither evil nor other intent. Such a mixture of attributes of the social and super-social (semi-natural, semi-demonic) in the body of interest generates the same mixed reaction, which ties intellectual experience with the social much more intensely than this is characteristic for traditional academic activities.

Philosophy has changed a great number of dramatic roles for two thousand five hundred centuries of its existence, coming in a variety of images and putting on one mask after another. When becoming either an aim or means the given intellectual practice let name itself an object of life, and a lifestyle, and a means of consolidation, and an instrument of the thought, a method of cognition, and special knowledge. Coexisting with the science, philosophy even declared itself one of the sciences. Interacting with religion, it quite often tried to pave the way to faith. Being combined with the art of “the love of wisdom” did quite a lot to be presented as one of arts.

Having deserved quite an ambiguous status of “no man’s land,” philosophy has always shown responsiveness by demonstrating real miracles of mimicry.

But giving itself up to an instinctive desire to imitate or even merge into something different (religion, science, art), Philosophy seemed to forget that it was ingenuously privy to the birth of modern science and religion, culture and art, politics and law. As one cannot imagine modern societies without political, economic and legal institutions, so Christianity, Islam and Judaism are impossible without the corresponding systems of theology. And indeed, science, art, humanitarian values are real philosophical projects which are described in detail and substantiated reliably.

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THE STOIC COSMOPOLITANISM AS A WAY OF LIFE

ABSTRACT

The word cosmopolitanism is derived from “*cosmos*” (universe) and “*polites*” (citizen). The cosmopolite is a citizen of the world. The Stoics elaborate on the theme, using the ideas of *oikeiosis* and *sympathy* as its basis, thus drawing from their physics. Particularly, Epictetus defends cosmopolitanism on the assumption that man is akin to God, whereas Marcus Aurelius highlights the common possession of mind (νοῦς) and that man is by nature able for communal life. For the Stoics man is a social being who can be perfected only within the society of other human beings. The brotherhood of men is grounded on the indubitable axiom that the human soul is the source of the unique good, which is virtue. The distinctive parameter for creating a community is virtue, which is an objective for everyone but also an inherent and ecumenical capacity.

Keywords: Stoicism; cosmopolitanism; politics; ethics; wisdom; friendship.

Diogenes of Sinope, the cynic philosopher, who most probably introduced the term “cosmopolite”, answered when asked: “I am a citizen of the world (κοσμοπολίτης)”¹. In Philo’s *De Mundi Opificio* the cosmopolite is defined as the person who directs all his actions according to the will of nature, which is the law of the cosmopolis, the polis of the cosmos (οἶκος αὐτῶ καὶ πόλις ὁ κόσμος).² This law, according to the Stoics, is “ὁ τῆς φύσεως ὀρθὸς λόγος”, the right reason of nature, which is the divine law. The human being is a citizen of the cosmos as long as he conforms to the divine law, which is no other than the natural law, found in him in the form of consciousness and right reason. In my paper I will argue that while the Stoics define the cosmopolite as the person who shares the *oikos* of the cosmos, living as a citizen in a gigantic polis whose governor is God or Logos, therefore as a passive state of being, or as a being who enjoys the potential rights or benefits given by nature, at the

¹ Diogenes Laertius, VI. 63.

² Philo. *De Mundi Opificio*, § 142, vol. I, 50, 2 Wendl.

same time the cosmopolite is an energetic being who constantly gives his consent, a person on the path to wisdom who strengthens his bonds with other human beings starting with the process of *oikeiosis* and ending with philanthropy.

For Hierocles,³ the Stoic philosopher, the idea of *oikeiosis* could be illustrated in its resemblance with a system of concentric circles, which encompass the human being. The first circle around the human being is the one that encloses himself, his soul and body. The second circle encloses parents, friends and relatives. Outer circles include more and more human beings, till the final circle which encompasses all the rest, the entire human race. The duty of the person is to draw the circles closer to him, bringing each circle closer to the center which is his own being. This description of *oikeiosis* requires the understanding of the term *per se*: “τό οικειοῦσθαι” signifies not only the recognition of what belongs to the specific being, “τό οικεῖον,” but also the continuous effort of the being for self preservation and for the highest potential benefit. Caring for oneself, caring for the others is part of the *oikeiosis*, part of the natural and rational order of things, which is also our duty since it is natural and rational. That is primarily what binds human beings in their political connection.

In the *Fragmenta* the Stoics consider as a citizen only the person who is “*Spoudaios*,” “*Sophos*,” the prudent, virtuous and wise person.⁴ This connotes that since the virtuous person is the person who is imbued by right reason, then to be a citizen in the stoic manner is to live according to reason, logos. Only rational beings can be citizens of the world,⁵ and the Stoics consider both gods and humans as citizens of this universal polis, beings who are submitted to the common cosmic law. The Stoics seem to focus intensely on the aspect of law. Their definition of the polis precisely is that the polis is a multitude of people, governed by law.⁶ In Dio Chryostom’s texts it is upheld that civic authority is providence for the people according to the law,⁷ just like the divine law is also providence for the beings. This analogy is characteristic of their effort to establish a firm relationship between what happens in the human cosmos and the natural cosmos as the former is a continuation and expansion of the latter. Law and justice are prerequisites for the community. Cicero in *De Legibus* clarifies that due to the fact that right reason is the common possession of gods and men and since right reason is law (*lex*) it is entailed that men have law also in common with the gods. Those who share law must also share Justice; and those who share these are to be regarded as members of the same polis (*una civitas communis deorum atque hominum*).⁸ In accordance with the theories of Plato and

³ Stobaeus. 4, 671–673.

⁴ S.V.F. Z. I. 54, 4. Cf. Sellars, J. 2007. “Stoic Cosmopolitanism and Zeno’s Republic.” In: *History of Political Thought*, XXVIII, 1, 11.

⁵ S.V.F. III, 241.

⁶ S.V.F. III, 327.

⁷ Dio Chryostom. *Discourses*. XXXVI, § 20.

⁸ Cicero. *De Legibus*, I. vii. 23.

Aristotle, the Stoics maintain that the telos of this polis is eudemonia. Nonetheless, unlike Plato and Aristotle, they do not think that the citizen belongs to a particular polis, narrowly meant, i.e. one determined by boundaries. For Zeno of Citium the world state must abolish national borders so that only a homogeneous state remains. The stoic city is ample, a living space, a universal community. In compliance to the above, it is deduced that breaking the order of the cosmopolis is the only factor that breaches eudemonia (ή της τάξεως παράβασις λύει τήν εὐδαιμονίαν τοῦ κόσμου).⁹ This order is living according to nature, reason, and virtue. As a consequence, the cosmopolite is the human being who is relieved from mental states and actions which violate this tripartite order.

Although the Stoics recognize that due to cosmic sympathy and *oikeiosis* (appropriation) every human being must be aware of his connection with the other human beings, there is also a profound understanding of the difficulties that can be raised. The stoic cosmopolite is not a wanderer; a traveler that goes from place to place, or a seeker of political friendship. He is a human being on the path of wisdom, pursuing right judgments and relief from the tyranny of passions. The practical question is this: how can cosmopolitanism as a way of life not intervene in the individual quest for virtue and wisdom? Is the attachment among people always so conscious and necessary, and will it leave the stoic man undistracted? Thinkers such as Marcus Aurelius¹⁰ raise even greater obstacles:

“To my own free will the free will of my neighbour is just as indifferent as his poor breath and flesh. For though we are made especially for the sake of one another, still the ruling power of each of us has its own office, for otherwise my neighbour’s wickedness would be my harm, which God has not willed in order that my unhappiness may not depend on another.”¹¹

What Marcus seems to be saying here is that although *oikeiosis* means the process of appropriating other human beings, at the same time it connotes that each human being is detached one from another. In fact, the whole Stoa remains vigilant as to the influence of the other people on one’s own soul. Right reason can be blurred, passion can be created. Even worse, the company of people can make life inauthentic and deprived of any real value. As Seneca clarifies this thought in *De Vita Beata*:

“So long as we wander aimlessly, having no guide, and following only the noise and discordant cries of those who call us in different directions, life

⁹ S.V.F. II. 949.

¹⁰ The Stoic Emperor does not diverge from the orthodox stoic view. He embraces the idea of the cosmos as the universal home of all men. Cf. Marcus Aurelius. *Meditation*, 6. 44.

¹¹ Marcus Aurelius. *Meditations*, 8. 56.

will be consumed in making mistakes [...] Nothing, therefore, needs to be more emphasized than the warning that we should not, like sheep, follow the lead of the throng in front of us, traveling, thus, the way that all go and not the way that we ought to go [...] having so many to follow, we live after the rule, not of reason, but of imitation ... when the people push against each other, no one can fall down without drawing along another, and those that are in front cause destruction to those behind ...”¹²

What hopefully becomes apparent in these writings is that the noetic faults or sins that characterize the human being are not only tainted as individual disorders but also as social mishaps as they are shared by all people. Moreover, they tend to be multiplied and proliferated through the dynamics which are developed within a society. Thus the crowd can be a catalyst of negative influence for the individual who wishes to acquire wisdom and eudemonia. This creates a significant predicament in the equable coexistence of people and hence, the idea of cosmopolitanism seems to be led to a self contradiction. How can one lead a philosophical life, as the Stoics envisage it, if one is in danger of being enslaved in the opinion of the people? The answer lies in the qualitative difference, which is the difference between being in a crowd and being the crowd. In the *Fragmenta*, Clemens acknowledges the view of the Stoic Cleanthes that the crowd (πληθος) is deprived of good, fair or prudent judgment.¹³ The same qualitative difference can be defined as the one between the community as gathering of people and the community as the *civitas communis* of men and gods alike. For the Stoics, political friendship starts on a moral level.

Their sage stays attached with the community because that is what right reason holds true for his nature and also because it is a duty (*kathekon*) to help other human beings. It has rightly been observed that the duty to help is grounded on the conception of another human being as a member of the cosmopolis and it does not constitute recognition of any relevant rights.¹⁴ Therefore the initiation of this philanthropic activity lies in the individual will of the doer, and does not succumb to an external understanding of justice. Philanthropy is defined as the friendly use of people.¹⁵ This engagement of the sage into the social or public affairs unavoidably leads to the Stoa's acceptance of the political praxis, but not unconditionally.¹⁶ Retreat from politics is allowed, mainly when the stoic man cannot influence the decisions and actions taken, on a significant

¹² Seneca. *De Vita Beata*, I. 2–4.

¹³ S.V.F. I. 559.

¹⁴ Mitsis, P. 1999. “The Stoic Origin of Natural Rights.” In: *Topics in Stoic Philosophy*. Ierodiakonou (Ed.). Oxford, 153–177.

¹⁵ S.V.F. III. 292.

¹⁶ Cf. Bodson, A. 1967. *La morale sociale des derniers Stoïciens, Sénèque, Epictète et Marc Aurèle*. Bibl. de la Fac. de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Univ. de Liège, Fasc. CLXXVI. Paris: Soc. d'édition Les Belles Lettres.

moral level. That is, the stoic man will opt for retreat in the political field so as to protect his apathy and *ataraxia* in the case that public affairs have become invulnerable to his moral abilities and wisdom. Personal ethics always come higher in the axiological scale of the Stoa, the sage ought to protect himself first from vice and foolishness.

While the sage will not sacrifice his inner perfection in the noise of the crowd, he will still remain susceptible to demonstrating care in the form of friendship or philanthropy. Epictetus upholds that in the case that man does not refer to external things, and stays focused on his own proairesis, he will be capable of friendship.¹⁷ Friendship for Epictetus becomes natural when the person remains focused on the good, and when he follows his right judgments. Similarly, the ancient Stoics conclude that friendship is found only among the virtuous, those who have conquered the path of wisdom.¹⁸

Seneca, a Roman Stoic, advocates people to know their fellow human beings in an active manner, so as to become aware of their intrinsic value and dignity, based on virtue, not on external goods. Since virtue puts an end to every other axiological system, and is asserted as the only axiological constituent, it is entailed that in such friendship there can be only one precondition, virtue, in other words the essential equal relation that is imposed by virtue. Hence, the person stops seeking for richness, power or beauty in his friends as all these are nothing more than indifferent and do not comprise goods whatsoever.¹⁹ To Seneca's mind, friendship follows the norm of nature, the ecumenical law.²⁰

For Zeno the concept of cosmopolis equals with an exclusive city for the wise, while Chrysippus understands the cosmos as a polity of gods and wise men. Cicero believes that the notion of the cosmopolis specifically refers to all men living under the canons of the natural law.²¹ Cosmopolitanism, as the Stoics seem to conclude despite a number of partial differences, becomes a dynamic, not a static, procedure of co-integration to the virtuous condition, at which fear (φόβος), desire (ἐπιθυμία), delight (ἡδονή), distress (λύπη), and the individual interest cease subsisting. It is the culmination and the essential contour of friendship and philanthropy that verifies the human sense of community (*sensus communis*). The stoic views on cosmopolitanism point to the direction of a constant and systematic social reference to moral circumstance. The Stoic thinkers defend cosmopolitanism as humanitarianism, as friendship, as *oikeiosis*, as philanthropy, as inclusion. Caring for the others is caring for the cosmos, for the self as well, as the cosmos and the self are imbued by the same substance. The methodical examination of passions and moral pathology is the

¹⁷ Epictetus. *Dissertations*, II. 22.

¹⁸ S.V.F. III. 631.

¹⁹ Seneca. *Epistulae Morales*, LXVI. 24.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, III. 4.

²¹ Cf. Obbink, D. 1999. "The Stoic Sage in the Cosmic City." In: *Topics in Stoic Philosophy*. Ierodiakonou, K. (Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon, 178.

prerequisite constituents of the knowledge that is absolutely essential for a harmonious coexistence among people, for the acceptance of the other within the community, and focuses practically on the mutual care between the members of a cosmopolis.

The Stoic cosmopolitanism is not apolitical, however, it does not focus on the political. The elementary goal for a perfect society becomes individual perfection since the context of the moral duty that concludes to individualism does not contradict cosmopolitanism. On the other hand, cosmopolitanism is not a vainglorious indagation. It is a way of philosophical life to the extent that one realises that the need for right reason and virtue, in other words for a natural life, is a common feature among all human beings. To deny rationality is to deny human nature *per se*, and under that prism is to deny the connection with other human beings. The Stoics uphold that we are cosmopolites because we are rational, creatures whose ethical status is potentially the same with that of the gods. If cosmopolitanism is a challenge, then the challenge is condensed into the idea that our rational praxis, our rational ethos, our rational being coincides with that of our fellow human being in the realm of morality.

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ON THE UNRESTRAINT IN BELIEFS

ABSTRACT

This article studies the unrestraint in beliefs associated with the overemphasizing of our beliefs. The author argues that the intolerance for other points of view appears (among other factors) because of a naively-objectivist understanding of philosophy, one which is based on two assumptions: first, philosophy is considered only as a theory and not an individual practice, not an experience, and second, the truth is considered as identical to a certain ideal-objective content that can be in one's possession.

There are true ideas and proper words. If we learn these ideas, we will definitely seize the truth. The author opposes this understanding the notion of philosophy which is based on the experience of the encounter and upon reflexive comprehension of this experience. It is possible to minimize unrestraint in beliefs if we assume that all the points of view including our own are considered as belonging to the incomprehensible Absolute.

Keywords: unrestraint in beliefs; beliefs; encounter; reflection; reverence.

An encounter is an origin of the philosophizing. Philosophers talk about different things: being, reason, communication. But before he "gains his own voice," a philosopher surely encounters with the thing which makes him speak. An encounter happens before the birth of a thought. One of the purposes of philosophy is to understand the meaning of an encounter.

An encounter is an unexpected collision with the real. There are many different forms of such collisions. Plato encounters Socrates. Plotin encounters One. Descartes encounters something which later will visually incarnate into a series of his dreams. The experience of young Vladimir Soloviev, of mature Immanuel Kant (who realized that he had not yet learned how to respect a person), and many other thinkers, from ancient times to nowadays prove that their philosophies results from the experience of an encounter.

The real is always here, but we avoid an encounter with it. It is inconvenient to know the truth. However, the main reason is different: our position in

the world prevents us from seeing the essential. It is like we are living in chains which deprive us from moving freely. The encounter is a liberating and transforming touch. One gets rid of the burden of chains. He sees what really exists. The real is seen through the proper word, ordinary relationships of people, things that surround our lives. Words, relationships and things start to mean something for a man.

Encounter obliges. A philosopher has no ability to choose. Everything in his life, even the silence, is defined by encounter.

A thought which does not originate from the encounter is powerless: it cannot attract or alienate. The encounter reveals the depth of a thought which was not yet seen to a thinker. Philosophical thinking is in contact with the source of a thought. A philosopher thinks because he is absorbed by the source of thought. An encounter is an unintended collision with the source of a thought: with the real, with the consciousness, the wholeness and the unthinkable.

Beliefs are ideas and statements which have transformed into theoretical and practical maxims. These maxims guide us in different spheres of thinking or activity. Its foundation is a source of thought. Beliefs without any connection with the real are unconvincing.

The man defends ideas and follows maxims with which he is identified in varying degrees. A philosopher seeks for the encounter as the source of the thought, not as a particular idea. A philosophical concept temporarily keeps a philosopher in contact with that source. The real cannot be a part of belief, but you can meet with it. You cannot meet with beliefs. Encounter happens only now. Beliefs are previously created thoughts. Beliefs are created by a human, and reality is not created by anyone. Encounter points out things which people cannot control and depreciates old ideas. It exposes new ideas or fills old ones with fresh energy, breathing life into them.

The “unrestraint in beliefs” phenomena is based on human freedom, on the choice to walk on an easy path like many people have done. The unrestraint in beliefs is an attachment to temporal ideas and concepts. The belief that being a spendthrift is always bad, and that the easiest way is always better than other paths. This is a belief that there always exists a convenient form of reality for us; that you always can gain profit from this form, and think of profit as the only purpose. The unrestraint in beliefs is a belief that it is me who finds the way to the real, and the real will not just come to me.

The unrestraint in beliefs reveals itself in the urge to defend your beliefs always and everywhere, to talk only about them, to make “conclusions,” to estimate other people and their opinions, never taking into the account what other people think and following only your own understanding of expediency.

A human cannot change the real. We create philosophical concepts hoping they will help us not to let go of the real—but every time it slips away from us. There is no such concept which is capable of expressing the event of the encounter, and it is obvious that no concept can bring the encounter into one’s

possession. Yielding to our weakness, we choose economy, not being a spendthrift. Why should we refuse to use previous developments? Why should we seek the new encounter? But are not they just other limits of our capabilities which make us more and more secluded?

Thinkers are prisoners of their conceptions. Any philosophical concept at a particular point starts working as an error detector which explains: this must be understood in the following way, that in another way; this line of thought is right, and that line is wrong. A philosopher gains beliefs. Now he not just perceives, but he corrects what he perceives. Beliefs are an error detector. We subconsciously ignore or intentionally see as wrong everything which doesn't correspond to our beliefs. But it does not mean that a philosopher must get rid of all beliefs. Any maxims work like an error detector making limits for our perception, but it does not mean that unscrupulousness is the best solution. Yes, all maxims serve as an error detector; however, it is not always bad. The moral error detector is very necessary since it helps one to avoid many stupid things and allows one to live one's life with a clear conscience. Philosophical method as an error detector can be not only a help, but also a hindrance: it decides in advance where we should go. Philosophical beliefs should be under control. Sometimes the propriety of a decision, the effectiveness of communication and the reliability of observations depend on our ability to look beyond our conception. Philosophy is more than just beliefs (the aggregate of interconnected or independent ideas), it is also the experience of reflection, which allows oneself to gain distance from any ideas. A philosopher remembers: he has no choice. A thought must be returned to its origin. Thinking is an unending cycle of beginnings with a clean slate. Reflection distances oneself from existing ideas and notions and guides oneself to the source of thoughts: it keeps you from forgetting the fact that you owe everything you have to the encounter, not to beliefs. Philosophizing is unselfish expenditure of energy, being an excessive spendthrift without the slightest hope to reach the source of thoughts.

One of the reasons of the unrestraint in beliefs being an uncontrolled use of human concepts which are serving as an error detector is the nonreflective identification with one's own past, which was already comprehended. Depending on the degree of a person's identification with his or her beliefs, we can single out two of the most common types of the manifestation of unrestraint in beliefs. If a person is attached to some ideas only to a "skin-deep" degree, if these ideas are not carefully thought-out and are badly adopted only to please somebody, and the problems are actual and they need to be solved right now, the reasons of the unrestraint are very likely to appear. People easily attract to things which they did not properly adopt: little efforts, considerable advantage. Lack of skills in the solution of tasks is replaced by convincing demonstration. The main thing in this art is to know how to skillfully conceal ignorance (inability) and earnestly portray benevolence. Ostentation in the unrestraint in beliefs in beliefs ("zeal") is comparable to the "good intention," they are both signs of respect to a superior.

The second type of manifestation is more complicated: it is about the maximum (for a particular person) degree of identification with his or her beliefs: on the level of speaking about it and on the level of deeds. On this occasion an error detector corrects not only speech, but even thinking.

A philosopher ought to have beliefs, but he is a spender: when concepts have served their purpose (when they have helped to understand the encounter), they can be with gratitude left in past. Ostentation in the unrestraint in beliefs is mercantile. Being an unrestrained spendthrift of thought-out ideas is noble. A philosopher understands: we do not create the most important things. A philosopher's wastefulness results from his reverence before the source of thoughts. Not only ideas and notions (previous concepts) must be abandoned. One should for a time give up reflection. Important events occur without our participation. The real cannot be put under control.

The best way to control your beliefs is to leave them in reverence before the source of thoughts, to leave a desire for control.

The reverence returns the real to the philosopher, it points out important things. By unrestraint in beliefs, a person tries to escape from reality for fear of losing things which he/she gained. How nice it would be to see the world working based on easy, understandable rules. Complexity disturbs. A point of view different from your own scares you, it breaks well-working mechanism, solid link between past and future. It is better to avoid the unpremeditated. What suits us most of all: a calculation, a total inventory of intellectual property, belief in ourselves and belief that everything is expressible and countable. There is nothing in the world except for the objects. No such thing as the truly Different (non-object) exists. There is a reality, but not the real. Every type of fanaticism is rational and entirely profane. A fanatic's mind is a well-working mechanism, an error detector choosing only easy and understandable paths.

A reverence is wasteful. The economy of devotion and piety cannot exist. How can we allow ourselves to devote ourselves to the Unseen? Owing to the Unseen, we perceive ourselves and our beliefs as things which do not belong to us. The real devalues any beliefs, and our beliefs are devalued first.

Philosophical consciousness is not an error detector, it includes a reverence and the encounter. But you can meet the real only when you give up everything. When you betray yourself. The encounter itself is a reverence.

A reverence is an origin of the philosophizing.

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AESTHETICS AS METAPHYSICS AND PASSION

ABSTRACT

Philosophy is an inquiry and way of life. Is it possible to apply this formula to aesthetics? There is no doubt that aesthetics is always an investigation, a questioning. However, is it possible to speak about aesthetics as a way of life, too? To answer this question, it is necessary to understand what happens in aesthetic theory today, or rather, what is contemporary aesthetics of today.

Keywords: aesthetics; beauty; metaphysics; catharsis; passion.

*Aesthetics in its post-modernist option
is capable of appearing as “the first philosophy.”*

A. A. Gryakalov

To begin with, we will give some reasons to consider aesthetics as a philosophical discipline. The first reason is that it constructs its own hierarchy of questions-antinomies. For example: Is the world as a whole beautiful or is it ugly? Are there a lot of beautiful people all over the world or a few of them? Is it only possible to be born beautiful, or is there a way to become beautiful? (Beauty does not need definitions in aesthetics, first, being a category, and second, being an easily understood concept even at the intuitive level). It is possible to answer all these questions-antinomies positively and negatively, and both opposite answers will appear argumentative and thus correct.

The second reason to consider aesthetics to be a philosophical discipline is that it investigates human nature. Since the Heideggerian “ontological and anthropological turn,” aesthetics does not put beauty and art in the center of its inquiry, but rather the person and its being, analogous to a work of art. Studying human nature, philosophy feels in itself the strong aesthetic component, growing on its way to the contemporary reality. “Person exists poetically”—this formula is developed into the prolific range of aesthetic characteristics of hu-

man nature. For instance, rhyme and rhythms create the illusion of repeating sounds in the poem, but actually repetition does not occur: a new sense is always there. In human life, a person always goes through repetitions and returns which are very important and even dear to her, but she can never actually return even if she wants to.

Besides, the human being always “stands vertically”: his feet are on the ground but his arms and eyes stretch to heaven. This disposition places the man beyond the wild world of animals. Ancient Greeks, for instance, consciously cultivated the ability to stand upright and never bend down. Thus they distinguished themselves from barbarians. Curious as it is, printed text of a poem is also “standing vertically”: the first letter of every line is written under the first letter of previous. The poem, as well as the person, has its own “spine.” Leonid M. Batkin, in his research of West Europeans’ type formation, points at one more similar feature between a person and a poem. In his book analyzing poetry of Josif Brodsky, Batkin argues that the sense of the poem is manifested in the last line. The same way, meaning of human life comes to light in its end, and, probably, after a person’s death.

Besides, the person is capable of creating according to laws of beauty, and the basis of human activity is the ability of imitation. Human being imitates everything and overturns simultaneously: weaves, but not like a spider, floats, but not like a fish, flies, but not like a bird. The person acts by the principle of “the-contrary;” the work of art is arranged similarly (“if you want to paint light, paint darkness;” if you want to show an angry person, show his kindness).

The philosophical and at the same time metaphysical character of aesthetics is clearly seen through its research of the aesthetic nature of Being (or *Sein*¹—the most widely used category of philosophy after the said ontological turn²). It is clearly seen already from the fact that its investigation is absolutely disinterested in character. Besides, ancient Greeks defined being also as *aletheia*. *Aletheia* is the mystery which is always ready to reveal itself to a human being, wishing to disclose one to himself. It means supposedly, that being cannot be an ugly mystery; it is a beautiful one.

Of course, as it is well known, *Sein* is more basic than the opposition of ugly and beautiful. It is on the other side of their contrast. But, nevertheless, there is a primacy of the positive. So, there is an absolute beauty, but there is not absolute disgrace.

¹ The philosophical category of *Sein* (being, existence) designates the world of human absolutes that give the person a chance to become the human being. So: absolute contains truth, good, beauty, love, conscience, memory etc. There is a special philosophical category for designation of being in German (*Sein*), and it became symbolic since Martin Heidegger; therefore the German version is kept in the text of the article.

² By the term “ontological turn” I mean one of the main trends of the 20th-century philosophy: a turn to life research in comparison with the German classics whose mainstream had always been the study of knowledge.

Apart from the traditional analysis of art and beauty, modern aesthetics studies one more philosophical problem, i.e. of human essence. So it fulfils not its “own” aesthetical task but an anthropological task. First of all, an aesthetical component is born each time anew in the elementary act of any human activity. To achieve the aim, the person first shifts attention from the aim to means (instruments) and ways of achievement of the result. In such a way the human being gains the ability to look disinterestedly (selfless) at the purpose at least for a while. Then two major abilities of the person in parallel appear: to think abstractly and to look disinterestedly, aesthetically.

The aesthetic component of human nature was recognized many times. In the 20th century the man regained the right to look at the world unselfishly-aesthetically; and a very high price was paid for that. The cataclysms of the 20th century taught us to live in a situation of loneliness, since society leaves us to the mercy of fate. Then an aesthetically-unselfish view of the world “over,” or above any social, appears. Aesthesis is born anew in modern culture as a “super-social” phenomenon. (Super-social in this context means that it is possible to think and look as if any social distinctions do not exist; as if it is possible to be a representative of all mankind. It is an illusion, of course, but it helps us to survive). People waiting for nothing from the part of the society look this way. It is the view and metaphysical feeling of tragic optimism. The heroes of Ernest Hemingway, the representatives of the lost generation saw the world this way. The person who has finished the school of tragic optimism is capable to feel like “living life,” to gain pleasure and delight in life, to be happy simply because of being alive. It is a catharsis of life, experience of its too-muchness (Jacques Derrida). It is a catharsis from life that turns aesthetics into a way of life and passion.

Catharsis is a most demonstrative manifestation of the metaphysical nature of the aesthetic and is the highest type of aesthetic emotion. In Martin Heidegger’s *The Origin of the Work of Art* two characteristics of catharsis are clearly seen. First, it is a question of escape from daily routine: “Standing near Van Gogh’s picture, we appear in another place;” we feel a dumb call of the earth and learn the world of a peasant.

The philosophical status of aesthetics is caused by the metaphysical nature of its categories. Beauty is the most unique metaphysical category first of all because it is physical at the same time. We often speak about corporal, sensual beauty. Beauty can be visible and heard, smelled and perceived. Sometimes it is so “bodily” that we forget about its metaphysical nature. However this metaphysics of beauty (and of aesthetics in general) does exist.

The metaphysical component of aesthetics is necessary for a human as a social being most of all. Practically, every social phenomenon provokes the raising of a metaphysical component. Metaphysics is present in social institutional functioning: i.e., each state has its symbols, hymn, and attributes. The ideal of social development always comprises an aesthetic component.

Secondly, according to Heidegger, the major effect of the work of art is the birth of aspiration for “set out, take off.” There is the exit beyond our own limits, an eternal transgression, a rush and pathos. However, exit into the gleam of *Sein* is not the single metaphysical possibility of aesthetic. The dual—both physical and metaphysical—nature of beauty allows it to carry out an important cultural task: to introduce the absolutes of Being into everyday life. It is possible only when the absolutes accept aesthetic form. For example, kindness should be art, otherwise it will not reach the addressee, and good intentions will pave the road to hell.

It is interesting that social being today is not a purely social phenomenon. Many processes in its system have the mixed, social-aesthetic character. The type of power relations in modern society may be called “temptation power” (Jean Baudrillard). Diffused forms of power are out of personal control; a person practically is not supervising them. People are free to think what they want, and they have a deposit of this freedom which is provided by society. However, total spread of the commodity-money relations involves a person in the consumption of a large quantity of goods, capable of satisfying every exquisite, unique desire. As a rule, the goods have the character of “a symbolical aesthetic surplus value of a sign” (Baudrillard). It means that we pay “for aesthetics” more than for the consumer cost of the goods.

So, we are “bought” and tempted by aesthetics. We get power from the aestheticized forms of temptation. Michel Foucault wrote, however, that we should love (this) power because it makes investments into the development of personality. In this case the aestheticized power of temptation grasps our inner world. But we can take it back. It is possible thanks to aesthetic taste, talent and creativity. Aesthetics appears an ambivalent social force of postmodern society. It is a *pharmakon* (Derrida): poison and medicine at the same time. On the one hand, in contemporary world, aesthetics plays the role of a conductor of the temptation power. On the other hand, it is a force by means of which a person escapes from the power of temptation. Thus aesthetics acts as a great metaphysical force.

Aesthetics’ metaphysical power shows itself in the situation of change in modern West European *ethos* (Benno Hübner). For a very long time it was an ethos of duty. Probably it was the heritage of Kant’s tradition. But the European became tired of the call of duty, and it was replaced by ethos of pleasure. It does not mean that people lost moral reference points; they just have chosen a reframing which made life easier. How does the new ethos work? E.g., I have no duty to study or work, I do it simply because it is interesting for me. It gives pleasure.

An ordinary matter: the quantity of the reading public has decreased, a reading culture is being replaced by a visual culture. The majority of the population in civilized countries turned into film- and TV-viewers. But any media image is the aestheticized one. The look through a lens gives integrity and creates artistic

effect, turning the sight into a vision. Images are imposed on each other (Gianni Vattimo), creating a multisemantic image of the world. It is the image but not the theory. And we watch the world as cinema-goers, i.e. aesthetically.

All the aforesaid allows us to come to the following conclusion: contemporary society does not live under “purely social” laws. It is a social-aesthetic phenomenon in which social and art laws are fancifully connected. It is impossible to investigate such phenomenon by means of social theory only, as well as by means of pure aesthetics. Probably we have to use the special discourse—social ontology of the aesthetic, reproducing its metaphysical opportunities—to study this social-aesthetic phenomenon.

It is well known that many non-classical philosophers fought passionately against metaphysics. In the beginning it was the fight against metaphysics of the subject, when the person placed itself outside the world and at the top of a huge stairway, at the bottom of which the world lay. It was, then, the fight against metaphysics of the stiffened absolutes, understood as anti-dialectics. “Physics, beware metaphysics”—these words are attributed to Newton. If there be any theoretical force to estimate and save beauty (physical, corporal, visible beauty of the world and of the human being) from the imperious relations of temptation, from falling into a metaphysical vacuum, it will be the power of aesthetic thought acting as passionate metaphysics to beauty rescue. And if this task is steadily and passionately carried out by the aesthetic theory, then beauty will not lose the ability to save the world.

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Igor Gasparov

SPIRITUAL EXERCISES AS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF PHILOSOPHICAL LIFE

ABSTRACT

In my paper I will argue for the thesis that spiritual exercises are an essential part of every philosophical life. My arguments are partly historical, partly conceptual in their nature. First, I show that philosophy at each stage of its history was accompanied by spiritual exercises. Next, I provide a definition of spiritual exercises as genuinely philosophical activity. Then I show that the philosophical life cannot be complete if it does not include spiritual exercises.

Keywords: spiritual exercises; philosophy; philosophical way of life; good life.

In Western culture philosophy is a well-established academic institution. Philosophy exists in the form of faculties, chairs, talks, books and papers. Philosophers mostly are either members of university faculties belonging to academic staff or they are public intellectuals whose opinion is demanded by the society. Today to be a philosopher means writing papers, books, holding talks at conferences. Sometimes philosophers also offer opinions in public affairs. Sometimes they are heard, many times they remain ignored. To my mind, nothing is wrong with all this. But what is often missed in the contemporary philosophical scene is the original drive to transform the mind and the life of its adherents which was present in philosophy since its beginnings.

THE VERY CORE OF PHILOSOPHY

The term “spiritual exercises” raises for most readers religious associations. One may be reminded of the famous book by Ignatius de Loyola, a founder of the Jesuit order that bears the same title. The work of Pierre Hadot shows that the roots of the so called Christian spiritual exercises lay in ancient Greek and

Roman philosophy.¹ And they seem to be not an *ad libitum* supplement of its philosophical practice, but, on the contrary, its very core. Socrates, a symbolic figure of ancient Greek philosophy, may count as a person living philosophical life. In contrast to medieval or modern philosophers he is definitely a non-writer. His way of doing philosophy consists rather in seeking wisdom and trying to answer the question “Which human life is a good one?”² He needed the answer in order to live it. His dialogues were spiritual exercises he practiced to transform his life and the lives of his interlocutors.

In the antiquity Socrates was not a unique person whose philosophy was closely intertwined with spiritual exercises. We could take nearly every great figure among the pre-Socratics, such as Pythagoras, Parmenides or Empedocles, and see that their philosophies were a fruition of spiritual experience. For example, Parmenides’ famous poem is nothing other than a description of his mystical journey.³ Due to the works of Hadot and Michel Foucault we know today that ancient philosophy, first of all, did understand itself as a method of self-perfection. Even ancient physics was not so much a detached, “objective,” third person perspective observation of bodily movements in space, but rather an attempt to discover the human *télos* among *téloi* of multiple other beings in the universe. In other words, ancient physics was also a spiritual exercise aimed at turning the surrounding space into a dwelling home for human beings.⁴ After Descartes declared that the human mind is not able to understand the aims which God set upon the things in the universe including ourselves,⁵ physics, like science in general, was doomed to be an inquiry of the bodies in motion. There are no doubts that physics after Descartes provided over time many advantages for our lives, but until now it remains unable to make a sense of our lives. Today all physics and biology are silent about why all is the way as it is and for what can it be good.⁶ Nevertheless the refusal to ascribe aims to things could also be thought as a kind of spiritual exercise according to which the goal is to eliminate from the mind all its “devout” phantasies in order to see things as they are. I think it is not absolutely mistaken to see Hume's skepticism in this light. But be it as it may, it seems to me that contemporary naturalism that in its origins goes back to Hume also becomes slowly aware of the deficit of meaning in the modern scientific worldview.⁷ Thus I come to my first preliminary conclusion

¹ Hadot, P. 2002. *Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique*. Paris: Editions Albin Michel.

² Benson, H. H. 2005. “Socrates and the Beginnings of Moral Philosophy.” In: *Routledge History of Philosophy. From the Beginning to Plato*. Taylor, C. C. W. (Ed.). London–New York: Taylor & Francis Group e-Library, 298–329.

³ Palmer, J. 2012. “Parmenides.” In: *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Zalta E. N. (Ed.). URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/parmenides/>.

⁴ Hadot, P. 2002, op. cit., 54–55.

⁵ Bennett, J. 2001. *Learning from Six Philosophers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 17–18.

⁶ Nagel, T. 2012. *Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁷ Flanagan, O. 2011. *The Bodhisattva's Brain: Buddhism Naturalized*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

that at each stage of its history philosophy was accompanied by spiritual exercises, be it in the direct form as was the case in Greek and Roman antiquity or be it in the form of the feeling of the deficit of sense as it is rather the case today.⁸

HOW “SPIRITUAL EXERCISES” MAY BE DEFINED

But what the spiritual exercise is it is not easy to define. There is a classic definition provided by Ignatius de Loyola in the first Annotation to his *Exercitia Spiritualia* (1548):

“... by this name of Spiritual Exercises is meant every way of examining one's conscience, of meditating, of contemplating, of praying vocally and mentally, and of performing other spiritual actions, as will be said later. For as strolling, walking and running are bodily exercises, so every way of preparing and disposing the soul to rid itself of all the disordered tendencies, and, after it is rid, to seek and find the Divine Will as to the management of one's life for the salvation of the soul, is called a Spiritual Exercise.”⁹

At first glance, this definition appears unsatisfactory because it contains expressions like “praying,” “find the Divine Will,” “the salvation of the soul.” People who are not Christians, or not religious at all, may be disappointed about them, because they would be not able to consider them as true, neither even as meaningful. Since I claim that spiritual exercises are an essential part of each philosophical life, not only of those which are especially Christian or religious, I must concede that the definition is not acceptable for my purpose. Nevertheless I take it as my starting point and try to extract from it as much content as possible.

First, it may be useful to look at the analogy between bodily and spiritual exercises to which Ignatius pointed in his definition. I think that the most important in it is the sameness of function. Like physical exercises permit us to keep our body fit, spiritual exercises fulfil the same function in respect to our mind. It must be clear that the analogy as such does not presuppose any commitment to mind-body dualism. Its only purpose, in my view, is to illustrate the point that our minds—be they physical or not—like our bodies need to be carried in some way or other, and the spiritual exercises are such ways to care of them.

⁸ Because of the waste scope of the topic I restrict myself to the Western philosophical tradition and leave outside the Eastern ways of doing philosophy where we can found much more examples that show how philosophy and spiritual exercises merge into a unity.

⁹ The Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius de Loyola at sacred texts.com. Accessed August 27, 2013. <http://sacred-texts.com/chr/seil/seil05.htm>.

Second, the word “spiritual” may also irritate us because it makes us easily think of “ghosts” or “spooks.” But it does not mean anything like this is here. What the word here means is rather the mind in its entirety. Once Hadot considered the question if it would be better to substitute “spiritual” for “mental,” “intellectual,” “moral.” His conclusion was that any such substitution would be unsatisfactory since it would reflect only a particular aspect of the mind whereas the term “spiritual” refers to whole of the mind with all its abilities: thinking, feeling, imagination etc. (Hadot, 2002, 20–21)¹⁰ Sure, there is a further connotation of the word “spiritual” which may be misleading, because many people hold that “spiritual” is interchangeable with “religious.” The problem with this is that some past, and very many contemporary philosophers are non-religious. If spiritual exercises are an essential part of every philosophical life, as I would claim, and “spiritual” means “religious,” how then can they be philosophers without being religious? My answer is that religion and philosophy are two different forms of spirituality. Sometimes they come very close to each other, sometimes they stay wide apart, and sometimes they are in a direct fight. But every time they both are spiritual. Robert Solomon’s book *Spirituality for the Skeptic*¹¹ could serve as a good evidence for the existence of non-religious spirituality.

MORE QUESTIONS

Now I still have to answer two questions more in order to bring my argumentation to the end. I claim that spiritual exercises are an essential part of every philosophical life. Under “a spiritual exercise” can be understood a praxis which is performed by the mind and aimed to transform its bearer's life into a life which she holds to be a good one. “A good life” here may refer to a life that is either valuable or sense making for one who lives it. Now what is a philosophical life? What is it that turns an “ordinary” life into a philosophical one? I believe that, on the one side, there is no sharp boundary between the so called “ordinary people” and “philosophers,” because each person has a striving towards a sensible life whatever faint it may seem. On the other side, there is kind of a turning point that distinguishes the philosopher from the ordinary man. This turning point lies in the conscious decision to use consequently one’s own reason in order to understand what a good life is. Nevertheless the end of this change in life is not only an understanding but also an accomplishment of a life that one claims to be good. In other words, a good life should also be lived, not only thought. But on the route towards a good life, the very thinking of it as a performance of the mind, often enhanced by its other powers like imagination

¹⁰ Hadot, P. 2002, op. cit., 20–21.

¹¹ Solomon, R. C. 2002. *Spirituality for the Skeptic. The Thoughtful Love of Life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

etc., is necessary for the implementation of such a life. Therefore, if philosophy does not include spiritual exercises it could not be considered as complete and satisfying its own requirements. Someone may object that contemporary analytical philosophy is an example of genuine philosophy without any traces of spiritual exercises. I would answer to this that spiritual exercises are often used by analytical philosophers without naming them so. The most evident examples are famous thought experiments that abound there. Thus, I conclude, a philosophical life as far as it is a conscious mind activity producing a meaningful good existence cannot be conceivable without spiritual exercises as its essential part.

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PHILOSOPHY AS SELF-CARE

ABSTRACT

This article states that the search for the meaning of life is possible only through an address to non-existence, and it is a sign of genuine human self-care. Religion and philosophy are considered as incarnation of the space of care. Philosophy here is understood in a broad sense, not as a rigorous science, but as search for wisdom. Based on the structure of self-care, given in Michel Foucault's works, here are revealed peculiarities of the search for the meaning of life in respective fields. This also implies different lifestyles. The author believes that genuine self-care is available to everyone, in spite of the nature of modern mass culture.

Keywords: the meaning of life; discursive/non-discursive mode of knowledge; self-care; telos; ascetic practices; ethical substance; mode of subjection.

GAP AND FINDING ONESELF

The existence of man is a problematic node of philosophy, especially in modern philosophy. Roughly, since Descartes the question on "I" and the related pronouns "self" cease to be the background overcoming the barrier of religious dogmas. The progress of the Enlightenment in conjunction with technological progress leads to the fact that more and more people not only care about their being, but also on the essence, the meaning of their own existence. Search for the meaning of being clearly reveals the ability to transcendence, detected by Kant, and linked to problems of non-existence (Hegel, Heidegger and Sartre). The focus on the topos of meaning, on a method of understanding existence highlights the issue of the birth of sense as a moment at which the man begins to find himself.

This situation is described by Jean-Paul Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* (Sartre, 1993, 41) and can be called "the case with Pierre." According to this story, man's existence is organized around the presence, the presence of some-

thing. An individual considers one's existence as a set of resources which if particularly organized give an opportunity to derive practical benefit, for example to take a position, to increase capital, to intensify emotions and pleasure. This peculiar economic approach to life is not related to objective reality, as it means only repetition, identity, staying in analogy with others. Only the meaningful, rather than mechanically repeated existence of an individual makes his being unique, free and unrepeatable. The recognition of the lack of meaning in habitual economically reasonable existence can serve as the starting point of understanding, the point of a fundamentally new organization of existentially meaningful being. "Being of meaning requires the preservation of non-being," as Vladimir A. Konev¹ rightly points out. (Konev, 2003, 12)

The nothingness of Pierre changes the objective reality of the individual, directing him to an insistent need to fill in the emptiness opened. Thus a clear conscious desire is born, to find something beyond the everyday worries and practical benefits, an attempt to traverse oneself beyond the limits of the dates mentioned on the monuments and pages of encyclopedias. Detection of the emptiness in place of meaning of life fills in everything, the mist of senselessness envelops all everyday issues showing objective reality as mere existence, and thus the person is forced inevitably and irrevocably to enter into the space of genuine self-care. Authenticity is taken here in the sense of Søren Kierkegaard and Martin Heidegger, the latter is known for including self-care into the sphere of existentials, along with fear, anxiety and terror. Thoroughly exploring Heidegger's creative work, Russian researchers, among others Piama P. Gaidenko², mention that care acts as a continuous anxiety taking the form of aspiration for the future, on the one hand, and turning to intraworld being, on the other. (Gaidenko, 1997, 411)

THE HISTORY AND CONTENT OF SELF-CARE

The fundamental importance of self-care for the human being could be seen on the pediment of the Temple of Apollo in Delphi. And, despite the fact, that it said, "Know thyself", the underlying meaning of this statement is precisely self-care as critics say. (Foucault, 1998, 22) Later, the value of self-care and its content was one of the prevailing themes in the speeches of Socrates, represented in Plato's dialogues, and nowadays we are obliged to Pierre Hadot and his lectures *What Is Ancient Philosophy* (Hadot, 2004, 36–39) for the revival of this issue. The structural analysis of self-care belongs doubtlessly to Michel Foucault,

¹ Konev, Vladimir A. — a professor at Samara State University (Russia), the head of the Theoretical Workshop on Ontology of Social Importance of Being, the author of over 30 books on philosophy, aesthetics, anthropology.

² Gaidenko, Piama P. — a professor at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, a specialist in the history of philosophy, epistemology, ontology.

whose efforts helped us to realize self-care not as selfishness or as a relic of ancient philosophical constructions, but as a prevailing system of moving constitutive signifiers. According to him self-care in every era and culture consists of ascetic practices, telos, the mode of submission and ethical substance. (Foucault, 1997, 263–265) It is something that serves as a telos; or, how revelations of ascetic practices vary from epoch to epoch. Also it is something that takes the place of the ethical substance, and the way the fixed mode of submission is transformed with time and circumstances. But these substantial things get, in fact, the same shapes whatever culture and time period of human history is in question, as self-care acts as fundamental originally human thing.

The way this mechanism works was successfully demonstrated by Michel Foucault, the ethics of the first centuries of our era may be provided as an example. After analyzing a considerable body of texts, he came to the conclusion that instead of telos of self-care there can be either purity, or immortality, or freedom, or self-discipline. (Foucault, 1997, 265) Desires, feelings or intentions can be recognized as ethical substance that is subject to change, improvement, turning into a kind of aesthetic work. (Foucault, 1997, 264) A modus of submission of varying degrees of rigor emerges as the way in which people can be encouraged to recognize certain moral obligations as their own. This may be a universal principle of rationality, or divine law or cosmological order, important to be followed since one is a human being. Finally, ascetic practices in the wide sense act as the content of an individual's activity localized in intellectual and perceptual spheres.

Embarked on the path of his own search for the meaning of life, the person feels like playing the part of the personage from a Russian fairy tale, which was ordered “to go there, I do not know where, and find something I do not know what”. Culture offers two clues to help him—one represents a religious choice, the other—a way of philosophical research. Both, eventually, it forms a certain lifestyle.

RELIGION AS SELF-CARE

Religion gives hope that, as we remember according to Friedrich Nietzsche, happens to be “the last drop out of the barrel of misfortunes that pours out on the person.” Religion focuses on eternal life or eternal return, and thus rescues the person from the rigid vice of material, final, temporary, mortal existence. Offering prayers to God, the believer in fact aspires to the possibility of a personal relationship with God, with the hope to be heard personally. Being heard by God finds connection with the transcendental, with the eternal, with the absolute and therefore becomes involved in the timeless. And in this regard for whoever the believer prayed, he prays for himself and for the possibility of his own immortality. Praying for the world, the person actually cares about himself, about his own immortality. This is the telos of religious choice. Opening the

texts of the Church authorities, deeply religious, such as Richard of St. Victor (Richard of St. Victor, 2011, 283–286) and St. Augustine, we read that the person is insignificant, he is a grain of sand, dust from the feet of God, but the words convey obviously the opposite effect: even a grain of sand in the light of the Divine acquires meaning and significance. Discovering the meaning of life in religious systems requires certain ascetic practices, entrenched in all church institutions. In most cases, they are aimed primarily at the body, the suppression of which should consistently lead the person on the path of spiritual truth. As ethical substance, when treated and improved, serves the human spirit, the soul, and the mode of submission which are built in the local perspective of a particular church, usually in a fairly strict mode.

We do not consider religious choice in search for the meaning of life as an archaic heritage of past centuries. The current political and economic situation shows that a huge number of people choose religious principles to understand themselves and design their relations with the world, and make religion a foundation for their socially active position. Thus, it is premature to “discount” religious choice as one of the possible directions of self-care.

PHILOSOPHY AS SELF-CARE

In turn, philosophy tries to get by without turning the man to the transcendental in its religious version. In this context, we understand philosophy not as a strict science in which research is conducted using concepts and terms, where theories and research programs are created, and deduced arguments are put forward. It is about philosophy that is close to Friedrich Nietzsche’s words, “the merry science.” Philosophy here is taken as a desire to find answers to essential questions characteristic of all people, regardless to their status or cultural differences. According to Merab K. Mamardashvili³, this register of existence of philosophy is called “real philosophy” which differs from the “philosophy of doctrines and systems”. (Mamardashvili, 2000, 34) The real philosophy is a unique combination of words and practices, thought and action, serving the questioning of human existence and further opportunity to find oneself among self-evident facts. The real philosophy differs from academic philosophy. It is some deep internal knowledge, the ability to create oneself rather than concern for practical benefit or the achievement of an intended result.

In our opinion, such a philosophical concept of study of oneself, one’s place in the world and the world itself presupposes a discursive mode of existence of the individual. Like Hadot in relation to study, we understand discursive

³ Mamardashvili, M. K. (1930–1990) — one of the most influential philosophers in Russia, a professor at Moscow State University. He examined the problem of mind, philosophy of language and thought. Together with Alexander M. Pyatigorskii (1929–2009) he published the paper *Symbol and Consciousness*.

thought as “expressed through oral or written communication.” (Hadot, 2004, 4–5)

According to Michel Foucault, any knowledge, including knowledge of the individual and of its being, is connected with two modes: the discursive and the non-discursive. (Foucault, 2012, 64–71) In the first mode something is realized, sounded, pronounced as a problem that needs to be solved, determined and named. In the second mode there functions something that is not a problem, a question, a reason for a discussion for an individual. The question of the meaning of one’s own existence puts all of human existence into question, transforms the very fabric of one’s being, and does not leave even the quietest nook of life in shadow. Only philosophy, not in its strict, but expanded meaning, can talk so totally and globally of human life.

SELF-CARE AS RESPONSIBILITY

Having chosen the path of philosophical inquiry, in care of himself the individual fills its structural elements with content different from that in religion. Ascetic practices relate primarily to the intellectual sphere of life, which then sequentially converts the corporeal sphere as well. Not immortality or purity but freedom or self-improvement acts as the telos of self-care. Ethical substance to be converted is not man’s inner world, but its external manifestation, in particular, the embodiment of the sphere of senses. The perceptual sphere acts as what is subject to transformation, expansion, aestheticizing, maximizing and turning into a work of art. The modus of submission is localized in the political sphere, in the space of the public, not the private, and this is the reason, as it is possible to assume, why the decline of a public person, registered by Richard Sennett, takes place. Characterizing modern life, he writes:

“Uniqueness of man has become a major burden of everyone, self-actualization, instead of being a means of understanding the world, has become the aim. Only because we are too self-absorbed it is very difficult for us to understand the principle of private, clearly explain to ourselves and others what our personality is. The reason is that the deeper the soul is immersed in the private area, the less it develops, and the more difficult it is for a person to express his feelings.” (Sennett, 2003, 4)

Philosophical study of the meaning of life states that the human being is the only thing in the world aware of its existence and therefore bearing responsibility. Responsibility is an answer, and the answer requires the presence of a questioner. The questioner in this perspective is the one who answers. The circle is closed. The question of the meaning of life unites all people. It seems that by his writing about the “silence of the Bavarian peasant,” Heidegger means that very kind of philosophizing: the search for the meaning of human existence. The question of sense refers to the ontological features of human world.

Professional philosophy, or the philosophy of doctrines and systems responsibly and consistently, logically and practically provable, asks questions and answers them. Sometimes in history, in order the answer was given and heard among the chatter of everyday life, philosophers such as Socrates, Boethius, Abelard, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche had to pay an incredibly high price. In the works and the lives of these great existential thinkers, essential and scientific explications of philosophy are closed up. Not religious hope, but perhaps truly philosophical solace comes to those who are able to inspire others to their own search, irreversibly changing themselves irreversibly changing the world around and its future.

The philosophical quest, however, as well as religious choice, has never been a simple and easy thing to do; Socrates emphasized this already in his speech to the court, taking as his personal business, personal mission—to stick, like a gadfly, to the Athenians with unpleasant questions and answers. (Plato, 2004, 67–68) In the history of culture understanding, comprehension, the hermeneutics of the existential stood out as the pilgrims' and strangers' destiny—that of the people dismissed from the bustle of everyday life at least for a while.

The present level of development of science and technology, the level of comfort of life, its quality can help to ensure people to take the time and opportunity to really take care of themselves. But these same innovations carry with them a total power of popular culture, promote the substitution of deep and sincere relations between people with superficial “likes” on the net, create such a flow of information, which even professionals sometimes find difficult to handle. The theorists of mass culture, among others Jean Baudrillard note that “The masses are presented with the meaning, and they crave for spectacle.” (Baudrillard, 2007, 10)

Something appears to exist if and only if it is expressed, showed, demonstrated in any way, and transferred into the discursive mode. Technical progress gives us all the possible conditions for infinite speaking—for showing. That is why Baudrillard rightly describes his contemporaries as the “silent majority” (Baudrillard, 2007, 21) in the shadow of which, through the hum of everyday subjects, through endless pictures in Instagram and topics in Youtube, it is even more difficult for the individual to stop and discover the “absence of Pierre” and begin our own search for the one the real concern is about.

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REALISTIC STRATEGY IN COMPREHENDING BEING

ABSTRACT

The article deals with the category of sense. It examines the meaningfulness of the absurd and takes realism to be a basic strategy in comprehending being. This strategy is compared with constructivism and reflection, or correspondence (copy) theory.

Keywords: being; understanding; conceptualization; sense; thinking; meaning; absurdness; realism; constructivism; correspondence theory.

The realistic strategy plays a special role in artful, scientific, and philosophical experience tending to comprehend being.

According to Alain Robbe-Grillet, a French writer and the creator of a “new novel” theory, all authors believe to be themselves realists; none of them would never agree to being regarded as a producer of abstractions, illusions, chimeras, falsifications—“and all of them, surely, should be trusted in it” (Robbe-Grillet, 1989, 157). The same is true about scholars and philosophers. Each of them speaks about the real world, but every time in a definite aspect of realistic recursion. The world is a unity in different forms. Numerous versions of realism unite themselves in asserting the existence of being not reducible to human consciousness. Neighboring strategies of comprehending being are doubtlessly ontologically weaker than the realistic one, although they might seem more seductive in some ways. Together with the dominant one, they begin and end their way, leaning for support on specific conceptual resources, and upon typically characteristic treatments of sense: abiding and coming into being, occurred and occurring, expected and being created. The established formula, pretending to be philosophically exact, is supposed to solve the sense of the “sense” problem. But it would be naïve to expect a universally settling answer, a complete overcoming of the old opposition of substantialism and functionalism.

“Supporters of the first [trend] presume that sense (of the word, action, or reality) is what can be localized, found, analyzed and understood to a certain degree of success. Supporters of the second one perceive no such thing as sense, either in language or the brain, nor in society or nature, if it is not brought in by a man.” (Kassavin, 2009, 93)

To begin with, let us call “sense” something most close to thought (in Russian lexica their kinship is observed as well as the closeness of sense and sensation in English). Though, we may presume, it is more correct to treat thought as the first approximate of sense. In any variation, the thought presupposes the thinker, the mind—the one pondering. People are firm in their belief to be the ones, or at least part of our kind; sometimes and to a certain extent—also some animals; in rare cases—by absolutist treating—God first and foremost. But about animals’ psyche and about God’s mind we know not in the least more than about our own consciousness. So let us take a review of it, i.e. its cultural derivatives and natural supports.

Consciousness is a subject of righteous human pride. Differing from its formalized facets (intellect and reasoning), interlacing with sensation and volition, not a stranger to inspiration and dialectical broderie, it forms a dominant aspect of our psyche, though never totally covering it. To deny its ontological partiality means to slide down to a rational prejudice. We do not do that. If our reasoning is narrower, and more modest than the life of our soul, it is drawn into the latter and, further on, into our psycho-somatic unity, then, consequently, sense dwells not only near the thought (and/or exactly inside it, as its specially “pure” hypostasis), but also not too far from the body and the psycho-somatic nature altogether, its products and functions. It is present in things produced and being produced by man, in bodies he touches or observes, in occurrences happening to people, in events lived and endured—in all socio-cultural reality and, probably, in reality pre-cultural, pre-human, purely natural, be it treated, in hylozoic fret, primordially animated, psycho-physical. This position, being drawn in concord with the spirit and letter of immanentism, is opposed quite consciously and responsibly to multishaped versions of transcendentalism. Among them are Edmund Husserl’s and Theodor Adorno’s conceptions. We read first: “A veritable abyss¹ yawns between consciousness and reality.” (Husserl, 1983, 111) We meet something similar from the second author: “The ideas live in cavities²—between what things claim to be and what they are.” (Adorno, 1973, 150) No; senses and ideas dwell in being themselves, and not in lacunas, which simply do not exist and thus are absent. In the Pyatigorsk canyon there are no less, no more conceptual clots than at the bottom or at the top of Beshtau mountain. We should not mix up cavities with deserts or desolate lands. Let us, for the case,

¹ Emphasized by the author—A. F.

² Ibid.

remember the senses of a monk's solitude or those heroic deeds in a glam Terrence Malik's film *Badlands*. Seeking for sense is not an overseas, nor a transcendental journey. A long-way tour is just an episode in conceptualizing being. The rout of the process lies in the local neighborhood. It does not swing away from homage as something contra-indicated. True, it is more difficult to perceive an opaque (though) fleshy fruit under your feet than a shining dummy, a sparkle, mirage at the inviting horizon.

Sense gives us an opportunity to disclose, evaluate and understand: ourselves—like ourselves, and everything else—like something other. Understanding, sense operating is not a totally logical, intellectual act. One can disclose oneself and other things through sensations (say, of pleasure or pain). One can evaluate something other than himself through instincts, animal-like. Even understanding can be based not upon like-mindedness, but on feeling, on unanimous volition, on some other non-reflecting kinship of souls.

The world had been full of sense even before the human being arose. Mad. Spontaneous. But harmonious. Resilient plastics of wild snow leopard, altogether self-confident and at the same time alert—it is an impressive illustration of natural harmony. Together with the human being and his meaningful senses the absurd enters this world. It appears to be not a conceptual vacuum, nor the absence of meanings, but their fragments, mixture and centaurs-like aggregation. This is true in any case, even in sight of emptiness “for the only way one can speak of nothing is to speak of it as though it were something because the only way to speak of nothing—is to speak about it as if it had been something.” (Beckett, 1998, 47)

It may well happen that in the absurd there is evidence of the notorious misplacement of any human thought and action. This is a wholly distressing situation that people are needless in a Universe, but we cannot count it out either. And it should be contemplated over. To the final stage. The absurd, by far, is a testament to human beings keeping aloof from the world. The maybe true, maybe imaginary. Sometimes pernicious, sometimes rescuing. But even keeping away from aloofness, one cannot always push aside nonsense. In the absurd, as nowhere else, the liveliness of human reason is seen as is the vanity of sophistry. Abstracted expansion of rationality makes a human race some fabricated aporia. Thought deeply rooted in life unmasks them. See the squad of Versailles, raising guns, aiming at unarmed communards—and there floats up in your memory the refined maxim of Königsberg's transcendentalist: “A man to man is a goal, and ought to be nothing but goal.” (see Krzizhanovsky, 1991, 605) The absurd exposures us to nihilistic itching, the pathology of analytical sectioning of being. The amputation of present meanings, abstraction, contextually allowed, when pretending to be universal, transform conceptual ugliness into the normative. If we take the subject anesthetically and impartially, it will surely present us only one of its sides: “which displays itself when, eagerly wishing to comprehend a beautiful person, you arm yourself with an anatomic

knife, vivisect him and see the disgusting man ...” (Gogol, 1984, 436–437) The positivists likes to remind “that the fragrance of amber is in reality no more than a cachalot’s fecal, and the bouquet of flowers in which the pretty girl hides her face is in reality a bunch of torn off plants’ genitalia. Who wants this crazy “in reality”? (see Krzizhanovsky, 1991, 607)—the man of letters wonders. There is no need, however, to take it too close to heart; it is not in the least a real state of affairs; it is only objectivized, “theorized” fragments of the former. If humanity is not an odd-out, resistance to nonsense is not hopeless. But you have to use reason. Bind, alas, with lawful substitutions. Masked under its counterpart, the absurd is firmly seated, having received cultural indulgence, in the binaries of judging formal logic. In this room, touching “rivulet is moving and not moving” sounds ridiculous nonsense. And it is quite absurd to defy the black-and-white perception of the world: similarly absurd is the cosmetic painting of old pictures and films. The absurd cannot be objectively copied: it does not exist out of human subjectivity. The absurd cannot be constructed by purely subjective means either; it needs the cavities and canyons of objectivity, and thus objectivity itself. Objectively existing transcendence, taken to be real, is an evidence of the absurd lack of meaningful sense, at least one, in itself and in the other: the immanent always lacks the transcendent, and vice-versa. The same is the case of worked out transcendence, if the latter is not controversially defined. Objectivity is a shyly cynical transcendence. Marrying the scholars regularly, it always dresses in an innocently white clad. This is the reality that demands pondering over and prepares the site for the developing of conceptualization strategies. There are, supposedly, three all in all.

The reflection theory strives to operate by constant objective meaningful senses. Constructivism in its radical versions aims at implicating the subjective sense into an *a priori* senseless object. Realism adds a subjective component to the *a priori* given sense, i.e., the sense prior to the concretely given empirical perception. This is my hypothesis. It is deduced from my sympathy towards the philosophy of subject, in its versions of existentialism and hylozoism, together with suspicion towards objectivist theories and practices. Being a human subject means to generate meaningful senses receiving the response, echoing selectively the meaningful senses you meet. The true human subject is a realist. Authentically subjective discourse is a realistic discourse.

The suggested hypothesis certainly does not have pretension to exclusive newness. One of its roots presents the opposition of ancient classics concerning the problem of characteristics and mechanism of mimesis: Plato’s imitation-reproduction (of the originals) and Aristotle’s imitation-production (in some sort of agreement with the originals). (cf. Petrov, 1997, 264–265) Another source seems to be Goethe’s trichotomy of art-aesthetic strategies: simple imitation of nature–manner–style. Simple imitation—this is a copying of dead or still live objects; manner—this is the objectification of the artist’s spirit by means of self-invented language; style—which is the German poet and philosopher’s

preference, is based upon the things' essences themselves and on our recognition of the latter in forms of the visible and palpable reflections (Goethe). One more basic idea was met by Mikhail A. Lifshitz: "Two poles of realism are: "realistic" in the medieval sense and "nominalistic" which is realistic in the newest sense of this word." (Liefshitz, 2004, 391) At last comes the important observation of Alain Robbe-Grillet: it is precipitate to use the word "realism" in the sense that, owing to the writer's (and, we should add, the scholar's and the philosopher's) appearance on the stage, reality immediately turns into something complete, for good or for the time-being. (Robbe-Grillet, 1989, 160)

Let us turn back to my hypothesis and the nuances it bears. Realism is a fundamental conceptual settling of a human being, coinciding with all its rivals and, by definite additional premises, embracing them all. The reflection theory and constructivism are its diametrically opposed particular cases. Position taken by the reflectionists—significant for utterly minimized, or zero, subjective conceptual up-building—turns out to be naïve realism. It is the methodological andgnoseological principle, diametrically opposed ontological platforms of extreme realism and extreme nominalism, that could be premised to the former, or in some other ways be referred to it. In their own manner both of them depreciate the subjective, existential weight of the universals. By extreme realism true meanings exist before, out of and independent of the human individual. By extreme nominalism they dwell not in the inner, but, rather, in the external experience of a man, in talking and writing as a means of communication. Constructivism, with its heap of subjective senses, is techno-realism, and primarily, because it actualizes itself adequately in a technically thick art (machinery industry, city building, photo- and cinema) and in foregoing projects. And secondarily, because the reality it deals with excavates the meaningful senses not out of itself, like *physis* or substance, but, like substratum or *techne*, receives them from someone or something else. It won't be correct to identify realism itself with any of its versions, including naïve realism, i.e., reflection theory, and to restrict oneself in the polemical space of the conceptualization of being to the binary scheme "realism–constructivism."

The absurd is always sprinkled into realistic discourse. More often—permitting to reveal it, more rarely—to eliminate itself. In different ways, but to a similar extent the tendencies to approximation, or dissolving of the description are non-sense; and, likewise, non-sense is the monumental isomorphism, and precious accurateness. True realism strives for overcoming the absurd. Corresponding templates, as well as all heuristic painstaking, is not enough here. The aesthetic turn is very important. A struggle with absurd is a struggle with the bad taste.

The foundation of a realistic comprehension of the world is deeply ontological. Everywhere, when the recognizably true, different from imaginary, is certified, realism gets its base for self-affirmation. It always is—asserting something, denying something—engaged, biased, subjectively founded. The priority

of the objective that exists independently from mental and physical human efforts is merely one of all possible choices, but it is not necessary, and not in the least an irreproachable choice of a realistic knower. He can mistakenly give reverence to ontologically doubtful entities: dull nature, part of which turns alive all of a sudden; regularity devoid of any relationships, acting totally or stochastically; a super-natural person with the status of a non-changeable supreme lord. And it is wrong to hold that we have no responsibility for all objectivity mentioned, the same as for anything else including its absolutist ambitious hypostasis. By theodicy, a human being does not only vindicate God—he justifies himself for connivance of evil happenings. The son is responsible for his father, and the citizen—for the past and future of his country. Objective independence is logically possible, but, in a human dimension, ontologically defective. Independence of an object is undoubtedly always a fiction. Objectivity happens to be the thing in which the subject diminishes; canceling resistance towards outer pressure and control, losing selectivity in reaction to perceptions, viewing himself reflectively from apart, as if he was a stranger, alien, outsider. The objective view of the world is the destiny of figures truncated in their being: of a depersonalized Godly substance, and, both for religion adept and for a science upholder, “impartially” jealous of human subjectivity.

“Objectivity as modern scholar’s settling, or, even better to say, his settling belief in objectiveness of the being under study, is bind with typical for our civilization lord-slave attitude to reality, namely, when things and people are regarded not as something original and self-sufficing, but as something makeshift and instrumental ...” (Majorov, 2004, 24)

But religious objectivism is, likewise, falling away from truth: a heresy of a creature sinning modestly.

A realistically thinking subject, denying impartiality, does not prostrate himself kissing the ground before necessity, nor does he pledge himself to the account of probabilities. He has the right to demand the impossible, slowing down his arbitrariness by Dostoyevsky’s hint: life is more fantastic than any fiction. Within authentic realism, the human and world are congenial sense-making subjects—from life, stubborn, non-tolerant, passionate wranglers and players.

The value of realism is not prone to deflation. Its power lies within the conceptual core, not within connotations; it is in the strategic setting, not the deviations from it. It is quite different from rival theories. The reflection, or correspondence theory sticks to objective realities and meanings; but those are far from objective if taken out of transcendental depositories. The subjectivity of the subject is simultaneously concealed, both the living and cognizing, and of the one who provides the existence of the living and cognizing. Constructivism is oriented on implying the sense onto the *a priori* senseless object—which

ends, sooner or later, in turning the constructing (constructed) mind itself into the same object. The subjects fall down into at stalemate situation of senseless comprehension, extremely far from the situation of autopoiesis, self-creation. The value of reflection and constructing is given evidence by a deeper—realistic—context. What grace, iridescence and augment of sense there are in pictures by Frantisek Drtikol, viewed by an experienced eye: a naked closely-cut long-legged girl on the backcloth of geometric décor permeated by the light and shadow play!

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THE UNITY OF BEING AND HISTORY AS A PRINCIPLE OF ONTOLOGY, GNOSEOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY¹

ABSTRACT

The principle of unity, interrelation of being and history is viewed here as a principle of ontology, gnoseology and epistemology, as a basis of updating philosophical outlooks, especially the problem of man and his relationship to the world (world-attitude). It is shown that consciousness was been interpreted in the context of a specific type of relations of man to the world. To overcome subjectivism a deep sense of objectivity of being and its development in relation to man is restored. A three-tier definition of being is given: substantive, attributive, and properly historical. The relationship of human activity to being and its development is explicated.

Keywords: world-attitude; being; matter; history; unity; principle; the substance-attribute; substance-subject; subject-without-being; constructivism.

The unity of being and history is considered here as a principle of ontology, gnoseology and epistemology, a basis of a philosophical worldview, especially, that concerning man and the man's relationship to the world, necessary for interpreting knowledge and science. The formulation and solution of the problem of the relationship between being and consciousness cannot be interpreted from the outside. In order to not hypostasize consciousness, as Sergei L. Rubinstein shows,² we must interpret it as a property of the man, taking into account the relationship of the man to men and the world. The subjective position of the man expresses itself in the world-attitude. The history of philosophy proclaims

¹ The article is translated by Alexey A. Zhirnov, PhD, doctor of culturology.

² Rubinstein, S. L. 1957. *Being and Consciousness. About the Place of the Psychic in the Universal Correlation of Phenomena of the Material World*. Moscow; idem. 1973. "Man and the World." In: idem. *Problems of General Psychology*. Moskva: Pedagogika.

that it is contemplative, activist or co-evolutionary, or is their combination: the world-attitude does not exist at all.³

This aims to necessarily restore the deep sense of objectivity enclosed in the categories of being and its development in relation to the man and his world-attitude. To exclude radical constructivism in which the man becomes a subject-without-being, and to restore the man as a subject-substance. To overcome subjectivism in the relation of the man to the world, and to restore its subjectivity, the man-as-a-subject begotten and prolonged by the world and living in the medium of its development. It is needed to consider the transition, first, from the substance level to the attribute level of the definition of being and existence (a registration of the movements and development of man's ways of being, properties and forms), secondly, from the substance to man's being in the form of the purposeful activity of the man. The concept of interrelation of being and history is a basis of the philosophical worldview.

The alienation of the activity of the man-as-the-subject from being and its development is dangerous, leading to an anthropological catastrophe. There is a correlation of history with being and its development; removing this correlation cuts the way to the premises of humanity in a very real "cave" alienating the man from the development of the universe. Nowadays, economism is such caves of alienation (the domination of private property, ignoring public sociality, on the guard of which should be a political will of the heads of states and peoples, still very committed to the protection of the private property). Technologism, dependent on economism is another cave—being, signed "in brackets," and, in its consequence, mankind occurs to live in an absurd world.

Thus, the dominating philosophical view advocates that concept of being which, in accordance with the whole philosophical tradition from antiquity, determines being substantially. As a rule, the concept of being is identified with the concept of matter denoting the objective reality primary to consciousness; the world is nothing but moving matter, i.e. the only and final objective reality. Matter is not a concept, but rather a philosophical category⁴ which cannot become outdated, because it expresses the essence of philosophy of materialism, in opposition to the philosophy of idealism, insisting on the primacy of consciousness. This approach is a generalized expression and a reasonable solution to the basic question of philosophy. The roots of this question go into the process of a cultural evolution from the practical to the theoretical, moving from the world of the mythological through the stage of the actual religious philosophical worldview.⁵

³ Prokhorov, M. M. 2013. *Being and History. The Study of the Philosophical Foundations*. Nizhny Novgorod, 262–286.

⁴ Lenin, V. I. 1973. *Materialism and Empirical Criticism*. In: idem. *Full Collection of Works*, vol. 18. Moskva, 130–131.

⁵ Prokhorov, M. M. 2008. *Being, Humanism and the Second axial Age*. Moskva: Ross. humanist. Society, 44–73.

The substitution of being as a philosophical category by other concepts leads to the substitution of the philosophical world outlook by different kinds of “crafts” and “counterfeiting.” One of the first was the 18th-century mechanism; its overcoming required a lot of efforts which result in the conclusion that it is impossible to absolutize any thing by turning it into substance. If in the past the source of such falsifications was concepts of natural sciences; now such concepts are often borrowed from human sciences or even have their origin outside science.

Uniting all these options to build up a representation of the world practice is to hypostasize. It can be illustrated by the smile of the Cheshire cat, which, according to the fabulous story, “was” even after the disappearance of the cat. Hypostasizing leads to what Francis Bacon called idols, or ghosts of thinking, and nowadays they are called simulations and simulators.

Likewise history cannot be alienated from being and its changes in the course of which human history arises as a special sphere of reality. With its hypostasis we face today the radical philosophical concepts of constructivism, rejecting the primacy of being. An example is Benno Huebner’s concept, described in his book *Martin Heidegger—Obsessed with Being*.⁶

Such approaches and views represent an attempt of the man’s self-assertion as a subjects-without-being, as a special specimen—subject-substance. Inherent activism claims to go beyond the boundaries of setting and reasonable solution to the basic question of philosophy, first of all, its first ontological side. Idealism tried and still tries to locate consciousness at the same level of education as a subject-substance. Now the man equipped in achievements of science and technology, adapting them at the service of radical constructivism, not squaring up with being, sees in all materials of his activities a means to ignore *substantia* of being. In short, radical constructivism rejects being and his dialectics.

Radical or worldview constructivism arose in Plato’s and Aristotle’s *technê*. This drew the attention to Martin Heidegger’s book *What Is Called Thinking?* His approach differs from the popular *technê*, which was and remains directly woven into being and its change. The *technê* of Plato and Aristotle has not such constraints. It tries to set itself free from people’s limitedness, to propagate people’s ways of thinking and actions to all existing things, to being itself. In the Russian literature, radical constructivism was defended especially by Georg P. Schedrovitsky.⁷

Currently, constructivist world views are widely distributed in Russia. Opposing them requires to form a philosophical picture on the basis of the principle of unity, interrelation of being and history as the principle of ontology,

⁶ Huebner, B. 2011. *Martin Heidegger—Obsessed with Being*. St. Petersburg Academy of Culture.

⁷ Schedrovitsky, G. B. 1994. *Selected Works*. Moscow.

gnoseology and epistemology. History assumes being, and being without history is incomplete. As Merab K. Mamardashvili noticed,

“... you cannot start history, as well as thought. You can only be in it. History and thought, has a very strange law. In the absolute sense of the word, there is no absolute beginning of thoughts or the beginning of history is that we never find ourselves in a position that is very often described as a situation of choice. Now if we stand in front of the river and think whether to rush into the river or not to rush ... Actually the principle of Heraclitus says that we are in the river every moment.”⁸

The entangled characteristic of being dominates, or characteristics of being are mainly given through recourse to one or another form, a part. For example, in *Being and Time* Martin Heidegger limits his investigation of time to a certain inversion between being and time, so that time itself has the status of the most fundamental category. On the contrary, in *What Is Called Thinking?* Heidegger returns to the ancient tradition of recognizing being as fundamental, while time mostly acquires an attribute character. We can speak on the one-sidedness of both the approaches. To avoid the one-sidedness, the transition to a three-level characterization is needed; such one which overcomes both these approaches and takes into account their positive and negative results.

First, the characteristics of being are disclosed at the level of substance. At this level alternative materialistic or idealistic worldviews are formed. Secondly, the attribute level of existential characteristics and the corresponding attribute “the model of object” (Vladimir P. Bransky⁹) is distinguished. At this level a confrontation arises between dialectics and metaphysics. Thirdly, the actual historical level of the definition of being as a human being (which is active to pursue goals), is revealed.

The selection of those three levels is inherent for Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s views. In spite of recognizing the substantive characteristics of being, and the opposition between materialism and idealism, in which Hegel supports an idealistic view, he describes being and genesis by demonstrating the contrast between dialectics and metaphysics. By reinterpreting the Aristotelian understanding of metaphysics as the first philosophy, Hegel introduces ideas about the existence of entities of different orders, and postulates the need to hierarchize existential characteristics in ontology and gnoseology. Ontology was seen as a fundamental relatively independent aspect of philosophy, organically interconnected with other its branches, and distinguishing its main sections. Hegel characterizes genesis (being) as well as a human activity in the framework of philosophy of history. In modern researches, Hegel’s genesis (being) as

⁸ Mamardashvili, M. K. 1997. *Psychological Topology of the Path*. Sankt Petersburg, 252.

⁹ In: 1981. *Materialistic Dialectics* (5 volumes), vol. 1: *Objective Dialectics*. Moscow, 1981.

history is often unilaterally highlighted. For instance, Tom Rockmore¹⁰ distinguishes it from other levels of being, and their Hegelian definitions from that proposed by Hegel and Karl Marx.

Changes in philosophy made by Hegel enabled to identify various historical forms contrasting dialectics to metaphysics. The modern era demonstrates the third historical form contrasting dialectics to metaphysics as opposed to the classical dialectics (with the priority of the ascent above descent). The first form of metaphysics in the Hegelian sense ignores universal communication and the development of being, the second recognizes them, but distorts their essence and laws. The third, more recent, intentionally disapproves them—despite the fact that only by the development of being we remain within the boundaries of an ideological vision of the world, taking into account the global ties of the world and its development. And only by that fact we can learn what is available since an alternative to dialectics of development is technologism. The supporters of the negative dialectics actually alienate themselves from the process of development, fall into subjectivism which was already pointed out by Heraclitus in teaching about the logo and apostasy. Heidegger reinterpreted this alienation as an oblivion of being. In this view, it can be argued that not dialectics but negative dialectics cuts way to teaching non-existence in ontology, violating the norms of the philosophical definition of being. Metaphysics in the form of negative dialectics, having anti-ontological sharpness, really leads us into nonbeing. Therefore, on the way of degeneration, it is an expression of our folly. Post-modernists, for example, explicitly write an absurdity, nonsense, etc. that there are “things” that the modern Western society produces. Let us say that the postmodernists philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari refer in Chapter 1 “Machines of Desire” of the book *Capitalisme et Schizophrénie* to schizo-analysis, and ascertain a deep connection between schizophrenia and the modern Western society which “produces schizophrenics as shampoo Extra or cars Renault, with the only difference that schizophrenics cannot be sold.”¹¹ The roots of negative dialectics lie in the absolutization, under hypnosis. The acquisitive economy and the technology corresponding with it still shape the character of the struggle for existence in the history of the humankind.

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¹⁰ Rockmore, T. 2002. *Marx after Marxism: the Philosophy of Karl Marx*. Willey-Blackwell, 30–89, 288–371.

¹¹ Deleuze G., Guattari, F. 1972. *Anti-Oedipe: Capitalisme et Schizophrénie*. Paris: Ed. de Minuit (Coll. Critique), 32.

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SITUATIONALITY OF BEING: PRINCIPLES

ABSTRACT

In this paper, the author-developed conception of the “situationality of being,” i.e. the extension of the theory of the “philosophy of nonbeing,” is presented; the generalized definition of the notion “situation” is formulated; and the essence of the “situationality of being” is explained. The conception of the “situationality of being” makes it possible to develop the situational pattern of the world; in accordance with this conception, “the world is the situation of situations,” The world appears before us in the form of one gigantic situation due to the interaction of various situational factors of different level and different qualities, which lead in the long run to a certain situative dynamic balance (the so-called existent world).

Keywords: situation; situational approach; situationality of being; situational pattern of the world; system; being; nonbeing.

At present, the time has come to conceptualize situational ideas on the philosophical level; for this, it is necessary to make several steps away from the traditional interpretation of the notion of situation. This conceptualization will make it possible to appropriately evaluate the ontological significance of the “situation” phenomenon and penetrate into the internal sense of the notion of situationality of being.

1. At first, it is necessary to pass from the popular lexical interpretation of the notion “situation” treated as a combination of conditions and circumstances (which gives a very vague idea of the limited external sense of situation) to a deeper understanding of it—as the aggregate of factors determining the state and variations of objects. (Solodukho, 2011, 7)

a. Formally, we do not deviate widely from the conventional definition of the notion of “situation,” since the conditions and circumstances are the factors that form an object and assign its state (the Latin word “*situatia*” means “posi-

tion,” “situation,” “state” in English). The determination of a certain system state means the assignment of its significant parameters which is determined by the constituent elements and their structural relationship which, generally speaking, characterizes the system properties and its integrative characteristic (quality). This is true statically; from the dynamic standpoint of view, the situation specifies the direction of variations or temporal retention of the system given. Here, any transformations of this system will be specified by both the initial situation and a constantly variable combination of situational factors, that is, by variations of the already existing situation.

b. When defining the situation, the introduction of a “factor” notion is of importance, since this notion allows to reveal the determining role of the situation: the Latin word “*factor*” means in English “doing,” “generative.” It is vividly seen from this what the source of the motive force of the formation and evolution of objects is, namely, it is a number of different factors. The factor-generating function is indicative of the essential character of these situations, their participation in the formation of being level of reality, and their substantial significance.

c. The above-given definition of situation makes clear not only the “superficial” idea of it but expands also understanding about the sphere of action situational factors. In the determination of the system as a combination of conditions and circumstances, usually it is the external character of situations that is thought to be of significance. In the herein-presented interpretation, a ground is afforded to see the two-sidedness of situation manifestations, namely, its external and internal sides. In other words, factors may be both external and internal and, hence, it is necessary to speak in this case about the external and internal situations relative to the object examined. The internal situation is generated due to collocation of the object constituent elements, and is connected with the content of the object’s components and structure.

2. It is necessary to overcome the one-sided understanding of the “situation” notion, which is now wide-spread in a number of scientific approaches and spheres of human activities such as management, economy, psychology, pedagogics, and others. With the notion of situation and its derivatives (the situational approach and analysis, situationality, and the like) one connects the ideas of something casual, single, temporal, dynamic, uncertain, and the like.

a. Examining different scientific and unscientific contexts, we are very often faced with ideas about the ambivalent manifestation of situations; they may be casual and essential, single and general, momentary and extended, dynamic and stagnant, uncertain and restrictedly certain, and so on. All this taken together indicates an internal contradictory character of a situation as such. For this reason, one must not absolutize in the general case only one side of situations; the situational approach and situational analysis, as well as the notion of situational-

ity, must be therefore treated in accordance with the above-noted contradictory essence of the situation phenomenon. This brings up the question: What is the way to take account of it?

b. When following the conventional one-sided understanding of the notion of situation, it is necessary to contra-distinguish it to the system treated as an object characterized by stability, structuredness, hierarchicity, a certain limitedness (the presence of an ambient medium), integrity as the integrative properties, and some others. This set of qualities fails as a rule to correspond to the popular ideas about the dynamicity and soleness of situations; in these cases, the situation is opposed the system as its own dialectical opposite. At close consideration we can nonetheless see that by virtue of the above-noted circumstances (item “A”), the situation includes both the non-system and system qualities, and the situational approach (analysis) and the “situationality” notion must be taken into account: the situationality contains two sides: a situative and a systematic one.

c. It is the situative side of situationality that contains features such as randomness, unity, impermanence, dynamicity, indeterminacy, and the like. This traditional, “brand” side of situationality is in the situationality itself—the transient and ephemeral character of many of a number of manifestations connected with the situation on the whole. Nonetheless, the situations can be characterized by system parameters such as integrity and stability, structuredness, hierarchicity, limitedness, and regularity (as has been already noted above).

3. It is necessary to overcome widespread ideas about situation and a situational approach as a concrete-scientific or interdisciplinary phenomenon. By virtue of a number of circumstances, these notions are not only treated now as general-scientific, but have also already found philosophic content.

This can be confirmed by the following statements:

a. When applying the “situation” notion to categories such as “world,” “being,” “nonbeing,” “substance,” and some others, it acquires a categorical meaning. Making use of this notion, it is possible to construct a new situational pattern of the world, explain the forms of interrelation between being and nonbeing, and understand the essence of the non-substantial interpretation of reality. (Solodukho, 2011a) In the history of philosophy, we know the facts concerning situation that are connected mainly with existentialism (Karl Jaspers, Martin Buber, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre) and postmodernism, as well as introducing the “situation” notion in the form of “historical situations,” “existential situations,” “borderline situations,” and some others into the philosophical context. The situational character of human history, the situational inhabitation of every day, and every minute of human life make it possible to speak about the situationality of historical events and the situationality of daily routine. Situations prepare events and fill them with a sense of “coexistence.”

All this taken together leads us to the understanding of the situationality of being.

b. Any situation should be evaluated as the integrative characteristic of the world; the world can then be represented to be woven from situations. Ludwig von Bertalanffy's statement about his understanding of the world (world is the system of systems) must be complemented by the following: the world is the situation of situations or the world is the system of situations. (Solodukho, 2011, 8, 12, 147)

c. The ambivalent character of situation makes it possible to see in this category a special combination, that is, a dialectical composition of a number of different philosophical categories such as randomness and necessity, single and general, possibility and reality, indeterminacy and determinacy, objectivity and subjectivity, and some others. The notion of situation cannot be reduced in this case to the above-indicated general characteristics of the world. Using these philosophical categories that are based on the notion of situation, it is possible to see from a new perspective spatial and temporal aspects of reality. The content of situation opens the mechanism of formation and shows the structure of processuality.

The interaction of the aggregate of situation-forming factors creates conditions for the variation of reality, and it is represented as the movable multiform potentiality. The system stability is complemented by variability. As the local spatial outbreak, the situation is directed by its dynamics to formation of something new and includes impermanence of all that appeared and already existed.

4. It is necessary to overcome the inertia of thinking and to postulate another paradigm, that is, the philosophy of nonbeing. (Solodukho, 1997, 51–53; Solodukho, 2005)

a. If the tradition of European philosophy accustomed us to the idea of being eternity, the impossibility of the appearance of the existence itself, and the indestructibility of all that exists as it is, the oriental philosophic tradition (Indian and Chinese) admits the appearance of being from nonbeing, rendering tribute to the ontological void, and assumes vicissitude of epochs of existence and non-existence. Now, it is necessary to enhance the notions of oriental thought by applying the European logic of substantiation. (Solodukho, 2002)

b. Revealing the genetic and causal nexus between nonbeing and being, it is necessary to say something about the virtual structure of nonbeing that is formed by the aggregate of nothing-forms; the structure is found post factum at an instant of formation of being structure from the aggregate of thereby appearing something-forms containing the multiform something of existing. Availability of the virtual nothing-structure does not create being, since every element of this structure is merely the preceding real absence of the something-form that appears in the being.

c. When speaking about situationality, one must not confine oneself according to the stratum of phenomenal manifestations, to which the random character of situations is connected. Alongside the phenomenological level, it is necessary to trace the situationality of being at the ontological and metaphysical levels. (Solodukho, 2011, 12–14)

In such a way, an unconventional interpretation of situational ideas makes it possible to reveal the philosophical essence of the “situation” concept and formulate the conceptual principles of situationality of being.

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AN ADVANCE TO A NEW THEORY OF COGNITION

ABSTRACT

The theory suggested in the article is revealed in terms of existential materialism finding its source in Aristotle's maxim that philosophy is a study of the essential unity of the grounds of being and consciousness. This theory still makes use of the old principle of reflection postulating the subject/object dyad. The here-proposed theory points out that there is not really a dyad, but a triad of a cognitive relationship: subject-language-object. To cope with the main epistemological problem of truth, we postulate that not only the paradigmatic, but also the syntagmatic axis be considered. The basic syntagma of gnoseology is contemplation on the absolute and relative in true knowledge, but not in a Hegelian way.

Keywords: existential materialism; *Dabewußtsein*; the main triad of the cognitive relationship; the basic syntagma of gnoseology.

This theory is revealed in terms of existential materialism finding its source in Aristotle's maxim: that, in its essence, the grounds of being and consciousness form a unity. We may say that the latter is consequently causing the unity of ontology and gnoseology in metaphysics (combined, by Aristotle himself, also with logic, linguistics and semiotics into a gorgeous "megalith") of which philosophy is an inquiry.

It is clear that the materialistic theory pre-supposes the genetic priority of the material world; but claiming itself existential, it emphasizes that when consciousness is already there, and being is yielding to cognition, the unity of both immediately springs up. Let me coin a German word for this remarkable situation from which the process of cognition starts giving birth to perception, knowledge, speech, sense and meaning: *Dabewußtsein*. "Da" = here-and-now; "*Bewußtsein*" = "cognized being" = consciousness. The metamessage of the here-proposed theory is anti-neo-Kantian. Every kind of Kantianism, classical or postmodern, is indifferent to the unity mentioned, splitting essence and phe-

nomenon, and declaring the object to be *Ding-an-sich*—be it in epistemology, philosophy of science, logic and methodology of science or their postmodern background (which is also neo-Kantian in itself). Despite the recognition of the subject/object coincidence turning into their mutual interference in *Dabewußtsein*, the new theory of cognition points out that there exists not just a dyad, but a triad of a cognitive relationship: subject–language–object. Though all neo-Kantianism is also very much agitated about language, the difference remains, and that is between materialism and idealism understood in the traditional way.

Developing the bulk of existential materialism, we meet the following questions, doubts and objections. What sort of a philosophical trend is it? What are its main principles and categories? What about its novelty? What advantages does it bring? Why some neologisms were necessary and is it possible to do without them? Disciplines such as epistemology and logic steer clear of postmodern philosophy. For what reason does the existential materialism consider this experience? Why does it divide epistemology and gnoseology (which is absolutely impossible in Western philosophy), sticking mostly to the latter and combining it with ontology instead?

In providing answers, it is necessary to recall the classification of the “basic directions” in philosophy best known after Friedrich Engels. Materialism is divided into different forms on historical grounds: ancient (say, Democritus), modern (metaphysical, “mechanistic”—say, John Locke or Claude Adrien Helvetius), and the “newest” (“vulgar”—Ludwig Büchner, Karl Vogt, Jacob Moleschotte, and dialectical—Marxism). Idealism is divided into different types logically: i.e., subjective and objective (say, Georg V.F. Hegel and Johann G. Fichte, respectively). I argue that the reverse divisions can be fruitful. Leaving aside historical forms of idealism from Socrates to, say, Ernst Cassirer, let us pay attention to the quite reasonable *logical* division of materialism into objective and subjective. The latter term is complicated by numerous negative connotations. This fact, together with the most necessary, after the “anthropological turn,” account of philosophy of life experience, with all its derivatives, has caused a choice of the other term signifying the second form of materialism: “existential.”

It is not subjective idealism, despite of a declared coincidence in *Dabewußtsein* of (gnoseological) object and (gnoseological) subject. It is materialism; it recognizes the universal credo of any materialism: the objective existence of the primary source of knowledge—physical reality.

It is not at all Kantianism, though someone might recon so, because every type of Kantian thought presumes the thing-in-itself necessary and objectively existing. The thing-in-itself (the essence), by us, is postulated cognizable, and the emblematic sign of Kantianism—a dramatic split of essence and its *Schein*, phenomena—is not accepted. In fact, it is strongly denied.

It and not Hegelianism, though, for us, an objectively existing and essentially cognizable thing-in-itself admits the principal unity of essence and its phenomenon; this is because laws of the development of nature and society are not deduced from thinking. Why then is it not “Locke’s paradigm”?

Because for us knowledge is not seen as perception of the conformity or the discrepancy of two ideas. Because “simple ideas” actually are not simple at all; and complex ideas are not simply a combination. Because true knowledge consists not only in a logical coordination of ideas (as indicated by Locke’s favourite term, “agreement”), as any positivist would agree. Because the informative ascension is not an arithmetic operation. Because, last but not least, matter does exist, and it exists not as a conglomerate of bodies, but in itself, i.e. as objective reality, one in number, given to us in sensation. Or rather taken.

Then why is it not simply dialectical materialism?

Because it is materialism more simple than dialectical: it is syntagmatic. The relationship of absolute and relative knowledge is claimed, by us, of utmost importance for gnoseology: it is its basic syntagma. The syntagmatic axis, together with the paradigmatic one, proves to be quite necessary to complete the query, because it allows an examination of the concepts’ taxis, and so not only exposes the concepts. (It seems to be *selbstverständlich* tacit knowledge for analytical languages as English; but it is not at all a *Plattenheit*. Cf.: for Anglo-Saxon philosophy it was not something unnatural to begin speaking, in epistemology, about meaning instead of truth, since “meaning” means the total sense of a sentence. In synthetic languages, as Greek or Russian, meaning is the meaning of a word, and hence comes misunderstanding. The dialectics appears in the given format as logically removed in “*Aufhebung*” and, perhaps, as a sort of didactics. In Ancient Greek the word *σύνταγμα* meant some “system, construction, or device (the squad, in armies)”. Later it received a narrower meaning as the law, the constitution; it is also a grammatical term.¹ We use it to mark certain valuable frames of reasoning initiating philosophical discourse, necessarily containing the logical-grammatical relationship of basic concepts, and at the same time “the semantic energy of the whole sentence” (Aleksei F. Losev’s expression). Syntagmas, for us, are relatively direct parts of actually bow-shaped, curvilinear process of cognition, which winds in its development twisting as a Moebius’s strip, leading to a gradual approach of the sphere of knowledge to the sphere of being.

Ours is the position of gnoseological optimism, i.e. philosophical belief in the cognoscibility of the world and its laws. This is based on principles of rationalism, allowing us to always keep reflectivity at a critical level. It is clear that materialistic rationalism does not prohibit—on the contrary, it prescribes research not only in an abstract-logical way, but also in a sensual-

¹ Slavjatinskaya, M. N. 1996. *The Textbook of Ancient Greek Language* [in Russian]. Part II. Moskva: Philology, 288.

perceiving mode. Perceptions, thoughts and representations, communicative activity, constructive-producing efforts constitute spheres of human life, and spirit life.

Materialism persistently preserves its orientation towards sciences, and we choose from natural sciences physical geography, for its ability to adequately transfer visible, observable world into our inner world, representing the reflection principle; and from the humanities—linguistics and, wider—semiotics. The latter most representatively demonstrates a necessity to correct a gnoseological subject-object dyad not by refusal from one of the members (or from both, as in current postmodernist discourse), but by the introduction of language as “milieu” (in specific cases—as a mediator) into the structure of the cognitive relationship. It transforms the aforementioned dyad into a triad, and only then there comes the real possibility to explain the communication process; this is by means of a symbol of an “alternative” current changing its direction depending on the role executed by the subject in the given semiotic situation.

Furthermore, semiotics enriches the theory of cognition with profound data by analyzing representation: 1) *Vorstellung* appears to be the central form of consciousness (actually, consciousness is essentially presentation); 2) it takes an intermediate place between sensual and rational knowledge, and its analysis, pulling together mental images and signs, allows a softening of the rigor of the classical theory of knowledge; 3) at the given step, in this, half-conceptual, half-sensual area, there “live” senses and values, interferential pictures of mutual relationship of subject and object, i.e., knowledge that does not have either sense or value outside of the semiotic situation.

Philosophy, for its part, helps semiotics to formulate consistent and clear definitions of its basic categories. The reached clearness and strictness gives hope to solve the central problem of gnoseology, i.e. the problem of truth.

Gnoseology differs from epistemology which is the theory of scientific knowledge as the general differs from the specific; undoubtedly, it differs, too, from the theory of understanding as it is being developed today. The theory of understanding (Kantian, in effect, as with everything “postmodern”) contains a lot of true and convincing aspects, and the big achievement is its interest for language problems; however, it unites being and consciousness in quite the other way: understanding is being. It is, in fact, ontology without gnoseology. It avoids all doctrines about truth and essence, subject and object; it is all about “sense” and “value,” and hermeneutics / phenomenology prevails over all. The theory of understanding, apparently, in general avoids logic, not in the sense of groundlessness or incoherence, but in the sense of specific hostility towards strict definitions.

The new here-postulated theory of cognition, apparently, is not so innovative, openly being guided by materialism and offering definitions of cardinal concepts. Our thought is that when we build gnoseology, then hereby we construct ontology as well. Indeed, in the theory of understanding consciousness

and being unite. However, this coincidence eliminates and destructs both the object and subject of cognition; hence come multiple postmodern “deaths,” including to philosophy itself.

Let us take up an analogy. The so-called vulgar materialism includes the maxim “consciousness is material” (and it is, by the way, the basis of all brand-new parasciences), and in hylozoism the opposite maxim is postulated (and it is another basis of parasciences): “matter is conscious.” In the same way, the theory of understanding and gnoseology of existential materialism come into contradiction. *Dabewußtsein* is dispositional: object and objectivity are not eliminated, but steadily admitted; interpretation does not force out explanation, and hence comes deep trust in “big words,” such as truth and essence, and big narratives, such as classical theories of knowledge.

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MAJOR DIRECTIONS OF THE ANALYSIS OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL INSTRUMENTS

ABSTRACT

The article examines the research of the innovative-oriented scenarios in modern methodology. The innovative-oriented epistemological instruments indicate an opposition between determinism and sociocultural constructivism. Methodology is understood in the context of the technology of activity which is projected onto the innovation sphere in the context of their genesis, adaptability, spread and consumption. The article conceptually analyses epistemological instruments; it considers positive and negative tendencies relating to NIBC (nano-, bio-, info-, cognitive) technologies. The author claims that the modern image of the world includes the sum of technologies which determine the world; the image of the possible future can be called “post-human.”

Keywords: epistemology; modern methodology; innovative methodological tools; virtualization; paradigm of constructivism; innovative process; emergence; complexity; uncertainty; chaos.

The analysis of the innovative tools of modern methodology is supposed to reflect the specific character of the contemporary world and is closely connected with modern techno-scientific civilization. The principal openness of the future, numerous variations of the course of events require new methodological approaches. Innovative methodological tools are a vital object of the philosophical analysis of recent civilizational transformations. Philosophy of science has fixed three main tendencies in analysing epistemological instruments. The first is connected with virtual technologies and the influence of information reality on men’s life and activity. It is necessary to take into consideration the specifics of the Internet-space and the subjective objectivism of the virtual beings. The second tendency is connected with the substantiation of the paradigm of constructivism as a modern ontological model. Classical science attempted to de-

scribe reality as an object and naturally determined movement, which can be attained by disinterested and impartial investigation. But the mental image of aim can be understood as an intensive directional source of action.¹ The reflective analysis of the structure of the constructive method in the context of its psychological and analytical components will be carried out. Methodology takes part in constructing the future. Possible worlds are thus complete alternative totalities—one may think about them as possibilities. The idea of possible worlds indicates an important approach, both in developing different models of open rationalism and a new methodology of constructivism.

The third tendency shows the specific character of the innovative process. Modern methodology is aimed at the adequate study of the innovative process with its own characteristics, distinctive principles and concepts. It is directed towards identifying and substantial analyzing innovative tools of philosophical methodology. It seems obvious that today it is very important to determine mechanisms of methodological inertia, methodological barriers and limits of methodological adjustability considering the sociocultural background of the age, the expansion of informational and virtual technologies in the context of the present intellectual situation.

Understanding of methodology is proved in the content of the technology of activity which is projected onto the innovation sphere in the context of their genesis, adaptability, spread and consumption. The tool value of such methodological means as attractivity, emergence, polyfurcation, instability, interactivity, risk, chaos, complexity is estimated. The emergence of hybrid concepts has become a new notion in methodology. Those concepts are to emerge as some definiteness in the middle of uncertainty. In the space of philosophical reflection there exists a set of heuristic methods of research authorizing search and decision-making in conditions of uncertainty. The reconstruction of the system of modern methodological tools is directed towards the strengthening of future-oriented branches and expert methodological support.

Philosophy of science has fixed the high sensitivity of complicated systems toward modifications of the initial conditions of existence. Chaos, for example, is now thought of as a cause of spontaneous structure genesis and is not seen just as a shapeless mass, but as a super intricately organized sequence. The attractor sets forming “the center of slipping” into an accumulation point. They draw up and concentrate the stochastic elements around themselves. By doing this, the attractors seem to absorb the chaos, structure the surroundings, and participate in creating order.

It should be noted that values contain the most important semantic determinations and are accompanied by intellectual experiences. Causal generalizations

¹ Leshkevich, T. 2008. “The Power of Thought: New Approaches to the Problem.” In: *The Proceedings: XXII World Congress of Philosophy. Rethinking Philosophy Today*. Seoul: Seoul National University, 288.

that state the necessary and sufficient conditions are untenable in many ways for the explanation of many social circumstances and regularities.

Scientists make efforts to reveal new forms of the intellectual search process. But how is an innovation in methodology possible? The main problem for epistemology is the problem of the progress in scientific knowledge. This assertion is not as trivial as it may seem. The focus of attention is directed to situational methodology and situational determination. In modern methodological culture the recommendation “against methodological compulsion” is being formed. Every method must be adequate to its subject and correspond to its nature. This imperative is the cognitive value of science.

Philosophers explain the meaning of the concept of emergence in the following way:

“Emergence may exist in a system for any of the following reasons: there is some more complex level at which a variable interacts that does not do so at simpler levels, there is a property of the ‘whole’ which interacts with properties of the ‘parts,’ there are relevant variables which interact by different laws at more complex levels owing to the complexity of the levels, or (the limiting case) strict lawfulness breaks down at some more complex level. Thus, explanatory emergence does not presuppose descriptive emergence, the thesis that there are properties of ‘wholes’ (or more complex situations) that cannot be defined through the properties of the ‘parts’ (or simpler situations).”²

Modern thinkers would like to understand the real tendencies of the development in the context of a new paradigm with all its complexity and dynamics. The concepts “complexity” and the “theory of complicated systems” are an important element of modern methodology. Complexity determines the spirit of the 21st-century science. Klaus Mainzer describes the complex systems as “systems that comprise many interacting parts with the ability to generate a new quality of macroscopic collective behavior the manifestations of which are the spontaneous formation of distinctive temporal, spatial or functional structures.”³

Many problems are essentially of a global era complex nature. However, it has become clear that scientific prediction or forecast enables us to avoid large-scale negative consequences of global technological development. The phenomenon of uncertainty reflects the type of interactions which are devoid of a final stable form. It characterizes existence in the state when the real reference of the future is not exposed. Modern methodology of synergy fixed the situations of risk, which are defined by a complex relationship between a degree of

² Addis, L. 1995. “Methodological Holism.” In: *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*. Audi, R. (Ed.). Cambridge University Press, 492.

³ Mainzer, K. 2007. *Thinking of Complexity. The Computational Dynamics of Matter, Mind and Mankind*. New York.

probability of a given event and a measure of gravity of the supposed or anticipated consequences of the event.

Today science includes the NBIC- (nano-, bio-, info-, cognitive) technologies which have become an important part of science. The various modern worldviews include the sum of technologies determining the world itself so that the image of the projective future can be called “post-human.” In this future the leading place belongs to high technologies; the weight of the artifactual environment will increase. However, modern methodologists describe the situation in which results of researches do not refer to the goals put forward. The situation of the divergence of aims and results is observed in all spheres of the life-world.

In the conditions of the global world, stating the idea of technologies as reliable tools in humans’ hands can be treated as a subjunctive by virtue of the fact that it has no guarantee against technological disasters. This situation is viewed as the globally risky of the modern scientific and technical progress. This is the ground for the emergence of unpredictable effects, new forms and patterns. The system adopts new rules and assumes new forms of operation that may openly contradict previous purposes.

From the methodological point of view the adequate innovative-epistemological model reduces the degree of uncertainty. Therefore the main task is to elaborate new methodological strategies by using categories, tendencies and the innovative potential of a philosophical rethinking of the modern world. In this connection, the main objective is the “editing of a stream of opportunities” that with evidence specifies the value of professionalism, the role of the intellectual elite and an intellectual initiative in the course of formation of the innovative-oriented scenarios.

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Shane Ryan

THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE

ABSTRACT

In this paper I make the case that we should reject an argument that even knowledge of pointless truths has pro tanto final value. The argument draws on Greco's virtue epistemological account of knowledge, according to which knowledge is an achievement and achievements have final value in virtue of being constitutive of the good life. I argue for my position by drawing on a case of knowledge of a pointless truth unlike previous cases of pointless truths discussed in the literature. This is a case in which knowledge of a pointless truth is very cheaply gained, and so it is a case in which the disvalue of the cost of gaining the knowledge cannot plausibly outweigh the supposed pro tanto final value of knowledge.

Keywords: Knowledge; epistemic value; pointless truths; achievements; Greco.

John Greco (2010, 2011) has argued that knowledge is true belief because of ability and that as such knowledge is a success from ability. Furthermore, Greco argues that success from ability is an achievement and, following Aristotle, he argues that a good life is a life rich in achievements. Indeed, achievements are constitutive of the good life and as such they have final value; they are valuable for their own sake. A proponent of the view that all knowledge is valuable may draw on Greco's argument and use it to support her case. After all, on Greco's account knowledge is always an achievement and it seems natural to read Greco's position as implying that every case of knowledge is valuable.

Her argument might run as follows:

- (P1) Achievements are successes that are because of ability;
- (P2) Each case of knowledge is a cognitive success that is because of cognitive ability;
- (C1) So, each case of knowledge is a cognitive achievement;
- (P3) Each case of an achievement is finally valuable;

(C2) So, each case of knowledge is finally valuable.¹

My counterargument is:

(P1) Achievements are successes that are because of ability;

(P2) Each case of knowledge is a cognitive success that is because of cognitive ability;

(C1) So, each case of knowledge is a cognitive achievement;

(P3*) Knowledge of pointless truths is not finally valuable;

(C2*) So, not every case of knowledge is finally valuable.

If knowing is always an achievement and all achievements are finally valuable, then all knowledge is finally valuable. If every instance of knowledge has final value, then knowledge of so-called pointless truths is finally valuable. An example of knowledge of a pointless truth is knowledge of the number of blades of grass in a garden.² But knowledge of pointless truths plausibly is not valuable in virtue of being an achievement, let alone finally valuable.³

One obvious response that may seem to accommodate this plausible claim is to say knowledge has *pro tanto* final value. To claim that knowledge has *pro tanto* final value is to claim that knowledge is always valuable to some extent. This means that while knowledge is valuable, the value of knowledge may be outweighed by other factors in particular instances. Drawing on this qualification, the defender of the claim that all achievements are finally valuable might claim knowledge of the number of blades of grass in a garden is valuable as an achievement, it is just that the time and effort required to know the truth, the number of blades of grass there are, is such that the value of the knowledge in this case is outweighed by other factors. By saying this, the defender can hold on to the claim that every case of knowledge is valuable, not that every case of knowledge has all things considered final value but rather that every case of knowledge has *pro tanto* final value.

But on closer inspection this response is unsatisfying. This defense of the claim that each case of an achievement is finally valuable works by pointing out that the cost or disvalue of gaining knowledge of a pointless truth may be such as to outweigh the value of gaining knowledge of that truth. It seems plausible, however, that there may be cases of knowledge of pointless truths in which the knowledge in question is not costly to gain. Knowledge of pointless truths may be gained cheaply. The problem is raised once more as to whether we consider such knowledge finally valuable in virtue of being an achievement at all and, if

¹ This presentation of my opponent's argument is adapted from Duncan Pritchard's (2010, 31) presentation of Greco's argument.

² The examples of pointless truths in the literature usually involve some count (blades of grass, strands of hair, and grains of sand) that reaches a very high number.

³ My focus here is on showing that knowledge of pointless truths, or pointless achievements, have no *pro tanto* final value. Elsewhere it has been likewise been argued that immoral achievements have no value. For more on this see Michael Ridge (2011, 21).

so, why. Consider the following case of cheaply gained knowledge of a pointless truth:

Pierre sits in a café by the window looking out onto a relatively busy Parisian side-street. He decides to gain knowledge by counting the number of people who pass by his table on the street outside between every sup of his coffee. He comes to know that five people passed between his first sup and his second sup, seven people passed between his second sup and his third sup, etc. Let us further add that there is no opportunity cost worth considering, he could not have been doing anything else in this time that is valuable.⁴

If knowledge is finally valuable then it seems that if there is nothing else Pierre could be doing that is valuable then he should count between sups to clock up more and more value. That there may be nothing else Pierre could be doing that is valuable seems a legitimate stipulation.⁵ The important point that I hope strikes the reader is that even if he has nothing much to do, achieving knowledge of pointless truths does not seem to constitute something worth doing, let alone something that is finally valuable as an achievement.

The defender of P3, that each case of an achievement is finally valuable, might claim that even here, that although knowledge is valuable as an achievement, other factors make it such that it turns out that all things considered this knowledge is not valuable. But this is a case of easy to gain knowledge; if supping and counting are going to be enough to outweigh the value of knowledge as an achievement then it seems that the value knowledge has as an achievement, its *pro tanto* value, rather than whatever different particular values may accrue to different instances of knowledge as achievements, is non-existent. Perhaps there may be a clash of intuitions with regard to the value of Pierre's knowledge. Perhaps some will have the intuition that Pierre's knowledge does have some value, albeit a risibly low value. Even if we were to grant that Pierre's knowledge does have such value the case would remain to be made that that risibly low value is final value.

A defender of the claim that each case of knowledge is finally valuable might abandon attempts to make her case by drawing on Greco's account, as, given my argument, I think they should. Such a defender may attempt to offer a number of alternative arguments for the claim that knowledge has *pro tanto*

⁴ To deal with Pritchard's argument (2010) that for knowledge to be a cognitive achievement then a skill must be exercised, we can add that a special counting skill is being used.

⁵ It might still be objected that if Pierre is counting between sups, then he is missing out on doing something more valuable. For example, relaxing is valuable and he is missing out on that. I think the relaxing example doesn't work because it's not something that can be necessarily done at will. Suppose Pierre is waiting for Jean-Paul and he's worried that he might be waiting in the wrong café; he just cannot relax. The opportunity cost objection might gain some traction if the case were made that granting that Pierre can sit at the café and count people between sups of coffee necessitates that he can do something else that's more valuable instead. However, it's not obvious what that opportunity cost would be and that it could do the work of convincing us that the *pro tanto* value that knowledge has as an achievement is not risibly low or non-existent.

final value. She might make the case, to first cash out the intuition that Pierre's knowledge does have value, that all knowledge, even Pierre's knowledge, has value in virtue of its possible usefulness. The thought would be that, while it is true that we think that Pierre's knowledge is knowledge of a pointless truth, that knowledge may turn out not to be pointless or, perhaps, as far as Pierre knows it may turn out to be useful. It is after all possible an evil-doer might threaten to kill Pierre's family unless he can tell her how many people passed between sups, in which case knowing the answer would seem very valuable. This argument based on the possible usefulness of knowledge seems problematic, however, when we consider that the converse outlandish scenario might alternatively be the case; the evil-doer might kill Pierre's family if he knows how many people were passing between sups.

Alternatively, the defender of the claim that every case of knowledge has pro tanto final value might make the case that intuitively, given a certain frame, having an extra instance of knowledge is valuable and therefore we have some reason to think that knowledge is valuable. More specifically, she might say that imagining two worlds, one in which S has n amount of knowledge and another in which S has $n+1$ amount of knowledge, that, *ceteris paribus*, the second world is better. Or to put it more simply, again *ceteris paribus*, intuitively having more knowledge is better than having less knowledge. The extra item of knowledge is the knowledge of how many people passed between sups one and two of the coffee. The intuition that the knowledge in the Pierre case has no value may now seem a little weaker given this framing.⁶ Even so, there would still be some way to go to show that the value in question is final value and that the intuition that it is better to have more knowledge than less, given that the extra knowledge in question is knowledge of a pointless truth, is not just down to an inappropriate epistemic acquisitiveness.⁷

While we tend to think that knowledge is valuable and not just instrumentally valuable, we need not be committed to the claim that each case of knowledge is finally valuable. Instead, a general claim about the value of knowledge may be true. While each individual case of knowledge may not be valuable as an achievement, it may be the case that knowledge, along with other goods that are

⁶ For the appeal to form the basis of an argument that the knowledge in the Pierre case is valuable, we must assume that intuitions that propositions are true offer some kind of epistemic support that those propositions are true.

⁷ Perhaps the way to go would be to argue that all true beliefs are pro tanto finally valuable, and assuming that having knowledge implies having the relevant true belief, as is widely assumed in analytic epistemology, then it will turn out that having knowledge is pro tanto finally valuable. While this could be an answer to our immediate concern, it wouldn't show that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. Within the literature on the value of knowledge topic there's taken to be a pre-theoretic intuition that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. (Pritchard, 2010, 5–8) Argues that there is also an intuition that knowledge is distinctively valuable *vis-à-vis* that which falls short of knowledge and that a good account of the value of knowledge should also address this intuition.

achievements, are, owing to their nature generally valuable in the way described in the first argument. In other words, we can claim that it is in the nature of knowledge to be finally valuable as an achievement, though this does not commit us to claiming each case of knowledge is finally valuable as an achievement. It being in the nature of a good to have a certain value need not imply that each instance of that good has that value. For example, it is the nature of a tiger to be fierce; in saying that, however, the possibility of a non-fierce tiger is not excluded. Rather, it is just that such a tiger, given the nature of tigers, would be exceptional as a tiger (Pritchard, 2010b).⁸

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⁸ Pritchard (2010b) credits John Turri with the tiger example.

Artur Karimov

ANALYTICITY AND MODALITY

ABSTRACT

In this paper I defend the concept of metaphysical analyticity, and argue for the notion of analyticity as truth in virtue of the reference determiner, introduced by Gillian K. Russell. Contrary to Russell, I try to show that necessary *a posteriori* statements are analytic under this notion. Also, I maintain that contingent *a priori* statements cannot be properly called analytic.

Keywords: analyticity; modality; necessity; aprioricity; meaning.

The title of the article is intentionally ambiguous. I want to consider the relation of analyticity with modal concepts, i.e. necessity and contingency, but also defend a broader definition of analyticity in terms of a possible world evaluation. Before I start to talk about analyticity, I would like to make a few things clear. Firstly, I believe that analyticity is a viable philosophical notion despite the strong criticism it has received in the 20th century from such different positions as meaning holism (Willard Van Orman Quine) and meaning externalism (Hilary Putnam). Secondly, the literature of the subject offers many definitions of analytic truths, but I adhere to the definition of analytic truth as truth in virtue of meaning. As it stands, this definition is not very clear because it relies on a certain theory of meaning, and, more broadly, on a certain philosophy of language. So, I will introduce some clarifying conditions which are not argued for here, since a relevant theory of meaning and philosophy of language are not my primary concern here.

What is the bearer of analyticity? Although many believe that sentences are its bearers, it seems that they are not the best candidates, because sentences by themselves cannot be true or false. Truth or falsity is a property of what is expressed by sentences. Propositions are not good candidates, either. A sentence might express different propositions. Also, different sentences may express the same proposition. We take statements, i.e. propositions expressed by a sentence,

to be bearers of analyticity. A statement “is a sentence together with its interpretation or some rules for using the sentence. Particularly, these rules govern which evidence may be relevant to the truth of the sentence.” (Juhls, Loomis, 2010, 216)

I will start, following Boghossian, by distinguishing between two kinds of analyticity: metaphysical analyticity and epistemological analyticity. (Boghossian, 1996) A sentence is said to be metaphysically analytic iff it is true in virtue of meaning alone. By contrast, a sentence is epistemically analytic iff anyone who understands it is justified in taking it to be true. Of interest here is the latter, metaphysical notion of analyticity. There are some objections to this notion that will be considered below. Boghossian presents a simple case by asking how a mere fact that *S* means *p* makes it the case that *S* is true? Does not it also have to be the case that *p*? The quick answer to this would be that if we read “fact that *p*” in a Tarski’s semantic way, then the notion of fact is devoid of any metaphysical status. Another way to respond is to admit that all truths (even logical truths, like the law of identity) in a way depend on how the world is, given the correspondence theory of truth, but some truths are not merely factual. There is a non-trivial way in which some truths are dependent on linguistic facts about meaning. The objection holds only if we accept the premise that truth in virtue of meaning and truth in virtue of fact are mutually exclusive, but they do need not be.

What is meaning? I adopt Gillian K. Russell’s distinction of four different components of meaning: content, character, reference determiner and extension. (Russell, 2008) The difference between content and character is best seen in demonstratives: “I”, “here”, “now”. Kaplan first made a distinction between content and character. (Kaplan, 1979) He explicates content in a Fregean way, i.e. a function from possible worlds to extensions. Character is a function from context to content. Character determines the way in which in different contexts an utterance expresses different contents. Character also plays another important role—it is a part of meaning of the expression that a speaker must know in order to be considered competent with the word. So, if the content of “I” is an agent of utterance, the character of “I” is a rule for determining that content, given the context of an utterance. For sentences the content will be the proposition it expresses. The reference determiner is what fixes the referent of a term; it is a condition an object must meet in order to fall into the extension of an expression. For demonstratives it would be the context of utterance, for predicates—context of evaluation, and for proper names—the context of the introduction of the term. For Russell, the sentence is analytic not in virtue of content or character but in virtue of reference determiner. It happens if “for all pairs of context of introduction and context of utterance, the proposition expressed by *S* with respect to those contexts is true in the context of evaluation.” (Russell, 2008, 56) This is what she understands by truth in virtue of meaning. The reference determiner for “bachelor” is the condition that the objects which it applies

to be male and unmarried in the context of evaluation. The reference determiner for proper names is the condition that it applies to the object which the baptizer demonstrated when first introducing the name.

There is a way in which the notion of “truth in virtue of reference determiner” follows the traditional conception of analyticity, and a way in which it is different. It follows the Kantian definition of analyticity in the way that it preserves the containment relation between the meaning of the logical subject phrase and the logical predicate phrase. For example, in the case of “All bachelors are unmarried men” the reference determiner for “bachelor” is contained in the reference determiner for “unmarried man.” The main difference is that the reference determiner of an expression is not always cognitively accessible to the speaker. Therefore, analyticity and aprioricity come apart. This significantly alters the epistemic status of analytic statements. Sentences may be metaphysically analytic even though competent speakers do not recognize them as true. An example showing that analytic truth and epistemic accessibility do not always come together is provided by Williamson. (Williamson, 2008) He examines the sentence “Every vixen is a vixen.” If Peter believes that the claims of the form “every F is G” entail the corresponding claim about the existence of F’s (he takes universal quantification to be existentially committing), but Peter does not believe in foxes (suppose he read in the Internet and believed that there were no foxes and hence no vixens), then Peter rejects the truth “Every vixen is a vixen,” even though he understands this sentence perfectly well.

Given the above explanation of analyticity it should be demonstrated how it is related to necessity. According to Hoffman and Horvath, analytic truths are a special sub-class of necessary truths, namely those which manifest meaning inclusion. (Hoffman, Horvath, 2008) Meaning inclusion happens when the meaning of one expression is included in the meaning of another expression. For example, the meaning of one predicate (“is a bachelor”) is included in the meaning of another predicate (“is male”). Hence, accidental meaning inclusion is not sufficient for analytic truth. Semantic inclusion should be intended or desired. This is in concordance with the containment theory of analyticity. But the traditional theory of analyticity maintains that all analytic statements are necessary. Does this hold for the notion of truth in virtue of reference determiner? We must answer two questions: are all analytic statements necessary, and are all necessary statements analytic?

Wachter argues that to deny a true analytic statement is to commit a mistake of language. (Wachter, 1999) Not so for necessity statements. Take some examples of necessity: “Nobody can be guilty for something he did not do freely,” “Nothing can cause something which took place earlier.” According to Wachter, the source of those necessities is the world. This is what the world allows or does not allow for (moreover, all possible worlds). In this account the necessary statements are not analytic because to contradict a true necessity statement is not a linguistic mistake—it is a mistake concerning a possible world. I respond

that these examples are not true metaphysical necessities, but merely conceptual ones. It is easy to show how the concept of guilt already presupposes free choice, but I will not demonstrate it here. More interesting are examples of *a posteriori* necessities and contingent *a priori*.

Examples of necessary *a posteriori* are sentences like “Water is H₂O” and “Hesperus is Phosphorus.” These truths are metaphysically necessary, but they are not considered to be analytical. Russell argues that these sentences are not analytic because the meaning of the terms in these sentences is sensitive to the context of introduction. Had Hesperus been chosen to mean Mars and Phosphorus mean Venus, “Hesperus is Phosphorus” would not be true in virtue of meaning. I object that this consideration is trivial. If it were valid, no sentence would be ever called analytic. If “bachelor” meant “unmarried woman” instead, no one would say that bachelors are unmarried men. When a proper name is introduced into a linguistic community, its referent is fixed. Since reference determiners for “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” pick out the same referent, “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is analytic.

What about contingent *a priori* statements? Can there be analytic sentences that are contingent? The example of “I am here now” seems to satisfy that description. It is true in every context of utterance and every context of evaluation (we do not need to consider the context of introduction for demonstratives). Most philosophers would agree that this is the prime example of an analytic statement that is not necessary. I would like to argue that this is not so. This is an interesting example of a statement that is epistemically analytic but not metaphysically analytic. It is not true in virtue of meaning, although everyone who understands this sentence recognizes that it is true. The reference determiners for “I”, “here”, or “now” are not in any containment relation. The simple proof would be to put the sentence “I am here now” down on paper and let someone else take it out the next day.

The discussion about the relation between analyticity and modal terms is still going on. In this article I tried to defend the notion of truth in virtue of reference determiner, introduced by Russell. Contrary to her opinion, I have argued that analyticity and necessity cannot be separated.

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TRUTH IN RELIGION, SCIENCE, AND POSTMODERNISM

ABSTRACT

In this paper different approaches to the concept of truth are compared. Many changes in the concept of truth result in making it a zero notion. Similar processes are described in Max Müller's conception of the genesis of religion. In this respect we suggest that postmodern philosophy should be treated as a new mythology.

Keywords: truth; Baudrillard; postmodernism.

Jean Baudrillard once said that truth did not exist at all. (Baudrillard, 1990, 59) However, he voiced this thesis speaking on the discussion between iconoclasts and iconodules. Therefore, the aforementioned discussion implicitly refutes his own statement. Particularly, the arguments justifying the icon worship, e.g., Regulation 82 of the Quinisext Council (the Council in Trullo), state that truth recognition and worship is possible because personalized truth as the incarnation of the Logos appeared to people by itself thus becoming cognoscible. The Truth is here understood as the Absolute because in the *Holy Bible* the truth and the Absolute are sometimes identified with one another (Jer. 10: 10; Jn. 14: 6). And this identity demonstrates that the provided argument serves as the reason for criticism of not only atheism but also agnosticism. Agnosticism is more correct and does not *a priori* controvert the existence of the God. However, without abnegating and equally without acknowledging it, agnosticism proceeds from the ideas of the Absolute as a certain *dues otiosus*—otiose God not manifesting himself anyhow. But in the case in question agnosticism projects its own views onto reality—if Kantian thing-in-itself exists, its presence is impossible to prove by definition. In theory God must not necessarily be a thing-in-itself, deists' God. He may be a God of the Revelation religions. But such an apology of the truth and its accessibility in cognition is possible not only for the Pascalean God but also for the Spinocean *deus sive natura*, because nature in its numerous manifestations reveals its essence to us.

In consequence, Baudrillard does not abnegate the existence of truth. From his views it follows that “the truth does not exist” is a true statement. He merely upholds his own understanding of truth, relativizes it. Another question is how does he relativizes. Physicists Jean Bricmont and Alan Sokal showed how Baudrillard, Gilles Deleuze, Jean-François Lyotard and other postmodernists manipulated scientific data in attempting to justify relativism and demonstrate their incompetence in natural science issues. (Bricmont, Sokal, 1998) So, the absence of the truth is not the only logical possibility but it is this possibility which is not confirmed by the scientists and is contradicted by everybody who acknowledges the true nature of his statements and adequately uses the term “truth.” Certainly, this term could be used in the way Baudrillard uses it; insisting on the fact that it is necessary not to mix up the concept (or proposition) and its contents. Then it is admissible to declare that truth consists in the fact that there is no truth. But also in this case the reference of Bricmont and Sokal to the continuous linkedness of the scientific experience leaves no grounds for the declaration. And disagreement with this declaration is the effect of empirical data accumulation. Besides, it is also possible to draw attention to the induction drawbacks, and, following Karl R. Popper, state that induction does not exist. However, truth, as Plato’s *Kratylos* states, is something which corresponds to reality. Therefore, even if there is no induction, then it is also impossible to separate the form of the thesis from its substance. Derrida quite justly noticed that after Descartes philosophy cannot be non-Cartesian but the radical doubt and the attempt to overcome it certainly did not first appear in the Modern Age. Already St. Augustine in his *De Vera Religione* [On True Religion], in his polemics with the academicians, used the prototype of the Cartesian *cogito*. He applied it to prove the possibility of the existence of truth.

Not only after Descartes but since ancient times, philosophers have not been able to postulate the absence of truth without a justification of their thesis. Let us remember here that Maimonides used derivatives from the word *emet* (which is translated from the Hebrew term “truth”) to designate people not satisfied with a custom or authority and tending to the mental cognition of truth. (Florensky, 2002, 14) In other words, using this word he designated philosophers who would not adopt any statement without its verifying even if the validity were justified with the reference to the authority of Baudrillard or the authority of the person who is the authority for Baudrillard himself. Therefore, both the history and the sense of the concept under consideration do not allow an *a priori* denial of what is designated by it. To say that there is no truth in the classical sense of the word means to say nonsense. Non-existent truth is the same *contraditio in adjecto* as hot cold or circular square. Consequently, it is possible to speak of truth the way Baudrillard does do only biasing the sense of the concept.

In effect, contexts may change the initial meaning of the concept. For example, for Hegel, it was obvious that the very notion indirectly changes itself in the course of time. Baudrillard writes that beyond the framework of the text terms

lose their sense. (Baudrillard, 2007, 48) And really one cannot but agree that in a different text the sense of the word may be different. Then all the aforementioned critical remarks addressed to Baudrillard are eliminated. Say, iconoclasts and iconodules have, in Wittgenstein's terminology, one type of language game whereas Baudrillard and Foucault apply another type. But that is the point that referring to the iconoclastic controversies, Baudrillard imposes the sense beyond his own text and language game. Baudrillard's proposition is as follows: iconoclasts and iconodules lived with the idea of altered truth because the truth does not exist. However, historically and etymologically it would be more right to say that both the opposing parties lived with the idea of truth in the classical sense of the world. The truth, regardless of the ideology corresponding to it, cannot but exist due to this very (classical) sense. The point is not the fact that iconoclasts or iconodules lived with the idea of altered truth. The point is that Baudrillard distorted the sense of the concept of truth, and, having superposed it onto the period of iconoclastic controversies, saw the very distortion he was declaring. The question is: what did make him distorting the sense of the concept in the way which made it possible to state that there is no truth. Or vice versa: the question is what prompted his statement that there is no truth which resulted in the distortion of the concept. Who is the authority that influenced Baudrillard and with whose opinion would philosophers in Maimonides's understanding do not agree *a priori*?

I believe that the deconstruction of the extract from Baudrillard which is of interest for me would be impossible if we do not take into account that Baudrillard is a part of the postmodernist tradition which has been evolving since the second half of the 20th century. And the formation of the ideas in the framework of this tradition is comparable with the formation of religion as it is expounded in Max Müller's conception. For Müller religion is a product of mixing the meaning of the concept, a certain "language illness": the penury of ancient languages resulted in the designation of different phenomena with similar features using the same words, many names were metaphorical in nature. In the course of time the meaning is obscured, changed, and, when the original meaning becoming forgotten, the phenomena, due to language polynymism and synonymism, were personified; that is the way objects for worship appeared. The material presented by Müller in his *Science of Religion* may quite possibly be interpreted in favour of pramontheism. One cannot help noticing the isomorphism of his concept with the processes being the effect of the postmodernist discourse. Baudrillard quite reasonably questions Foucault: if sex exists solely when it is spoken and discoursed about and when it is confessed, what was there before we spoke about it? (Baudrillard, 2007, 45) This, verging on the loss of reality obsession with language, results in the scenario described by Müller. The word is equalized in rights with the reality and may even oppose it. Far back Pierre Duhem warned that one had not to make conclusions concerning results of physics research basing on a play on words. But his warning

was not heard. As demonstrated by Bricmont and Sokal, postmodernists often understand metaphors used in natural sciences literally which results in inadequate interpretations of scientific data, due to which an assertion of relativism, equality of any opinions (each implied as containing a part of the truth) becomes possible. The effect of this is quite predictable, often supported by the speculations around the general theory of relativity. It is the statement that truth cannot be contained in the unbiased form in any separate statement or concept. That is, there is no truth. However, this idea may be a prerequisite in accordance with which scientific data are interpreted: we believe these two processes are interdependent. Therefore, completely in accordance with Müller's mechanics, postmodernism creates a new mythology thanks to which words describing reality do not obey this reality. It is noteworthy that for Foucault, dis-identification of the words and reality, dis-identification of the words and things is an objective process which we are forced to merely certify (presumably, here Foucault managed to persuade Baudrillard). However, according to Foucault, archeology of the humanities is a speculative structure; the truth of it rests on two doubtful operations. First, it is initially postulated that words and texts, in general, are independent, unique structures. This postulate is an element of the tradition formed among others by Barthes, Derrida and Foucault himself who projects the postulate under study back to the past. Second, to make this projection Foucault considers the dis-identification of the words and things as exemplified by the evolution of money, and he extrapolates this particular metamorphosis onto everything that is going on. Neither the first, nor the second operations are justified. Ultimately, the reasoning turns out to be *circulus in probando*: words live their own lives because words live their own lives (and the very acknowledgement of this proposition explains why nobody is afraid of being caught in the incorrectness of the statement that there is no truth).

I believe that the ban of ontology is a direct effect of the denial of truth and affirmation of relativism. However, in the light of the above expressed investigations, I consider this ban temporary because it is just an episode in the dialectical formation of philosophy. This formation may be observed in most versatile areas. Certainly, such authors as Gianni Vattimo or Slavoj Žižek are not quite consistent when trying to simultaneously return to conventional axiology and stick to their own world-view concepts. But still they demonstrate the trend which may also pertain to epistemology.

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SOPHISTICS AND ITS MODERN READING

ABSTRACT

Whatever the theory of knowledge may be—classical, non-classical, or post-non-classical, idealistic or materialistic, dialectical or metaphysical—its core is always the question: “Is there absolute truth?” (which I doubt)—because I am (absolutely) convinced that there is relative truth, for it is obvious. In the last few decades post-non-classical views on truth, namely, relativistic have triumphed. Nowadays we witness a renaissance of theoretical paradoxes of sophistry that can lead, and often do lead to real social misfortunes. To avoid them, one has to consider how it all began in the times of classical ancient Greek philosophy. Such exploration is the aim of the present paper.

Keywords: sophistic; paradoxes of sophistry; social misfortunes; be just.

One of the best examples of the art of sophistic paradoxes is given in Plato’s *Republic*. This famous dialogue centers on a seemingly simple question: is it always better to be just than unjust?

Characters: Socrates, Thrasymachus, Polemarchus, Glaucon, and others.

Thrasymachus: “Now listen. I say that the just is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger.” (338 c)

Socrates: “But, Thrasymachus, the arts rule and they are masters of that of which they are arts [...] Then, there is no kind of knowledge that considers or commands the advantage of the stronger, but rather of what is weaker and ruled by it.” (342 d)

A doctor considers and commands the sick man’s advantage; a pilot considers and commands the sailors. “Therefore [...] there is not ever anyone who holds any position of rule, insofar as he is a ruler, who considers or commands his own advantage rather than that of what is ruled ...” (342 d)

So, a governor performs only that which is useful for his subordinate, for whom he works. (342 e)

Oh, really?

Thrasymachus: “Because you suppose shepherds or cowherds consider the good of the sheep or the cows and fatten them and take care of them looking to something other than their master’s good and their own; and so you also believe that the rulers in the cities, those who truly rule, think about the ruled differently from the way a man would regard sheep, and that night and day they consider anything else than how they will benefit themselves?”

Well, maybe Thrasymachus should not compare the subjects of the state—sheep; then Socrates might not construct analogies with horses and dogs, either. Let us continue.

Thrasymachus, to Socrates: “And you are so far off about the just and injustice, that you are unaware that justice and the just are really someone else’s good, the advantage of the man who is the stronger and rules, and a personal harm to the man who obeys and serves. Injustice is the opposite, and it rules the truly simple and [thus] just; and those who are ruled do what is advantageous for him who is stronger, and they make him whom they serve happy but themselves not at all.” (343 b, c)

Generally speaking, Thrasymachus often acts as a strict logician towards Socrates’s argumentation and, vice versa, Socrates plays a sophist, although in the literature it is always emphasized that he was not.

In all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is, that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger. It is just for subjects to obey their rulers—when they are not mistaken. “No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies. [...] the ruler, insofar as he is a ruler, does not make mistakes; and not making mistakes, he sets down what is best for himself.” (341 a)

This is Thrasymachus.

Socrates uses sophistries, for instance, in his conversation with Polemarchus, which concerned justice and harm. Discussing the topic that a fair person can sometimes inflict harm, Socrates uses the example of animals, namely, horses and dogs, that can lose their animal dignity because of harm performed to them. Then he makes the following move: What about people about whom we cannot say that they, when harmed, lose their human dignity? And thus does it necessarily become unfair?

The dialogue develops as follows:

- Do horses when they have been harmed become better or worse?
- Worse.
- With respect to the virtue of dogs or to that of horses?
- With respect to the virtue of horses.
- And when dogs are harmed, do they become worse with respect to the virtue of dogs and not to that of horses?
- Necessarily.

- Should we not assert the same of human beings, that when they are harmed they become worse with respect to the human virtue?
- Most certainly.
- But is not justice a human virtue?
- That is also necessary.
- Then, my friend, the human beings who have been harmed necessarily become more unjust. (335 b, c)

And then a pearl comes: But are just men able to make others unjust by justice, of all things? Or, in sum, are good men able to make other men bad by virtue? (335 d)

Impossible, answers “indignant” Polemarchus ...

“White Socrates begins and wins”, as they say.

In fact, for a horse to lose its “horseness” means to be unable to run the Derby, and for a dog to lose its “dogness” means to lose its loyalty or ability to hunt. The definitive sign for a human being is reason—and not might, not velocity, not even loyalty, losing which, by harm, a man does not cease to be a human ... What does it have to do with justice?

One more paralogism: every art does its job and benefits according to its purpose. But: “If pay were not attached to it, would the craftsman derive benefit from the art?” (346 d) “Does he then produce no benefit when he works for nothing?” (346 e) “Therefore, Thrasymachus, it is plain by now that no art or kind of rule provides for its own benefit, but, as we have been saying, it provides for and commands for the one who is ruled, considering his advantage—that of the weaker—and not that of the stronger [...] the man who is to do anything fine by art never does what is best for himself nor does he command it, insofar as he is commanding by art, but rather what is best for the man who is ruled.” (347 a)

NO; it is not plain by now. Art is something very far from politics, but for the engaged art, of course; artists do not “govern” the public by law; doctors do not rule their patients by law; housebuilders are not forced to build houses by law. When a sophist—and here it is no one but Socrates—argues that politicians who expose their laws on the subordinates act the same as musicians playing flutes, he (a sophist) makes believe that the governors are striving for the subjects’ benefit, and not to their own good, he is substituting the thesis “justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger” by the thesis “justice is nothing else than the craftsmanship of the governor”. But those possessing this art might never want to use it, poor souls: it is too hard a task! “No one willingly chooses to rule and get mixed up in straightening other people’s troubles [...] It is for just this reason [...] that there must be wages for those who are [...] willing to rule—either money, or honour ...” (346 e)

Or—a penalty, should he refuse to rule. Poor lame ducks, indeed.

Imagine a penalty for the artist for not playing the artist?

All this has nothing to do with justice.

The best known definition made by Thrasymachus: “Listen, then; I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger.” (338 c)

The just man everywhere has less than the unjust man.

I apologize for the lengthy quotes; the question is: has anything changed in the State since then?

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THE HEURISTIC AND METHODOLOGICAL POTENTIAL OF THE CONCEPT “SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION”

ABSTRACT

The concept of revolution in science is widely used in philosophy of science. We believe that the concept of revolution was borrowed from social-political literature and without any philosophical analysis was transferred to history of science. For this reason, attempts to transform that concept into an efficient instrument of building a theory of the development of scientific knowledge cannot be successful. This concept is nothing more than a metaphor for emphasizing empirical and theoretical discoveries of great significance in the history of science.

Keywords: revolution; scientific revolution; paradigm; philosophical foundation of science; theoretical and empirical discoveries; metaphor.

In the modern philosophy of science the concept of scientific revolution is one of the most important ones. It is widely used for studying the process of the development of scientific knowledge. Meanwhile, it acquired such a status comparatively recently. Most probably, the concept of revolution in science was first used to characterize the events that took place in physics at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. This period included the first steps in the research of elementary particles, the development of quantum mechanics and relativity theory. However, at that time, one spoke more about a crisis, and moreover, a crisis in physics (for instance, Max Plank and Albert Einstein), and not in science as a whole. Since then, the general tendency was to speak about scientific revolutions which consist in sufficiently deep theoretical changes, and in significant discoveries that open new areas of scientific research. Both the scientists and philosophers of science used the term “scientific revolution” as a metaphor, an informal image, in order to emphasize the significance and fundamental character of scientific discoveries or new basic theoretical ideas. In

those cases the scientific revolution was understood as an exceptional event; that very word was used in respect of Nicolaus Copernicus or the period of the development of quantum mechanics. However, in general, the development of science was modeled on classical mechanics. That approach was later solidified in the positivist understanding of the process of scientific development: science starts with accumulating empirical material obtained by observation and experiment which is subsequently systematized and explained in the framework of the corresponding theory. Therefore, scientific knowledge unifies empirical and theoretic knowledge, and it is empirical facts obtained in experiments that make the starting point of scientific research; those facts are used as a criterion of the correctness of theories and, in the case of a discrepancy with the existing theory, they are the reason to change the latter. The development of science is thus understood as an accumulative process.

The situation changed radically when Thomas R. Kuhn published *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. It was him who tried to turn the concept of scientific revolution into a category, that is, a universal concept, working as a heuristic and methodological principle.

Indeed, it is well known that Kuhn divided the development of science into a “normal science,” when the scientists are solving “puzzles,” that is, the problems offered by the current paradigm, and an extraordinary science, or a scientific revolution. In the phase of normal science the development is accumulative, in the phase of “extraordinary science” the current paradigm is replaced by another one, that is, the whole system of scientific knowledge is fundamentally transformed. And since both the phases are meant to follow each other, scientific revolutions become a necessary and universal phenomenon. Therefore, they acquire the status of probably the most important and unconditionally positive phenomenon in the development of science, since the new paradigm resolves the anomalies, that is, those puzzles which could not be solved in the framework of the old paradigm, and produces new puzzles.

Kuhn’s ideas essentially influenced all philosophy of science. However, we believe that the very word combination “scientific revolution” has not been properly analyzed as a philosophical concept.

Let us consider the history of the concept “revolution” and its place in the system of the related concepts. Obviously, one should start with the concepts of change, development and dynamics.

The problem of change and development of everything that exists, be it the world that surrounds us or our knowledge about it, is one of the most ancient problems. In one or another form it was considered by all philosophers of antiquity. The world and everything in it was treated as both changing and remaining the same, moving and resting.

The problem is which of the two sides of that controversy dominates. It is well known that different philosophers had different priorities: some of them believed that changeability has primacy over constancy (Heraclitus), others

claimed the converse (Parmenides), but the most popular were the attempts to join the two sides of the controversy into a unity (Pythagoras, Democritus). The last solution turned out to be the most productive and was developed by such philosophers as Plato and Aristotle.

One should note that, due to the character of ancient civilizations, time was understood to be cyclical, that is, the dominating opinion was that events follow each other in infinite repetitions, and for that reason the idea of development was not of any significance. However, it became significant in medieval European philosophy, which acquired from Christianity the idea of linear time, directed from the past into the future through the present. This generated the idea of development, resulting in qualitative changes, in something essentially new in people's lives. As for the repetition of the past, that side goes to the background and plays the role of historical conditions of the new quality which is the product of development. Another essential point on the theory of development is the claim that evolution never comes back to the starting point.

In its turn, in the 18th–19th centuries the idea of progress appeared in the French and English socio-political and philosophical thought on the basis of the concept of evolution, under the influence, on one hand, of scientific and technical progress, and on the other hand, of changes in social life in Europe. The concept of progress became an important value, due to the gradual liberalization and democratization of economic and political life, and also due to life becoming more and more comfortable, at least for a large part of the population; progress turned into a social ideal, with revolutions making its way.

Due to certain historical circumstances, the concept of development was connected with rapid, crucial and deep changes in social life and its conditions, which got the name "revolution," in contrast to slow and gradual changes, that is, reforms or evolution.

We believe that the very application of the concept of revolution to the process of the development of science needs to be justified. When social concepts, which always carry ideological and political meaning, are transferred to scientific life and development, the latter are inevitably misrepresented, simplified and schematized. Similarly, when the concepts and theories from science are transferred to social and cultural life, it does not improve, but, on the contrary, prevents one from understanding the latter, and leads to unjustified conclusions.

It is especially important to emphasize that the concept of revolution in social knowledge is a subject of controversial discussions of various social groups and carries the load of political engagement, of socio-political subjectivism, and often is a response to political needs. It is used in political struggle to attract supporters and destroy opponents. History shows that, depending on the political situation, the social processes that are considered as being of revolutionary character, later are characterized and estimated in different ways. Respectively, the understanding of the concept of revolution varies as well. History gives a lot of evidence of the destructive character of the events that are considered as rev-

olutionary, of the numerous hard consequences, including human victims, destruction of cultural values, and, in particular, damage to the science and its development. All revolutions break the traditions of social life, sometimes irredeemably. A special problem is the negative effect that revolutionary changes have on social morality.

The changes in scientific conceptions, however significant they are, have a different character compared to social changes and for that reason do not correspond to the contents of the concept of revolution, even in the case if they are referred to using the word combination “scientific revolution.” When the history of scientific progress is considered from the viewpoint that accepts scientific revolutions as necessary phenomena, this leads to a schematic approach which is theoretically dangerous. We note that in classical philosophy, in particular, in the time of social revolutions in European countries, the idea of gradual, cautious, prudent social changes, as opposed to the destruction of the existing social structures, was a prevailing one. The wisdom of philosophy expressed itself in protecting the way of life and reforming it gradually.

Having borrowed the concept of revolution from socio-political thought, Kuhn tried to endow it, in the framework of philosophy of science, with certain special contents. For instance, he brought forward the idea of the incompatibility of paradigms: in the framework of each paradigm scientific concepts have special meanings connected with that paradigm only. For that reason, when physicists use the same words in different times, they invest different meanings into them.

In other words, according to Kuhn, each paradigm in physics creates its own image of the world, which is not to be compared with the image created by another paradigm. Note that the scholars who criticized this concept (and such authors appeared as soon as Kuhn published his theory, although they were much less numerous and active than Kuhn’s supporters) started to point out its weak points (Kuhn’s theory essentially disregards such an obvious fact as the continuity in the development of science; Kuhn’s theory gives no rational explanations of the reasons why paradigms replace each other etc.), but none of them paid attention to the weakness of the very concept of scientific revolution, coming from the point that the concept of revolution is borrowed from a totally different area of study without a proper analysis.

The image of science as a set of “puzzles” and their solutions is also disputable. This image is so superficial that it by itself assumes an arbitrary treatment of the process of finding scientific truth, of the ways of its development, of the prerequisites of scientific problems, of the correlation of objective and subjective in science. The image of cracking a puzzle, transferred from everyday life, is far from being similar to the process of finding a solution to a scientific problem.

It is interesting to note that those philosophers who are usually joined to Kuhn under the ambiguous and uncertain term “post-positivists”, in the first

place, Paul Feyerabend and Imre Lakatos, essentially do not accept and do not use the concept of scientific revolution. For instance, Feyerabend considers the development of any new scientific theory as a revolution, because he believes that all theories are incompatible, which devalues the concept of revolution. Lakatos' theory of research programs is only remotely related to Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions.

We emphasize that Kuhn's idea of incompatibility of paradigms removes the problem of evaluation for a scientific revolution: paradigms cannot be compared and assessed in terms of each other because they are incompatible. It comes as no surprise that Kuhn himself did not see the development of science as a continuous connected process directed towards the truth.

The idea of scientific revolutions was further developed in Russia in Vyacheslav S. Stepin's book, *Philosophy of Science. General Problems*. In order to explain the contents of the concept "revolution in science," Stepin introduced a new concept "foundations of science" and treated the scientific revolution as a result of their change. Stepin claims that the foundations of science have a complex structure: first, it is the standards of rigor and proof, accepted by the science; second, it is the picture of the world (that is, the structure of the surrounding world, the objects, of which it consists, the time-space properties of the world etc.); third, it is the philosophical foundations of science (ontological and epistemological principles by which scientists are guided, consciously or unconsciously, in their research).

Stepin divides all scientific revolutions into global (that is, related to science as a whole) and intro-disciplinary ones. As a result, one can speak about many scientific revolutions, both in science as a whole and in particular sciences.

Stepin removed many of the drawbacks of the concept of scientific revolution that were present in Kuhn's theory. However, his own understanding of scientific revolutions can also be questioned.

Let us consider one example. Stepin believes that there were four global revolutions in the history of science: the first one in the 17th century (as a result of it, classical mechanics has emerged); the second one at the end of the 18th century—the beginning of the 19th century (the whole complex of scientific knowledge separated into particular disciplines); the third one in the second half of the 19th century—the first half of the 20th century (non-classical science emerged and started to develop); the fourth one at the end of the 20th century—the beginning of 21st century (the start of post-non-classical science). But if one accepts that the first scientific revolution took place in the 17th century, then Copernicus should be excluded from the history of the development of modern mathematics-based experimental science. And it was Copernicus who "set in motion" not only our planet but also the whole astronomy, which via the works of Tycho Brahe, Johannes Kepler and Galileo Galilei essentially influenced the development of classical mechanics. It looks also rather artificial to connect the global revolutions with the borders between centuries.

In our opinion, Werner Heisenberg's and Vitaly L. Ginzburg's understanding of the scientific revolution in physics is more convincing. When Heisenberg is using the concept of revolution in science, his aim is to find those properties of the concept which are related to scientific knowledge.

For instance, answering the question, how a revolution takes place in science, he emphasizes that it happens via minimal changes, when all efforts are concentrated on a single problem, which is certainly not yet solved.

According to Heisenberg, the essence of a scientific revolution lies in a change of the structure of mentality of scientists. One example of such a change is given by introducing non-visual concepts and theoretical constructions (such as the concept of electromagnetic field) in contrast to the concepts of classical mechanics. Relativity theory, continues Heisenberg, has essentially changed the understanding of space and time. Quantum mechanics changed the understanding of objectivity in describing nature: an account of an experiment now requires a description of the method of observation, and the results acquire probabilistic character, too. He believes that, to develop a new mentality, one needs many years of thinking about the new situation. This is so difficult, says Heisenberg, that one should wonder how revolutions in science were possible at all.

Therefore, concludes Heisenberg, there were two revolutions in physics: one in the 15th–17th centuries and another at the end of the 19th century—the beginning of the 20th century.

Heisenberg believes, however, the new ideas that appeared in the course of a scientific revolution are always combined with the old concepts which are not thrown away but preserved within more precisely determined limits, where they still work. For instance, when it was discovered, as a result of round the world journeys, that the Earth is a sphere, it changed nothing about the sea travels in the Mediterranean sea, and relativistic physics changed nothing in such classic areas of physics as classical mechanics, optics and thermodynamics.

Thus Heisenberg's theory aims to understand a scientific revolution as going essentially deeper in scientific knowledge, at the same time preserving the unity of the old and new ideas. In this way, the concept of scientific revolution keeps its evaluative character and becomes a metaphor, an image of development of scientific knowledge.

Ginzburg's viewpoint is quite close to that theory. He writes that the revolution in science should be understood as a number of essential changes in theory or methods of research, which lead to a discovery of new areas of scientific research. For instance, one can see two revolutions in astronomy. The first is connected with Copernicus's idea that the Earth revolves around the Sun and with Galileo Galilei applying a telescope to observe celestial bodies. The second revolution consists in creating the model of a non-stationary universe and with astronomy starting to use not only optical waves but the whole spectrum of electromagnetic radiation.

A comparison of such an understanding of scientific revolution with any concept of social revolution makes it clear that these concepts are radically different. That is why, in our opinion, one can conclude that the attempts to make the idea of scientific revolution a rigorous scientific concept were not successful so far. That concept can be applied only to create an image, a metaphor, which points out certain serious, fundamental advances in scientific knowledge. In other words, one can conclude that the concept of scientific revolution carries no special heuristic and methodological potential.

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PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY OF COGNITION BY MATHEMATICAL MODELLING

ABSTRACT

By the end of his life Plato had rearranged the theory of ideas into his teaching about ideal numbers, but no written records have been left. The Ideal mathematics of Plato is present in all his dialogues. It can be clearly grasped in relation to the effective use of mathematical modelling. Many problems of mathematical modelling were laid in the foundation of the method by cutting the three-level idealism of Plato to the single-level "ideism" of Aristotle. For a long time, the real, ideal numbers of Plato's Ideal mathematics eliminates many mathematical problems, extends the capabilities of modelling, and improves mathematics.

Keywords: modelling; theory of ideas; eidetic numbers; Ideal mathematics.

INTRODUCTION

According to Aristotle's suggestion it is asserted that Plato rearranged mathematically the theory of ideas into the theory of the world, modelling by means of ideal numbers only at the decline of his life. According to Friedrich Schleiermacher, the fundamentals of Plato's theory were formulated in his green years, while his *Dialogues* were written, according to the plan of the compilation of an integral theory. Karl Hermann supposed that Plato's views changed during his lifetime. We can see mathematical modelling even in Plato's early works. Still, Plato expresses it quite vaguely: *dymonium* in the *Theages*, the prayer in *Second Alcibiades*, patriotism in the *Menexenus*. In the *Theages*, intuition, naïve realistic knowledge was articulated; in the *Apology of Socrates*—a special philosophical knowledge, while in the *Lysis*—a causative row, leading to a universal origin, to ideal cognition.

Running slightly ahead, in order to prevent some unclear understanding (may be Plato's as well?) of his terms, we shall introduce now a three-level scheme of his ideas:

— Ideas (ideas)—the “mortal” generalization of all things, comprehensible for people.

— Ideals (ideas' ideas)—immortal generalizations of ideas not easily comprehensible.

— Ideal mathematics (The idea of ideas' ideas)—a generalization of all ideals, comprehensible to God only.

Even early Plato could clearly see the visible difference of his categories from normal mathematics—he discerned Ideal mathematics: in the *Menon*—the principle of exact science rather than abstract notions. In his “Συμπόσιον” Plato showed that the things tend to their limits, from bodies to souls, from souls to sciences (idea?), from sciences to the limit of all sciences, to the idea of the beautiful (an ideal?), not susceptible to alternations and existing eternally. [210a–212a] In each consecutive dialogue we can see more and more unusual Ideal mathematics. Gradually, a structure becomes visible in a new structure, and it is a numerical structure. Slowly, but steadily “ideal,” eidetic numbers are revealed. They, however, differ from mathematical numbers, they are more original, more principal than even his ideas, and they are a basis of ideas, their form, structure and their sense (an ideal?).

The top of Plato's categories comprehension by means of mathematical structure is in his *Parmenides*, where a possibility of not only a reasonable comprehension of things is substantiated, but also a possibility of naturally giving birth to them, by means of mathematical modelling, through material and sensible relations. For this purpose, Plato reduces the theory of ideas to maximal generalization with the categories of “Single” and “Other,” with an analysis of their ultimate properties (Ideal mathematics?), though he does not present numerical examples. As a result we have got numerous discrepancies, misunderstanding and contradictions in interpretation and even hostile reaction to his theory.

We have come to Plato with a bunch of numerical examples, with efficient algorithms and mathematical models, thus offering a help to Plato. We added to our arsenal ten direct and some reverse ideal numbers (ideals) of Plato; numerical regularities of his Ideal mathematics; and finally, lots of ideas, discovered by ordinary mathematics during the course of its development. We hope to offer a deeper understanding of Plato, by means of this “trick”.

It is usually considered¹ that the main essence of the *Sophist* is dedicated to the dialectics of such notions like “existence” and “non-existence,” entwined into *eidōs*, the whole *Parmenides* is dedicated to the dialectics of notions of “Single” and “Other” (i.e. something abstract, simpler than the original

¹ Losev, A. F. 1993. *Otzerki antitcznobo simbolisma i mitologii*, Moskva: Mysl.

eidōs) in Ideal mathematics. The reason, however, that Plato devotes two important dialogues to the description of a hard to describe logical system of dialectics, is universally ignored. The participants of the dialogue in the *Sophist*, however, try from the very beginning to give a definition to the sophist and point out: “we are bound to meet the necessity to admit that lies and mistakes really exist.” And then follows the main content of the two dialogues.

A confusion was caused by some lies and mistakes which likely happened in knowing the world. Plato was aware of the truth of any human mind comprehension. He could see it only in *eidōses* and in Ideal mathematics. Unfortunately, he is unable to show them. Is he unwilling to do so? So, he tries to resort to an ultimate and difficult step—a proof of a possibility of the real existence of *eidōses* and Ideal mathematics by means of purely clear dialectic logics of distinguished notions. Thus, Plato tries to describe convincingly what he is unable to show. Or is he unwilling to do it?

But when *eidōses* and Ideal mathematics are already standing before our eyes in their numerical real variants, Plato’s theory becomes comprehensible and understandable, and is fruitfully applicable in mathematical modelling, without these sophisticated proofs. The application allows us to compare it with the properties and revelations discovered by Plato, when he proves their existence in the *Sophist* and *Parmenides*.

Then it is not difficult to represent all that is generated by ordinary mathematics as ideas, Plato’s mathematical numbers, as mathematicians really generalize and effectively model numerous real objects and phenomena.

It is difficult, however, to represent ideals as a reality. Plato himself had doubts, regarding their attainability and the possibility to cognize them. We have been taught since childhood that there are no ideals in the world. But they happen to exist! They are few as they generalize the multitude of ideas, generated by mathematics. And they even have given birth to ideas. In other words, mathematicians create newer and newer ideas, deliberately gazing with their minds at singular, eternal and constant ideals of the Ideal mathematics. To be more precise, mathematicians are capable of doing it when they believe in their existence. So far, they generate ideas, using a good, old method, prescribed by Aristotle, they analyse numerous real things and phenomena, occasionally discovering the indicated ideals. They call their way of knowing intuition. You can judge which method is simpler.

The regularities between “separate” ideals, discovered by the Ideal mathematics of Plato, pictured in the Figure (below) of the development of the Ideal mathematics seem to be quite unreal. Those regularities, however, allow for creating mathematics forever. They are extremely simple, beautiful and fruitful. We believe that Plato described them intuitively in his *Parmenides* with categories of Single and Other, with the principle concerning all eidetic and all non-eidetic, and with the principle of principality. “This supernatural, unthinkable,

sophisticated and inexpressible “Single” is a principle of both existing and mental, of both mind and word.”²




Figure. Ideal mathematics (1997): Plato’s “Single” and “Other” (4th century B.C.)

Plato finishes creating the conception of cognition of the world in a dialogue in the *Parmenides*. In the *Philebus* Plato defined cognition as a synthesis, mixing up and confusion, determining it as a mathematical model, giving the origin to the world of ideals. The Ideal mathematics is characterized by many flattering epithets, like “reason” (space and over space), “wisdom,” “the king of Earth and the sky,” “Zeus” [28b–30d] and, finally, “virtue.” [65a] The nature of the Ideal mathematics differs from everything, being in everything; it does not need anything, it is all-sufficient. [60b–c, 61a–b, 64a–b, 65a]

The Republic supplements: “The good—this is a beginning or principle that transcends assumption,” [510b] “is not essence but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power.” [509b]

“As the good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision [...] then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower. you must say is the idea of good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as known.” [508c–e]

So, Plato, having spent so much effort on the description of the qualities of the Ideal mathematics and having used numerous epithets and flattering characteristics, finally, raises the curtain and shows it in all its simplicity.

“And knowledge (what every person must learn first of all) is but a trifle, it is necessary to discern what is one, two and three. (He knows only three ide-

² Ibid.

als, natural, integer, rational? Or, is he speaking of three levels: ideas, ideals, Ideal mathematics?) I call it the Number and calculation. Any art and knowledge has to be associated to it. Due to its nature [(Ideal?) mathematics] leads a man to reflection, but nobody use it as a science, leading us to being (Truth?)” [VII, 518c, d]

We are not going to resort to all parallels between Plato’s Ideal mathematics, proposed by us and the philosophy of cognition of Plato. An attentive reader will find and compare the properties of Plato’s dream to the possibilities of the real structure of our days, seen by Plato and what we can see nowadays. It will help him understand both the structure and Plato and apply efficiently such knowledge to solving problems of his own. We shall mention obvious coincidence.

Plato saw *eidos* not as a static, plane structure, but as a source of being (direct numbers and operations). So, *eidos* is constantly renewed and differs from itself, remaining the same thing. *Eidos* is “a singularity of mobile rest of self-identical difference.” [156e–157b] This odd set of contradictions and mutually destroying assertions is the most difficult to understand in Plato³—but is logically immaculate, having mathematical reliability and fully corresponding to the scheme of development of Plato’s Ideal mathematics.

Aleksei F. Losev writes:

“By throwing away from *eidos* not only sensible, but also the notion content we will get some ‘Single,’ some singularity or even some Unit, but nothing more, not the ‘*nicht-Ich*,’ that Fichte got, not Hegel’s ‘being,’ not Schelling’s nothing, but ‘Single’ lies at the basis and the origin of entire dialectics. Have a look at the proposed scheme of the development of Ideal mathematics (Figure). In its center there is really an original unit! [...] And it is all direct; ideal numbers grow from this unit in direct operations (in the right direction), while in reverse operations (in the left direction) are diminished up to the unit itself—‘being.’ When each reverse operation is performed on this unit, then reverse ideal numbers are formed behind it (in the left direction). They are formed separately, not jointly in a multitude with the direct ones—‘not being.’ All categories seem to surround the ‘Single,’ fringing with it, forming concentric circles around it.”⁴

This description⁵ of Plato’s creation represents quite adequately our scheme of the development of Ideal mathematics.

Plato’s Ideal mathematics in our scheme arranges itself, like in the *Philebus* and *The Republic*, without axioms, by a multi-staged addition of units, and its

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

ideal numbers generalize all discoveries of normal mathematics and programming, modelling all knowledge of mankind.

Just listen to Plato:

“The idea of Virtue [Ideal mathematics?— RK, SK] is the limit, it is hardly discernable, but as soon as you discern it, in the domain of the visible it gives birth to light and its Lord and in the domain of the cognizable it is the Lord, and the Truth and understanding depend on it.”⁶

Do mathematical modelling in accordance with Plato's prescription—this is the only way to the Truth!

CONCLUSION

Philosophy of cognition as Plato's imagination is represented by the scheme of the development of Ideal mathematics, by real, ideal numbers. The comparison facilitates understanding of Plato's idealism and allows for its efficient use modern mathematical modelling.

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⁶ *The Republic* [509d]

Mustafa I. Bilalov

ETHNIC SPECIFICATION OF TRUTH INTERPRETATION

ABSTRACT

The article examines the idea of constructing a truth theory that is ethnic and cognitive culture specific. To this task I use the hypothesis of ethnic and scientific mind. The substance and specifications of different ethnic minds and cognitive cultures are here described. According to the proposed conception, standard theories of truth are revised: correspondence, coherent, pragmatic, etc.

Keywords: ethnic character; cognitive culture; theories of truth.

The difference of mindsets is related partly to the functional asymmetry of the brain. Differentiated and logical thinking is characteristic of the so-called left-brain thinking which can streamline, structure, classify and identify information. Right-brain thinking uses integral images and represents nonverbal information. From the point of view of update standards and stereotypes of cognitive culture right-brain thinking can be characterized, as a rule, as irrational. As is well-known, non-Europeans possess this type of thinking.

The ethnic character of cognitive cultures is mainly determined by this circumstance. In analyzing ethnic cognitive cultures it is appropriate to use similar concepts which are significant for science, i.e. scientific mind and national mind.¹ Most probably the scientific mind is rooted in the Hebrew thinking. The Hebrews arose from many nationalities which have been integrated into one national community by Judaism. The Hebrews thinking is a combination of historically prior spiritual traditions interpreted theologically. That is the reason of the “exclusive survivability of Judaic Kerugma in the new sociocultural contexts.”² However, the Hebrews have given not only the paradigmatic ideas of

¹ Bilalov, M. I. 2008. *A Civilized Metamorphosis of Cognitive Culture*. Moskva: Academia, 144.

² Rickert, P. 1974. *The Conflict of Interpretation. Essays in Hermeneutics*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 75.

propagations, resurrections, rapture and other deeds of God, but also standards of intellectual and social perfection of humanity. The Hebrew spirit, formed through ages, focuses on permanent development. The methodological power of this spirit, permanent negation of past conditions, and inevitably going beyond the scope of saving the past is irreplaceable in all events, especially in scientific creativity.

Concentration of thought, pointed out by the academician Ivan P. Pavlov,³ and its proximate communication with reality, at the same time remaining absolutely independent, circumstantiality and detail are basic characteristics of the said kind of the mind. And even such qualities of the scientific mind as aspiring simplicity and clarity of thought, adherence to verity and submissiveness to it, are seemingly constantly present in the Jewish mind; in fact, they can be demonstrated in the mantle of a special tact in communication with the immature mind. All of them with spiritual giftedness, sharpness, versatility, evasiveness, vitality, purposefulness, determination for success turned the Hebrews into one of the most intellectual nations, standing in the avant-garde of the scientific and cultural achievement of humanity.

Ancient Greeks, on their part, assimilated many achievements of previous civilizations, and they also absorbed values of the cognitive culture of Judaism, then passed the baton to Christian nations, which promoted the foundation of scientific styles of thinking. With Socrates' issues the mind gets cohesion, its formulations reach the level of reflexing, form the basis of philosophical methodology of science. Plato brought about the separation science from the ordinary mind. Epistemic thinking starts with Plato. This style of thinking, typical of scientific knowledge, Aristotle applied to found sociology, politics, logic, and physics. Antiquity adds to cognitive culture a more or less definite culture of thinking, and also formed scientific and philosophical methodologies. The Greek national mind is an essential part of this cognitive culture and appears as the first scientific mind. Within a given culture truth is interpreted as Aristotle's correspondence theory or, as it is more exactly called, the correspondence conception of truth.

A special attention of anthropologists and philosophers was for a long time attached to the mystery of the Slavic soul. A deeper analysis of the Russian nation's peculiarities was given by Nikolai A. Berdyaev, who in interpreting the peculiarities of the Russian spirit, agreed with the poetically expressed idea of Fyodor I. Tyutchev: "Do not try to get it with your mind, do not try to fit in your dimension, there is no Russia of your kind, here your belief is only mentioned." In Berdyaev's view, for the understanding of the Russian soul, Russian idea, one needs to apply the theologically virtuous belief of hope and love. And

³ Pavlov, I. P. 1918. "About Russian Mind." *Russian Physiological Journal of I. M. Sechenova*. no. 9–10.

the most important characteristic of the Russian national individuality is its deep inconsistency, which

“can be connected with the fact that in Russia two streams of the world history collide and come to interaction: East and West. The Russian nation is neither purely European nor purely Asian nation [...] And two principles always fought in the Russian soul: the Eastern and the Western.”⁴

In my view, in the collision of two principles the Asian prevails. As Berdyaev was also sure, the Russian nation was not the nation of culture, based on ordered, rational principles but the nation of inspiration and revelation.⁵ And actually, this circumstance is demonstrated in many spheres of the spirit. So,

“irrationality of the Russian nation has already appeared in ethics orthodoxy, which is based on a mystical experience of a personal meeting with God—the meeting, guaranteeing moral behavior, which is not supposed to give any rational or social reasoning.”⁶

Three roots: the values of ancient and European culture (individualism, democracy, rationalism, atheism, nationalism, rebelliousness, priority of the material and etc.), Christianity in its orthodox form (spirituality, religiousness, intuitionism and mysticism, submission, conciliarism, monarchism, etc.), and Euroasianism (ascetic moderation, despotism, mutual aid and collectivism, etc.) formed an internally contradicting basis of Russian national cognitive culture. Some of these values extended philosophical understanding, and acquired the character of philosophical tradition in the 19–20th centuries. The Russians, being at the same time Europeans, having in their cognitive culture various similar traits to Europeans, still differ from them in the main point: they are not rationalists. The Russian spirituality is rather due to warm-heartedness, lyricism rather than to scientific character.

Common, special and single factors are distinguished in the national mind; one single aspect of the Russian mind is fixed by Pavlov. His view on the national mind was not especially favoured the Russian mind: he fixed only on onrush, quickness, flight instead of assiduity and labour-intensiveness. The Russian national mind is not addicted to facts, it is also unable to express anything against this or that general feeling. It tends to form general positions instead of sticking to exact details. It has a tendency for the misty and the dark instead of clarity; assenting without understanding; a tendency to newness instead of a tendency to truth; curiosity admiration by truism, instead of submis-

⁴ Berdyaev, N. A. 2006. *Self-knowledge*. Kharkov, 13–14.

⁵ Berdyaev, N. A. 1990. *Destiny of Russia*. Moskva, 9.

⁶ Aleksina, T. A. 2000. “Moral and Ethnical Aspects of “Russian Idea” or P of Russian Ethnos.” In: *Continuity. What Will Happen with Native Land and with Us* [in Russian]. Moskva, 369.

siveness to truth-ambitions.⁷ The specificity of the Russian national mind and national cognitive culture determine the cognitive ideal of the whole knowledge; this ideal was expressed by Kirievskiy and Khomyakov. The specificity of this knowledge is concluded in that it cannot be achieved in a combination of sensory, intellectual and mystical intuition, and even when rational thinking is cognized in the understanding of truth, it plays a secondary role in the range of the making up the unity of sensory and moral experience, aesthetic perception and religious contemplation.

North Caucasian nations are quite close to other Muslims on the genetic level. They both also have similar psychological, mental, and cultural characteristics. However, as Islam predominantly represents itself not as the element of a world outlook and self-identification in the ethno-national consciousness of nations, but as an ethnic specifically valuable system, the meaning of Islam is, maybe, artificially overrated in spiritual and intellectual processes. According to V. Davidovich, there are reasons to classify the cultural area of the Caucasus as an independent civilization irrespectively of the religion of its nations, particularly, because of such identical moments of a national psychology as having freedom-loving spirit, passion, the acceptance of old people in authority, scrupulous abidance of standards of etiquette.⁸

In the 20–21st centuries eminent representatives of science and politics of the region did not demonstrate polarized, synthetic, special minds. The best minds of the West—Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, Rene Guenon, Gilles Deleuze, and Jacques Derrida, etc.—criticized not only metaphysically one-sided (eclectic, sophistical, determined, etc.), but also the dialectic, probabilistic, cybernetic styles of thinking, serving rather effectively only European science and culture for a long time. Modern postclassical scientific rationality rests on the synthesis of rational and irrational, natural and socio-humanitarian, scientific and non-scientific, cognitive and valuable and so on. This rationality adopts the variety of human spirit in all its racial, religious, ethnical and other aspects. In this regard the North Caucasus has quite a beneficial geographical, mental and multicultural position. Though philosophy has not reached here the level of an independent conception of truth and knowledge, its advanced in natural endowments and educated representatives have much more chances to offer their intellects to the world, being adequately able to catch and interpret the main tendencies of the world development.

⁷ Pavlov, I. P. 1918, op. cit.

⁸ Davidovich, V. E. 2000. "Does Caucasus Civilization Exist? Scientific Conception in Caucasus." *North-Caucasian Centre of Higher School*, no. 2.

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A LINGUISTIC PARADIGM OF ETHNORELIGIOUS TRADITIONS

ABSTRACT

This article deals with the most significant versions of the confessional factor, acting in modern Russian society as a cultural resource of international consent. Analyzing the problem of confessional tolerance, the author traces the reflection of supporting religious values in communicative-speech space of the renewed society.

Keywords: linguistic behavior; religious scriptures; semantic orientations; descriptive function; ethnic and religious paradigms; confessional management; spiritual property.

The ethnoreligious problem involves consideration of a number of versions of confessional factors.

1. Characteristics of the text of religious scriptures as a symbol of culture of peoples. Motivation of interest in religious treatise is accounted for due to the attractiveness and vividness of the text content. As one of the supporting cultural characters of the people, the texts of these writings combine its features. Accordingly, they belong to the individual, to groups of believers, to separate ethnic communities who share this belief, and to the entire *the* community of believers. The imagery attractiveness of the textual content awakens a certain kind of motivation and interest in its readers and listeners concerning the religious treatises. That is why throughout the history of religious teachings the adaptation of texts to voice culture proceeds. The *New Testament* as part of the *Bible* was originally written in a simple language accessible to ordinary people of the time. The religious text is enriched by the cultural resource of the people. In this case we are dealing with the mutual dependence of the target set of religious leaders to bring people to faith, on the one hand, and to mobilize the speech means of linguistic behavior of those involved, on the other hand. Through the linguistic behavior of this kind we can

see religious symbolism of particular cultural values and cultures of nations in general.

2. Generalization of the religious formulas and individualized speech utterances corresponding to them. The true message of religious teachings is to customize the ideas, norms and principles of life; it regulates the choice of motives in one's fate. At the same time, this kind of customization is manifested in two ways. One of them is the transferring of a particular context of the rules of religion "on my own behalf." Another trend is an appeal to another person in becoming a partner of communication. It is in this context that normalized linguistic behavior involves the installation of the availability of religious formulas, the conceptual figurative sense of their voice narratives, the transformation brought to the consciousness of each of the subjects of this type in the language communication stated in the text of the basic ideas and attitudes in personal qualities and spiritual property.

After all, opinions and views based on basic constructs and religious norms is a necessary rule of any faith. It is in these constructs that religious ideas, modules, images were originally laid and kept up-to-date as a kind of living index.

Support for religious values tends to get their vitality in the chosen regulatory language. Following this, the consumers of this kind of values—religious people, representatives of various ethnic communities—were able to penetrate deeper into the semantic characteristics of the texts. Reading and presenting the text of religious scriptures involved an interpretation of the updated. Adaptive accentuation certainly actualized the features of speech of members of national communities and ethnic groups. The pronouncing of the text by any religious believer and repeating it constantly usually bears the traces of the native diasporic or national affiliation. Linguistic behaviour of all these people acquires the character of a peculiar mechanism of life and religious position. Social and personal religious space can perceive and evaluate, and interpret figuratively. On the other hand, it takes us to the level of the national identity of people. If we imagine the kind of speculative design of the cult of any language in the form of a tree, we will see the following components:

- 1) Plot—social soil of life fuelling the aura of religious faith.
- 2) Roots of religion—ideas, norms and rules.
- 3) Trunk of the Tree—generalized religious code.
- 4) Tree branches—the languages of the peoples who have taken this belief as a vital reference value, and the interpretation of their religious ideas, norms, and values.
- 5) Leaves—speech forms of behavioral registration of religious people involved in reading and interpretation of sacred texts.
- 6) The fruit of the Tree—personally meaningful explanation of the sense of religious scriptures, with the value of life and the way of life embodied in the native speakers.

7) Socio-linguistic aura associated with a particular denomination and the combination of different types of religious spirituality.

Targeting language behaviour requires consideration of other socially important conditions: context. The extension of this type of communication with the foothold on the use of religious texts forces us to highlight linguistic behavior as a pivotal component of solidarity; people of faith trust the confessional communities in all forms: individual, small group, large group, and throughout the community. It is obvious, and the potential effectiveness of this kind of communication is trust, respect and self-esteem partners.

3. The style of religious speech appeal as a mirror reflection of the historical traditions of the confessional management. Traditional semantic orientations are fixed in the texts of religious scriptures. All the traditions reflected in the interpretational text of such a kind involve those who are talking and those who are listening, including them into the real and potential modes of partnership and complicity.

These traditions are incorporated in the originally modeled shaped constructions of the *Bible*, the *Koran*, the *Torah* and other writings. Their characters are not abstract figures, and they carry a deep instructive sense. Each of them, regardless of the underlying religious code, is included in many important life situations. Its significance lies within moral orientation and “eye-opening,” expressed through the descriptive text. Belief is fixed by all combinations of names and judgments, statements and descriptions. Their role functions are different: readers, listeners, interpreters, and partners.

The texts of religious scriptures are fixed now on traditional semantic orientations. These are: good news, obedience, the will of God, faith, forgiveness, ridicule, reverence, condemnation, and many others. For some people it is a kind of mobilization, for others it is a function of obedience, and still for others—a descriptive function. Overall, the language behavior had the effect of transferring the religious traditions at all previous historical eras. In the interpretations of scripture texts by different interpreters, explicitly or implicitly, there is an allusion to the religious base present, which involves the aura of an ancient civilization with its subsequent personal and social orientation.

Stylistic features of the reference to the text of a religious treatise are manifested in several forms. In one case, it is limited to verbal communication and linguistic behavior, in the other case—to the physical action in the form of bows, brow beating, crossover, sit-ups; it may also be manifested in offerings of donations, etc. But the same is adapted to the type of religion. All the traditions reflected in the text of the interpretative kind, orient those who are talking and listening and involve them into the real and potential mode of complicity. This can equally be applied to the Gentiles, Muslims, Kryashens, Orthodox, Buddhists, and Judaists. The main function of language behavior in dealing with

believers or making one acquainted with one or another religion is to create a situation of belonging.

The level of interpretative, imitational and identification character of the text addressed to the religious believers in their own language ensures the availability and impressiveness of speech treatment. Much depends here upon the availability and the impressiveness of speech treatment. Equally compelling is linguistic behavior, reproducing the text to members of other religions, and ethnicities. Achieving such an effect occurs on a number of conditions. The first of them is the list of names mentioned in the religious scriptures and their context extension. The second one is intonation of speech, giving the emotional flavor of the text. The third one is the credibility of the subject of language behavior presenting the text, and the corresponding respectful (or disrespectful) attitude toward it (him).

All this together helps to realize the nature and features of the verbal presentation or put it on a subconscious level of reflection. The subconscious part is a very productive sense. Its inclusion in the speech communication by using either a religious name, or the authentic text, or associative references, or expressive pause can significantly deepen this sense, and, finally, provoke a unique personal response.

Attention should be drawn to the fact that various religious references, derived on the subconscious level of reflection, are translated by the text to the level of the native language. If, furthermore, we take into account that in each language context and subtext are always there, then we see how a religious and feedback original text shines through all these signs of oral cultures and each native language. Linguistic behaviour takes us to the level of social role of the media as an active subject of ethno-social relations.

4. Educational direction of ethnic and religious paradigms of social ties. With this, the focus of scientific interest of scholars from different fields of knowledge towards the value and importance of linguistic behavior is conjoined, especially in conditions of recreating the atmosphere of ritual in all the polyethnic regions of Russia. The social role of language to communicate people of older and younger age groups depends largely on their attitude to religion, the religious ideas behind them and life's problems. The special significance in recreating the atmosphere of ritual in all regions of multi-ethnic Russian is obvious.

5. Translations of religious texts, scriptures, quotations in other languages and their inclusion in the atmosphere of interethnic communication. The absence of barriers in expressing interest of one religious community to another, the openness of religious communities, the ability to spread ideas, values, and claims to other religious groups starts their mobilization focusing upon the role of spiritual association with their kin.

A prohibition to manifest the interest born in the faithful of one religious community to another has long been overcome. The openness of religious communities in recent years has become a social fact. Moreover, the spread and exchange of ideas and values among different religious groups and their role in mobilization of spiritual companions has been much focused. A change of faith, as was the case during the war in Afghanistan and later in the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation, strongly supports the idea that the text is not in a pure form, and social attitudes in other languages play the role of one mobilizing argument. Our example is based on the type of conflict situations, though many facts related to the peaceful circumstances also confirm this.

There is a tendency to productive, forward-looking statements. This involves increasing respect of members of one faith for another. Texts of some types of religious scriptures addressed not only and not so much to the clergy, but to ordinary people, attracted the attention of various ethnic communities that are not restricted to only one rigid religious doctrine. Russian translations of the *Koran*, the *Torah*, into the Turkic languages (primarily into the Tatar language), translation of the *Bible* with the *Old* and the *New Testament*, each acquire an understanding of the important cultural resource of ethnic harmony. The spread of this idea in the form of linguistic behavior has become a productive social norm in the democratic Russian state.

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LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

ABSTRACT

The modern Russian linguistics still accepts V. V. Ivanov's idea that there cannot be a unified ("uniform") language for everybody. This view has a direct bearing on problems of education, especially mass education. Peculiarities of language for our contemporaries arise; the main features of their "language behavior" are determined not only by the education system. It is not necessarily school. The centuries-old language experience of family life, cultural traditions outside families, and, in addition, the quality of "near" and "distant" socio-cultural interaction influence people. Therefore, trying to adjust the language consciousness of pupils to the adopted system of education, the "nominative" Etalon, teacher often gains the opposite effect—strengthening of the forms of language (active, ergative or multi-structured), which he is striving to prohibit. But a multi-systemic multicultural society does not require each person to be the bearer of all possible forms. This requires a philosophy of education based on the modern philosophy of language that supports unprofane training and education and provides safety for the person.

Keywords: education; interaction; language consciousness; active; ergative; multi-structure.

In Russia the system of mass education was defended from further developing ideas of positivism, Protestantism and atheism in the beginning of the second half of the 19th century. As everywhere, those ideas came to Russian schools and universities under the slogans of freedom, equality, and brotherhood. Freedom in education meant availability of the latter for everyone; equality and brotherhood—meant training in compliance with a contemporary framework identical in every (secondary and higher) school: the curriculum, the schedule, the content of teaching, the norms of estimation, which excluded individualization. However, though recognizing the principle of availability in Western Europe and in Russia, supporters could not avoid a long-known prob-

lem: not all students were capable of writing, reading, and reasoning even in their native language. As a result, in the beginning of the 20th century every fifth Moscow primary school student did not meet the existing educational standards. (Zamsky, 1995)

Recently, in Russia the situation is not much better. Teachers of the Russian language are well aware of the fact that about 30% of all pupils, including graduates of senior classes, make systematic mistakes on unaccented vowels; that they cannot allocate a word root, or place the right accent, or identify a test word. The same school pupils cannot usually distinguish the grammatical subject and predicate, and they are not capable of placing punctuation marks in compound sentences. They hardly understand the difference between vowel sounds and consonants, a sound and a letter. And without these basic skills it is impossible to master Russian grammar properly.

How should the work of the pupil and the teacher be properly evaluated?

First of all, we must turn to the history of language. It is known that Plato and his followers recognized only two parts of speech: “names” and “verbs,” moreover, they considered “the verb” as a spoilt form of a (heavenly) “name.”

“The grace that was given me, to every man amongst us, to say: do not think of yourself more highly than you ought to think; but to think as to think soberly, according to the measure of faith that God hath dealt to every. For as in one body we have many members, and all members have not the same office: so we, being many, are one body in Christ, and individually members one of another.” Apostle Paul (ROM. 12; 3–5)

This is the logic of the system. And systemic nature abhors uniformity. First of all, the matter concerns the inequality of the internal world: cultural, spiritual, linguistic. Twins may look alike, but inwardly they are different. Christians defined this as the inner man: “Though our outward man is decaying, the inward is renewed day by day.” (2 Cor. 4; 16)

This topic was traditional for Orthodox Russia in the 11th century (Ilarion 1994). It has not been forgotten in Russia in the new time. According to the Russian philosopher of the second half of the 19th century, Vladimir S. Solovyov, because of perpetual internal updating people need not positivistic “freedom,” but Christian free consent, not Protestant “brotherhood” and “equality” that bring everybody under a “single” umbrella, but Orthodox brotherly unity and love (Solovyov, 1990), comprehensive each in its uniqueness. And the nominative structure presented in our schools as the only possible form of the modern Russian language, as a reference, actually is far from the only form of its existence. In addition to the nominative structure, which in everyday life usually is used by only 30–40% of the Russian schoolchildren, there is an active structure (used by 10–15% of children), an ergative structure (used by 30–40% of children), as well as a multi-structure (used by 10–15% of children) of the modern Russian language.

Regarding the peculiarities of language for our contemporaries, the main features of their “language behavior” are determined not only by the education system, say, school. Centuries-old language experience of family life, cultural traditions outside families and in addition, the quality of “near” and “distant” socio-cultural interaction also influence “language behavior.” Therefore, in trying to adjust a student’s language to the adopted system of education, or to the so-called “nominative” Etalon, teachers efforts often have the opposite effect, i.e. that of strengthening and settling many other forms of language: active, ergative, and multi-structured. This is the law of dominants (Alexei A. Ukhtomsky). To master a category that has a nominative structure, to live in the “volume”, or space, in the terminology of Aristotle, both society and individual, consciously or unconsciously, apply the same logic. We must see the way and direction of movement of time from past to future (as well as the direction of the implication in Aristotelian logic, from left to right; from the antecedent to the consequent; and also the direction of the syntactical link, or syntagma, in a sentence, from subject to predicate).

In the society described by Plato, and his ergative language, time moves in the opposite direction: from the eternal heaven (future) to the earth here-and-now and then to the past; here the implication is deployed from right to left (from the consequent to the antecedent). In many languages of the nominative system the direct word order is used: a group of words that is the subject to the sentence; and a group of predicate entailed by a semantic set of circumstances expressed with adverbs. Thus communication is implemented by the principle of direct (linear) perspectives. But alongside with the nominative or ergative systems (predominant in many modern-day Caucasian languages, Eskimo-aleutian, Indian, Basque, etc.) the other direction and method of communication are implied: from the predicate to the subject (Klimov, 1973), that is the model of the reverse perspective. In this case, the timeless, spaceless context is moving to the fore, the subject does not overshadow the predicate and often is not even used in the nominative case.

Lack of a grammatically decorated category of time is typical of the active system language expressing the quality of the generic existence. The statement is thought of as one big word. What is communicated, is understood as what is happening here and now, and it is responsible for the generic principle of “all in all”. Any element in an expression normally can be understood, only if we apply the terms of the nominative structure, as a predicate, a subject, and other members of the proposition. But the modern Russian language, ensuring the diversity of human relationships and ties in a multisystem multicultural world, allows also the possibility of the existence of the multi-structure, supporting simultaneous updating and dynamic equilibrium interaction in one’s mind (“linguistic consciousness,” not only of the individual, but also of a social group). Several “old” and “new” states are embracing each other in their multisystem indivisibility. The multi-structure provides a “nonlinear” interpretation of

statements of processes, although for many of our contemporaries to accept its logic “would seem to go crazy.” (Ilyin, 1994)

Because each subject of communication (not only private persons, but also in social groups, peoples, nations), while preserving its identity, uses the language as required by the circumstances of life, it is not possible to set any fixed procedure for change of one design to another. (Klimov, 1973)

The oldest generic consciousness manifests itself in all of us at the early stages of spiritual development—and we, as in ancient times, are predisposed to see living creatures in the wind, water, earth, stone, although liveliness in terms of the generic existence differs from animateness. Soul, animation, and moreover, spirit, spirituality, are different things. The inner being is something of very specific origin, partly resulting from the general comprehension as complex, composed, spliced, mixed. So the specific term should be understood in the original Latin version. (Ilyenkov, 1997) Then the inner, essentially invisible, was not taken into account, although people recognized that something external, visible from one position and invisible from the other, was the object of observation. The desire to show the features of all surfaces of the object, regardless of the position of an observer in space and time, became associated with the specific torsion, arithmetically summarizing the overall image and often giving “extra” items—for example, multiplicative lots of legs or arms in the picture like signified moving figures. That seemingly cannot be seen simultaneously here and now, from the positions of the first form and its ergative language. According to Plato, “if a certain thing seems to be one thing, then another, and neither mutually each other do not produce, the thing is this will be both a single and separate.” (*Timaeus*, 52cd, Plato 1994) Final separation of the internal and external happened to European culture in Aristotelean “bulk” language, and the phenomenon of internal links and transitional parts of the incorporated unities was understood as the structure of elements of new social, cultural, linguistic systems. Any modern “civilized” language is a multi-systemic unity, the synthesis of several fundamentally different forms that consistently occur throughout human history. Each is valuable because it expresses the quality of one of the most important stages in the history, and only together, in the synthesis they give the phenomenon of the Russian language, English, German, French, etc. But a multi-systemic multicultural society does not require that everyone was the bearer of all forms. In the Protestant educational education systems, and not only in mass education, students are adjusted to the “generally accepted” rules of engagement, and their language has a nominative structure. Thus teachers inevitably affect a unique chain of corporal, mental and spiritual continuity, which has led to their disciples from birth, starting with the first man. The result is an attempt by a unique person—primarily a man as a spiritual being—to destroy its multidimensionality and universal social, cultural, linguistic existence, and the educational process becomes profane or stops altogether. This has an immediate impact on the results of the school students, including in

Russia, in the format of the state final attestation in the ninth grade and the Unified State Examination in the eleventh class. They grieve. However, it's enough to see how the so-called "weak"-minded children live outside lessons: cleverly, intensively, often selflessly; how much effort is spent on what they find really interesting? To conclude, they can demonstrate the same enthusiasm during lessons—only if the content of training and education is consistent with how they see the world, with the form of language that they use. This requires a philosophy of education based on the modern philosophy of language that supports unprofaned training and education and provides safety for the person.

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GLAMOROUS EDUCATION AS A PHENOMENON

ABSTRACT

The glamorous culture affecting education gives rise to the phenomenon of glamorous education (glam-education). The main features of glam-education, concerning its substantial, communicative, valuable, organizational components, are discussed in this article. Glam-education is proved to be a demonstration of the personality's existential crisis in the postmodern society. A brilliant package of glam-education camouflages the death of original thinking, the necrosis of genuine emotions and the lack of a productive imagination of a person.

Keywords: brand; consumption; education; glamour; glam-culture; hedonism; play; simulacrum; symbol; value; show.

At the present time the culture of glamour (glam-culture) demonstrates itself simultaneously as a particular practice, mentality, ideology and a way of life.

As a particular practice glam-culture, being generated by a global market society, is focused on the markets of entertainments, pleasures, show-performances, luxury and fashion. The main efforts of every glam-culture consumer are oriented on the acquisition of a set of the image benefits promised by the advertising of the glamorous production. Seeking a brilliant and attractive appearance (image), created on the basis of corresponding brands, is the main concern. A person is urged to show publicly eternal youth, sexuality, perfectness, sportiness, brightness and luxury.

With regards to its psychological aspect, glam-culture influences people by consumer temptation which constantly enforces the individual to design his or her own image by acquisition of goods belonging to famous brands. The main function of images and brands is to make an impression on the public, so every glam-oriented consumer dreams of becoming a brand himself, i.e., a self-brand. (Rusakova, 2009)

In the ideological sense glam-culture is noted by a total lack of principles, by absolute indifference to the values involving people in society, such as basic moral values. (Ivanov, 2008, 4)

The main characteristics of a glamorous way of life are narcissism, hedonism, show chic, irony in “cool” style, eroticism, image intellectualism, deficiency of authenticity, aestheticism and rank thinking (focused on top lists, ratings, nominations). (Ivanov, 2008, 4)

Glam-culture as a powerful social trend has an essential impact on education. On the one hand, the present society widens access to higher education for vast categories of population, mainly for the individuals of the “crowd.” The latter bring the dominating stereotypes of mass-culture, including the glam-component, into universities. On the other hand, as the educational system becomes a commercial enterprise, producing educational “services,” the glam-culture proves to be one of the best marketing tools for these commercial purposes.

In the last regard, the glamorization of education correlates with the so called “McDonaldization.” According to the author of this term George Ritzer, McDonaldization means that the basic principles of educational management are similar to the principles of a fast food restaurant functioning (Ritzer, 1993), i.e. the process of education and its results should be calculated, predictable, controlled, effective and pleasant. Brightness and attractiveness, both with charm, together makes glamour the irreplaceable promoter of McDonaldization in the educational field.

Actually the field of education is a complex system uniting various components: substantial (the content of translated knowledge), communicative, valuable, organizational, etc. Each of them is exposed to some extent to a glam-culture influence and demonstrates the presence of glam-elements. In this sense it is possible to reach a conclusion about the birth of glamorous education (glam-education) as a result of a glam-culture invasion into educational field.

In the substantial aspect glam-education is noted by a defundamentalization of knowledge content and by unreasonable simplification of educational standards. This fact is fraught with the risk of a decrease of the practical efficiency of the professional competences received at the university.

Communicative practices of glam-education are marked out by the hedonistic mentality, aimed at receiving pleasures from external conditions of the educational process. They articulate the entertainment and recreational components in education. The entertainment component declares itself in such forms as game, show-performance, presentation; the recreational one does so by means of cultivating a festival atmosphere and reckless optimism in educational institutions. At the same time, in full accordance with glam-mentality, this atmosphere is combined with an ironic and even cynical attitude on the part of the students to fundamental values of science as well as to ideals of education and

high culture. This attitude is declared in popular glam-formulas, such as “Enjoy yourself!,” “Live effortlessly!,” “Take it easy!,” “Image is all!” etc.

In the valuable aspect, education, under the influence of glam-culture, gains the character of the image benefit. The original knowledge and professional skills are not of great importance for the individual. Instead of them the symbols of one’s education (the diploma, the certificate, and the graduate document) are of great importance for a person. The value of knowledge is replaced with its symbols: the more symbols a person has and the more of them that are prestigious and impressive, the more educated their owner looks in the opinion of other people.

In full correspondence to glam-psychology, the image consumption in education generates a brand focused mentality. It constantly pushes the individual to pursue educational brands. The latter may be, for example, studying at a wide-known university, possession of a prestigious diploma, participation in an expensive educational program or in a well-known training, acquaintance with famous professors, access to postgraduate study, the awarding of a scientific degree.

From the social and anthropological point of view, glam-education is one of the obvious expressions of personality’s existential crisis in a contemporary society. If, according to Erich Fromm, the person of the 20th century has resolved the vital dilemma “To have or to be?” mainly to the advantage of “to have,” a person at the beginning of the 21st century resolves another dilemma “To be or to seem?” mainly to the advantage of “to seem.” Thus, by means of glamour, the individual seeks to escape—though only in his imaginations and dreams—from the routine and monotony of real life and to leave the existential vacuum of one’s personal being. In the same way, by means of illusion, by means of glam-education, one tries to compensate for alienation from original knowledge, abilities and skills. The illusion becomes the only substitute of reality, i.e. its simulacrum.

To what extent is this attempt successful and effective?

Glamour is often compared to a necrosis of aesthetics. This assessment in full can be attested to the penetration of glamour into culture and life. Subjecting reality to total sterilization and idealization, turning it into a world of glossy images and simulacra, glamour erases completely the dramatic nature of a real life being, emasculates the sense of such existential phenomena as death, love, destiny, conflict, and life drama. Meanwhile, according to Georg Hegel, contradiction is a root of any vitality. The lack of distinction, of gradient and of contradiction inevitably leads to stagnation, degradation and finally—the death of the object.

In this sense glamour perniciously influences life in all its manifestations. The educational field is not a happy exception. External shine, cheerfulness and beautiful “packing” of glam-education camouflage indeed the necrosis of original thinking, the lack of productive imagination and of genuine emotions.

The danger of glamour in education is that glamour relieves a person of free, independent thinking and imagination. Glamour generates a phenomenon of the so called *closed consciousness*, which is aloof from creativity, being focused mainly on consumption of a ready-made “truth,” ready knowledge and ready information. True possibility of an existential choice for a person is replaced by a choice of duplicated virtual variety.

In practice it turns out to be *executive consciousness*, which is capable only of reproducing the content of activity (knowledge, abilities, skills, technologies), created from the outside by someone—somewhere and somehow, without any personal attempt at its creative transformation, updating or improvement.

The attitude of the scientific and pedagogical community to glam-education is inconsistent. One part of the community remains faithful to the traditional values of education—the Truth, the Good and the Beauty—and estimates glam-tendencies with criticism, feeling their suffocating embraces. Probably due to this fact, this part of the scientific community is striving to separate itself from the glam-environment by encapsulating into autonomous territorial loci (for example, Silicon Valley in USA or Skolkovo in Russia). At the same time the amount of those who successfully accept new glam-values is growing. (Healy, 2003)

What are the prospects of the glamorization of education? Is it a temporary craze or a steady long-term tendency?

The answer depends finally upon the socio-cultural context. To be brief, glam-education will be reproduced, and it will be demanded as long and as far as the virtualization of people’s life in the market-consumer society proceeds; as economics produces more and more brands; as culture itself remains to be the production of images; as individuals will be producers of simulacra.

Researches show (Ivanov) that such a tendency accrues. Thus glam-education corresponds to a total simulacrazation of society and culture.

At the same time glam-education is not uncontested even in these circumstances. Original education, instead of an illusory one, remains demanded at least by those people who will develop the economy of brands and the culture of images. Besides, persons, who do not lose the taste for real life, instead of illusory being, still remain. It is exactly them who are interested in original education, instead of a glamorous one.

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MUSIC EDUCATION AND *KALOKAGATHIA* IN THE GREEK ANTIQUITY

ABSTRACT

Kalokagathia (καλοκαγαθία in ancient Greek) is the derived noun from the adjectives *kalos k'agathos* (καλός = beautiful, κἀγαθός = good or virtuous). The word was used by the ancient Greek writers and philosophers to describe the ideal of a person who combines physical strength and beauty along with a virtuous and noble character. It is the ideal of the personality that harmoniously pairs mind and body abilities and virtues, both in battle and in the activities of the everyday life. Its use is attested in many Greek writings (among them those of Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle), while the notion of *kalokagathia* imbued the moral thought in antiquity.

Keywords: *Kalokagathia*; ancient Greek music; virtue; education.

Kalokagathia means both the social and moral virtue. It defines the perfect (physically and morally) excellence of the men who are *kaloi k'agathoi* (καλοί κἀγαθοί) ("beautiful" and "good" men). In Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, one of the *Socratic Dialogues*, Socrates has an enlightening conversation with Ischomachus (a *kalos k'agathos* gentleman¹ who serves as a moral model in the society), about the virtue of *kalokagathia* and how he practises it.² Apart from all the practical things the good and noble man did, another important act was that he transferred to his young and untutored wife his own principles by means of what could be considered at the time as a form of domestic "moral education" so that she could become good and noble after him.³ Werner Jaeger in *Paideia I*, argues that "that ideal (of the man who is *kalos k'agathos*) was inspired by a clear and delicate perception of correct and appropriate behaviour in

¹ Xenophon. *Oeconomicus*, XI 1: ἄνδρα ἀπειργασμένον καλόν τε κἀγαθόν.

² Xenophon. *Oeconomicus*, XI 2: τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ κἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρός ἔργα.

³ Pangle, T. L. 1994. "Socrates in the Context of Xenophon's Writings." In: Vander Waerdt, P. A. (Ed.). *The Socratic Movement*. New York: Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 138–150.

every situation, which, despite its precise rules for speech and conduct and its perfect sense of proportion and control, was in effect a new spiritual freedom.”⁴

The ancient Greek thinkers upheld that *kalokagathia* is the result of *paideia* (education). According to Plato, the possession of *paideia* is the criterion for real wealth and power, instead of the possession of material goods. The ancient Greeks, when referring to education, never meant it without the music positioned in its centre. In this paper I will try to demonstrate that there is this certain relationship between the notion of *kalokagathia* of the ancient Greeks and the music education in their educational system. Under this prism I will also argue that music education plays a particularly constructive role in the acquisition of *kalokagathia*. Plato, very much influenced by the Pythagorean theories on music, considering each person as a unified psychosomatic and spiritual entity, in the *Republic* declares that the combination of music education with the physical training of the body contributes to the equal development of the corporal and the spiritual elements of a person, therefore, the virtue of *kalokagathia* can be achieved in this way. Physical training makes body the best shelter for the spiritual part of the soul, while music cultivates the reasoning part of it. According to Plato and Aristotle⁵, music and body training are inseparable for the further development of the human character. Furthermore, music is a contributor to physical training as dancing is one of its main elements along with singing and instrument playing.

Music for the Greeks is a lesson of the highest importance and value. It consists of three unified indivisible parts, harmoniously combined: the words with the poetic content, the musical melody or harmony and the rhythm. Harmony and rhythm are subordinated to the word. The ancient Greek verse is simultaneously a linguistic and a music reality. The link between word and music, their common element, is the rhythm. The rhythm itself is contained in the words, in the poetic text, and the music structure is defined in an absolute way by the words of the verse.

Music in ancient Greece was one of the most essential parts of everyday life and all citizens learned not only the basics in music theory but also how to play an instrument. Whereas music theory started developing during the archaic period, the development of the mathematics in the classical period offered music the framework within which its principles and theories were expressed and proved. Pythagoras, first of all the other philosophers, expressed the idea that the noted association between music and the soul should be put at the service of the upbringing of children and the molding and shaping of their character through melodies. He maintained that the physical, mental and spiritual condition of a person is very much influenced by music and that, beyond its other

⁴ Jaeger, W. 1945. *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, vol. I. Archaic Greece-The mind of Athens*. Transl. from German: Hightet, G. New York: Oxford University Press.

⁵ Aristotle. *Politics*, 1268b, 1279a, 1338a–b, 1339a, and next.

positive influence, music has therapeutic properties on the human soul. The Pythagoreans won the admiration of all as they had successfully managed to connect simple and definite small numbers, which are objective, with the subjective impression which people could adopt music and sounds with. The term *harmonia* (harmony), when used by Homer,⁶ meant the carpenter's clamp, while later it was defined by Philolaus as "a union of things that are much mixed" and also as "agreement among those who have been at odds in their thinking." The starting point of the musical theory of the Greek music and its connection with the soul is the Pythagorean assertion that the soul is a kind of harmony since harmony is "a blending and combining of opposites." This blending is identical with *harmonia*, the fundamental principle in the Greek musical theory. We must also take into consideration that the term *harmonia* is also used instead of the term *music modes* (τρόποι). The successions of the various musical intervals which form the various modes⁷ have to follow an order, a sequence, and different succession for each mode. The Greeks, philosophers or not, affected by the Pythagorean mathematical theory of music, thought very highly of the educational value of music and they established the theory of "the ethos of modes", in which they related various emotional and spiritual characteristics with the musical scales. They also believed that music itself had great impact on the soul and that it could shape soul and character as well. Music education contributes to the acquisition of the virtue of *kalokagathia* and is of great importance, for a man who wants to be good and noble in body and mind, to be musically educated. Democritus in the 5th century BC speaks directly of music *paideia*,⁸ so do Plato and Aristotle in the 4th century.

During the archaic period there was not any formal music educational system; tuition of instruments could happen any time informally from a friend,

⁶ Homer. *Odyssey*, 5. 248.

⁷ Aristoxenus. 2005. *Complete Works. Harmonic Elements*. Athens: Kaktos Publications, 38–40, from introduction translated by me: "The different ways the various musical intervals that formed the tetrachord succeeded one another were called 'harmoniai-harmonies' (this is the name Aristoxenus uses for the min B' 36,30 Meib) or 'modes' and they were seven totally: the Hypodorian or Aeolian (from A to A), the Hypophrygian or Ionian (G to G), the Hypolydian (F to F), the Dorian (E to E), the Phrygian (D to D), the Lydian (C to C) and the Mixolydian harmony (B to B). The Dorian was considered as the most important of all since it followed the typical structure of the octachord (two successive tetrachords with a linking tone in the middle) [...] The octachord was essentially the first complete musical system of the ancient Greeks [...] Later, when the octachord took its definitive form and the perfect systems were developed (the perfect systems included more octachords), harmonies and modes were considered to be the same and the pitch, which the typical octachord started to develop itself each time from, was the element that differentiated the modes. Since then, the 'harmonies' were renamed 'tunes'; the 'tune' in this circumstance was the pitch which the various harmonic systems started each time from. For that reason the tones took the names of the old 'harmonies' and confusion prevailed between the two terms 'harmonies-modes' and 'tunes'."

⁸ Diels, H., Kranz, W. (Eds.). 1956 (8th edition). *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 3 vols., 68B179, 68B15c, 25a. Trans. Freeman, K. Berlin; 1948, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers*. Oxford.

a relative or any benevolent person who knew how to play at least an instrument, and they were organized in choruses that were expected, by the society, to sing and dance during festivals. In early Greece many different kinds of culture were developed in each city, therefore we can trace different ways of how music itself and music education were formed and used, while the ideal of *kalokagathia* just changes faces but it is always present. For example, the Cretans, who were very brave, fearless fighters, as part of the training of their young boys to become robust men and tough fighters, they were learning dances in armour and were singing paeans,⁹ which were songs addressed initially to Apollo, the healer-god, but later, as they were associated with the battle and the winning of the god upon the terrifying monster-snake, Python, they became a symbol of bravery and of victorious battles. Sparta also, was the first musical capital of Greece, as pseudo-Plutarch in *De musica* testifies,¹⁰ and music was positioned in the centre of the education. Sparta, although it remained a military orientated and conservative society, holds a special place in the history of the Greek education, and Greek culture generally. Music education has been more important there during the 7th and the early 6th century BC than elsewhere in Greece then. The city flourished artistically and many musicians found artistic shelter and liberty in Sparta to produce masterpieces and become famous.¹¹ Education for both sexes was centred on the arts, with the male citizen population later receiving military education. Songs reflect the moral revolution that was developed due to the new tactical innovation of the «phalanx» in the battlefield. The moral ideal turned to be the devotion of each person to the prosperity and the good of the City-State instead of his own eudemonia. As Tyrtaeus bears witness in his songs: “It is a noble thing to be in the front of the battle and die bravely for one’s country.” The Spartans achieved the acquisition of *kalokagathia* giving priority to the moral ideal of the bravery and the effectiveness in the battles, as warriors. Later, in the classical Athens of the 5th century BC, the ideal of the man who is *kalos k’agathos* reached its pick and was greatly admired. Regarding music education in the City-State of Athens, where democracy was established, the music training was institutionalised. In Athens, as well as in Sparta and other City-States, music along with the letters and the training of the body are the three mandatory lessons to all children (male mostly) that are taught

⁹ Musically, the paean was a choral ode, and originally had an antiphonal character, in which a leader sang in a monody style (one single voice) with the chorus responding with a simple, informal phrase; however, later in its development, the paean was an entirely choral form. Typically the paean was written in the ancient Greek Dorian mode and was accompanied by the kithara, which was Apollo’s instrument. Paeans that were sung on the battlefield were accompanied by aulos and kithara. Only two musical fragments of paeans survive from the late antiquity: one by *Athēnaios Athenaiou* (Athenios, son of Athenios), and the other by Limenius of Athens. Those two paeans by Athenaios and Limenius must have been composed at the end of the 2nd century BC.

¹⁰ Plutarch. *De musica*, 1134B–C.

¹¹ Marrou, H. I. 1956. *A History of Education in Antiquity*. University of Wisconsin Press, 17–18.

within the educational system of the first cycle of education. The boys are taught music by the teacher of music, the *kitharistis*, who teaches them to sing songs and how to play the lyre, and also to read and write at the beginning, along with the *paidotrivis*¹². Later, the special teacher for letters, the *grammatistis*, applies on them further letter education while the music education is left exclusively to the *kitharist*. Everybody in Athens is engaged with music one way or another, on an amateur or professional basis.

The Pythagorean doctrines combined with Damon's¹³ theory of music, which declares that music produces motion in the soul, are the basis of Plato's quest and thought regarding the power of music. Damon's work was also focused on the social and political consequences of music, and he established the "theory of ethos."¹⁴ He is the first one who was interested in making a systematic research on the effects of different types of music on people's mood. According to Robert Wallace, it was Pericles' interest in using this research for controlling the people that led to Damon's ostracism.

Arete (ἀρετή), translated as virtue, differs in its content from one period to the other or from one Greek thinker to the other but it has always been a central notion and main quest as they all, despite their differences, based their ethical thinking on the ideal of living life in an exemplary way.¹⁵ The common Greek phrase of commendation "*kalos k'agathos*." was a phrase that expressed their admiration for the moral and aesthetic development and excellence of a man who combined both of them to a noble personality and character. This ideal has its origin in the Homeric tradition with the heroic morality of honour which educated the Greeks for centuries and impregnated ethics with the imitation of the hero and affected the moral thought. Although we refer to men, even since the Homeric tradition the term is not gender specific. We see virtuous and noble women who set the best example for all women in antiquity, as Penelope did. Later, especially in classical Athens, women are silently almost ignored until Plato sets new rules for them, as seen in the *Republic*, where women, the potential wives of the Guardians, are considered equal to men having the same access to education as men; therefore he considers that *kalokagathia* is the arete all men and women have as the ultimate objective. Key objectives in Plato's educational system are the institutionalized public and common, for men and women, education along with the formation of a thriving spirit and body, in other words the moral reformation of the citizen whose virtues of justice, wisdom, valor and prudence would be strengthened inside him. *Kalokagathia*, apart from the moral

¹² Aristotle. *Politics*, 1279a, 1287b, 1338b.

¹³ The famous musicologist of Athens and teacher of Pericles.

¹⁴ Anderson, W. D. 1966. *Ethos and Education in Greek Music: the Evidence of Poetry and Philosophy*. Harvard University Press, 2, 25–33.

¹⁵ Prior, W. J. 1991. *Virtue and Knowledge. An Introduction to Ancient Greek Ethics*. St. Ives: Clays Ltd., 1–3.

nobility and stability of the character, is also associated with bravery and effectiveness and with physical health and wellness.

Plato in the *Laws* argues that “the man who does not know how to sing and dance cannot be acknowledged as educated; on the contrary, the man who has been practised on music is very well educated.”¹⁶ A big part of the *Republic* is also devoted to the quest of how music and therefore music education can affect the shaping of the soul and the character with a view to the eudemonia of the City. Plato’s “theory of ideas” penetrated and characterized his quest even in his evaluation of art. This theory upholds the idea that reality, as the philosopher conceives it, is divided into two worlds: the world of ideas, of the true and the real, and the world of mimeses which are the things we are able to understand through our senses solely. He believed that art imitates and copies real life; therefore it copies the false things, the false world that exists around us, so art wards man off the truth and the real, not once only but twice, as it is the imitation of an imitation. This way, art deprives people from the truth, while the artists, being imitators of the truth, do not have the ability to understand or teach moral truths because the act of mimesis is a product of the non-rational part of the soul and distanced from truth also. Plato considered art and music, the domain of the Muses in the widest sense, as dangerous for the people and the City. In order to control its influence, he tries to establish a new educational system and examines all the elements that form the ancient Greek music, the poems (word), the melodies and the rhythms. This way the *kalos k’agathos* man can be developed. Music can be dangerous, according to the philosopher, because its emotional appeal challenges the dominance of reason (logic) and it has the ability to stimulate the entire range of human emotions. To ensure that the Guardians of his ideal State are not swayed by excess emotion, Plato subjugates music to a music education put to the service of the control of the State and he intends to neutralize its influence by imposing strict criteria for the official acceptance of the poems, of the melodies and the rhythms. The music education and the physical training of the body are proper for the preparation of the men who form the class of the Guardians and combined they can lead men to the acquisition of virtue and effectiveness, both in mind and in body, therefore, people can meet the ideal of *kalokagathia* under this kind of education. He excludes music which is sad or over-relaxing and he forbids music that does not express moderation and courage as these kinds of music make men effeminate and not efficient to face difficulties in real life. Music is useful only when it serves the purposes of the State by encouraging the citizens to be resolute to face difficulty and considerate in their relationships with the others. The philosopher does not exclude women from education; they are supposed to be martially trained so that they can defend their children, themselves and the city in case of war, while

¹⁶ Plato. *Laws*, 654a–b. Οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν ἀπαιδευτος ἀχόρευτος ἡμῖν ἔσται, τὸν δὲ πεπαιδευμένον ἰκανῶς κεχορευκότα θετέον.

in times of peace they remain to their homes, musically educated so that they can run and preserve them in the best way praising the gods. The women should always be trained and prepared to become potential Guardians' wives, therefore Guardians themselves,¹⁷ so education should be the same for both men and women and that was a very innovative thought on behalf of the philosopher, in an era when women in general were confined in the house and were trained neither physically nor mentally.

The philosopher tries to eradicate from the music education anything that does not have any religious or moral value and realizes that it is not only the content of the music works that exert influence on the soul but the form of them also and the means (instruments) which the music is transferred to people by. That leads him to restrict polyharmonic instruments as they have the ability to attribute all modes, therefore the forbidden ones also, and to discourage variation in rhythms, too. One of the instruments that he excluded from the music education was the *aulos*.¹⁸ "The *aulos* was a danger: it threatened self-control; it marred the aesthetics of the body; it introduced the allure of the alien. So often tracked as the enemy and antithesis of logos, the *aulos* blocked the mouth, that most idealized of all the features of the citizen's comportment, corporeal and political,"¹⁹ Wilson testifies.

Aristotle, in the *Eudemian Ethics*, claims that "*kalokagathia* is the only complete and comprehensive virtue as it encloses all virtues."²⁰ Like every other virtue it is linked with human knowledge; knowledge resulting from education. As every citizen has the obligation, according to the philosopher, to be educated within the framework of the State, his virtue is directly dependent on culture and laws. He also, as Plato and others before him, had noted the importance of education on the young people, so in the *Politics* he thoroughly examines the educational system of the City-State, alleging as prerequisite the eudemonia of the State, reminding to its citizens that they do not belong to themselves but only to the City-State, so it is the State only that has the right and the legal responsibility to decide what its citizens should be taught. The objective of the State is the *eudemonia* of its citizens and no one can reach eudemonia without being virtuous. Therefore, education should be one and the same for all, and the State should be responsible for it, as its purpose is the good and the prosperity of the State as a whole; there is no separate or individual good that is not focused on the City's eudemonia at the end. Virtue, according to the Stagirite, is

¹⁷ Plato. *Republic*, 451d. See also Jaeger, W. 1986. *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture: II. In Search of the Divine Centre*. Trans. from German by Highet, G. New York: Oxford University Press, 209.

¹⁸ There is the myth that *aulos*' origin is divine because Athena created it, but she turned her face with scorn and disgust when she realized that playing the *aulos* distorted her beautiful face.

¹⁹ Wilson, P. 1999. "The Aulos in Athens." In: Goldhill, S., R. Osborne (Eds.). *Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 58.

²⁰ Aristotle. *Eudemian Ethics*, 1249a, 17–18.

essentially the result of the knowledge that derives from the repetitive dynamic of the ethos and the free will of the man while habit establishes virtue. Also, “*arete* is the middle-ratio between two extremes,”²¹ and “action develops the corresponding predisposition in a pre-existent potential; it does so through habituation, which becomes our nature,”²² he teaches. In the *Politics*, music education, put in the centre of the educational system, is thoroughly examined by the philosopher and he comes to conclusions concerning the effect of music on the shaping of character and soul of the young people.

Aristotle, despite the differences he had with the Pythagoreans and Plato, agrees with them that, even though music is not one of the practical things in life, its pedagogic value and role is great, as it entertains, rests and makes the free time pleasant. Seeking the necessity and importance of music, Aristotle finds it, at first, in its entertaining role, secondly in its contribution to a moral status, as music introduces us to the good and right pleasures while “music is also useful for generating virtue”²³ and as its third objective he names the fact that it conduces to pleasure in life and to *phronesis*. These three aspects are connected with the three-parted discrimination of the soul, according to the philosopher.

“Musical forms,” Aristotle asserts, “provide a true copy of the forms of moral States, and this is the basis of the various moral influences exerted by the modes.”²⁴ Taking into account that in the rhythms and the melodies one can find mimesis of the whole spectrum of the human emotions and if he gets used to feeling sorrow or joy or any other sentiment under certain mimesis, he then is well trained to approach the appropriate feelings aroused by the real facts. Once the melodies are mimesis of ethos each one of them can shape the soul in a different way and this is the crucial point in the examination of the philosopher. Aristotle distinguished the modes into three types, the ethical, the practical and the enthusiastic.²⁵ According to the philosopher, the ethical modes act directly to the man’s ethos as a whole and affect his moral properties; therefore either they endow moral stability and serenity, like the Dorian mode does with its austere character, or they can destroy him, like the Mixolydian can do as it

²¹ Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1126b: καὶ διὰ ταῦτ’ οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἢ ὑπερβολῆ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις τῆς δ’ ἀρετῆς ἢ μεσότης.

²² Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1152a 30–33) uses the term habituation and human nature (ethos-ἔθος and physis-φύσις) synonymously. He considers them as identical. See Anderson, W. 1966. *Ethos and Education in Greek Music: the Evidence of Poetry and Philosophy*. Harvard University Press.

²³ Aristotle. *Politics*. 1338a, 13. See also Simpson, P. P. 1998. *A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle*. The University of North Carolina Press, 260.

²⁴ Winn, C., Jacks, M. L. 1967. *Aristotle: His Thought and Its Relevance Today*. Suffolk: Richard Clay (The Chaucer Press) Ltd, 83.

²⁵ Tatarkiewicz, W. 2005. *History of Aesthetics*, vol. 1. Harrell, J. (Ed.). New York: Continuum, 223.

makes the soul grieve and cry of wistfulness. Ionian and Lydian modes are softer melodies and they bring relaxation and calmness to the soul, while with the barbaric Phrygian the soul gets excited. Corollary to this examination is the conclusion that only the Dorian is suitable for the education of the young people as it is the only one that reflects morality, seriousness and bravery, while simultaneously, the Dorian is the only mode that follows the Aristotelian criteria for the middle-ratio as it is in the middle of the extremes.²⁶ This way, he upholds, education achieves its three scopes, the measure, the possible and the proper, and creates *kalous k'agathous* citizens useful for the city that is led to eudemonia.

The ancient Greeks believed that external beauty (*κάλλος*) was associated with the inner beauty, morality and virtue. Being *kalos kagathos* (beautiful externally and internally) was the highest ideal in ancient Greece. Music is addressed as a very important carrier of moral and pedagogical benefits, while music education contributes to the acquisition of the virtue of *kalokagathia* and is of great importance, as music influences body and mind and leads people to external and internal beauty.

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²⁶ Aristotle. *Politics*, 1342a–b.

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CHARACTERISTICS OF RECURSIVE STRUCTURES OF MODERNITY

ABSTRACT

The focus of the authors' interest is recursion, serving as one of the principles of design and existence of hierarchical systems. Its features are among others the infinite self-transformation associated with the return and playback based on the algorithm of its own unfolding, by analogy, which ensures the movement inward, on the basis of which complication of the system takes place. This method is quite common in cultural space, giving rise to a situation of multiplicity of values and interpretations.

Keywords: recursion; mirror; *mise en abime*; Droste effect; interpretation; text.

INTRODUCTION

The world around us is dynamic and changeable; it is constantly giving birth to different hierarchical systems. People are becoming aware that the world is not only linear, but it also develops in unexpected directions, as confirmed by research in the field of quantum physics and mechanics. One of the most mysterious and poorly understood phenomena is considered to be the treatment and relation of a certain system to itself, which gives rise to a new form of hierarchy. A striking example of such interaction can be called recursion (in Latin *recursion*—return); it serves as one of the many ways of building hierarchical systems.

The principle under study is in its essence a return of the object to itself, that is, the repetition of the self-reproduction and self-unfolding of the algorithm, by analogy, on the basis of which complication of the system takes place. At the same time, becoming more complex, the system is being updated simultaneously to a dynamic integrity, which at the same time involves many complications. Transferring this principle, one can say that thanks to the recursion a human

gives rise to self-reflection and starts the process of remembering and forgetting, if necessary. On this occasion, without introducing the term “recursion,” Carl Gustav Jung says, “when I tell my patients: ‘Take your dreams carefully,’ I mean: ‘Go back to the very subjective in itself, a source of our being, to the point where you are not aware of doing history of the world’.”¹ In addition, a recursive system reflects most clearly the idea of universal consciousness or metaphysical unity, formed in Russian philosophical thought. So, the idea of humanities uniqueness appears, for example, in the writings of Sergey N. Bulgakov as “unity–integrity,” where everyone “at the same time is personal and alike to all other people.”²

MONADS AS INSTANCES OF RECURSION

A lot of states can be noted even in the simple unity of a recursive system. In general, such a pattern is found in fractals. The main feature of this type of change associated with the complication is the integrity of the system, where a unit reflects the plural, and the plural, in turn, reflects single programs. On this particular recursive system, without introducing the term recursion, Gottfried W. Leibniz wrote. Thus, the philosopher argued that every part is a whole in miniature, it displays it as a mirror:

“Every monad [...] is not only the world itself, but [...] at the same time this big world in miniature, that is a microcosm, a little world [...] a concentrated universe [...] It is a representation of the universe in the sense that it is the view from the outside, as if through a window [...] but in the sense that it emits an idea like a mirror, but not as a dead mirror that reflects it, but as a living, reproducing its own image by force.”³

It is important to underscore the repeated image of monads that reflect the relationship. We can say that monads are “mirrors reflecting other mirrors” (“mirrors mirroring other mirrors”). The very principle of multiple mirror reflections reflects an important feature of our knowledge—the connection with the recursive thinking of a person. And the same Monad, expressing the world as a whole, shows only a certain part of it—or a series of a finite sequence. The world as a whole is an infinite number of convergent series of monads, some of which can be extended to the other around singular points. The result is that, encounters on the border of the series diverge near the singularity of the field,

¹ Jung, C. G. 1961. *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*. Ed. by A. Jaffe, Trans. by Richard and Clara Winston. New York: Pantheon Books, 38.

² Булгаков С. Н. 2003. *Агнец божий. О богочеловечестве*. Москва: Общедоступный православный университет, 119.

³ Leibniz, G. W. 1956. *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, vol. 2. Ed. by L. E. Loemker. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 189.

there is another world, called by Leibniz “co-possible,” arising from the “non-co-possible.” A co-possible world can be called either the set of converged and extended monads that make up a world, or a set of monads, expressing one and the same world. This world is a great mystery hidden in God’s mind. The philosopher explains what the Divine reason for the impossibility of knowledge is and how God uses it in every case. An example of this is the world that is always different because of self-moving sets, infinitely variable and interacting with each other.

Following the logic of his argument, Leibniz came to the conclusion that in all things Monad expressed on a net basis. It is because monads’ matter, they are not divisible, “subdivided without end,”⁴ but at the same time monads have a permanent existence. The monads reflect the integrity of the universe, and therefore, each monad is able of completing any integer. All of the above can be called Leibniz’s monads’ instances of recursion.

PRINCIPLE OF RECURSION IN CULTURAL SPACE

Despite the fact that philosophy borrowed the term “recursion” from mathematical logic, the recursive principle as a way of building a hierarchical system finds itself in cultural space, too, finding a place not only in science and its branches (mathematics, logic, computer science, computing, linguistics), but also in various arts. For example, in the visual arts of the Middle Ages, the artistic device *mise en abime* (“in the center of the room”) was used. Initially, this technique called *abime* (“abyss”) was used in heraldry: commonly, an emblem had a miniature picture in the center of a heraldic shield. This technique was later borrowed by other kinds of art. For example, in the literature there is a “text in the text,” “story within a story,” “dream within a dream,” in the theater—a “performance in the play,” in the cinematography and advertising—a “movie in the film,” or “picture in a picture.” In music, the recursion finds itself in rondo, also in variations on the basso ostinato (passacaglia, chaconne), and variational and polyphonic forms in general (canon, invention, fugue).

The symbolic significance of such use lies within the repetition of basic elements, shapes, themes, or scenes containing a key point. But beyond that doubling the image becomes the starting point for the emergence of the idea of infinity. It is a fact that an important feature of any cultural text is its limb. This is an intrinsic characteristic, but it is a recursive method for constructing a hierarchical system that takes them beyond the formal limbs. So, the question is: “how to create a never-ending text?” The hero of the story, Jorge Luis Borges’ *The Garden of Forking Paths*, says:

⁴ *Ibid.*, 56.

“I asked myself, how can a book be infinite. It never occurred to anything but the cyclical, going in circles volumes, volumes, which repeats the last page first, which allows her to continue as much as necessary.”⁵

In search of an answer to this question we may refer to works of Nicholas of Cusa, who said that the actual infinity is realized in the structure of the text itself. In his dialogue *On the Concealed God* Nicholas proved the idea of the simultaneous expressibility and ineffability of God. “He did nothing, no nothing, no nothing, and nothing with it—the source and origin of all beginnings of being and nothingness.”⁶ God eludes comprehension and naming, as the simplicity of God precedes and is referred to as the unnamable. The very existence of the actual words spoken is wider than what was said. In this case, God is greater than what had been said about Him, as soon as it was said. In general, the divine infinity is implemented in the final speech. Later in the deployment of dialogue the idea is illustrated that it is impossible to say that God is ineffable, for being the One who gives the names of the others, He cannot remain without a name. However, the idea that God expresses, and is at the same time ineffable, also is rejected, because God cannot be the subject of controversy.

We see what is said denying the other, it embraces the latter. The same principle we meet in the dialogue *About the Non-invariant*. It is the Non-invariant, acting as the Absolute, that defines itself and all. Every-thing is what it is, thanks to the Non-invariant, so all that is Non-invariant is Non-invariant. And all around tends to define itself, thereby reflecting the Non-invariant.⁷ Such disclosure of the Non-invariant, or self-disclosure—is a reflection of himself: hence there is a recursive repetition.

Let us emphasize that this principle of presentation and deployment of thought does not give complete understanding, but it is becoming infinitely closer to it. Infinity is transmitted through the artistic technique *mise en abime*, unlike Hegel’s “bad infinity,” that consists of the sum of the limbs. This clearly demonstrates the dialectical relationship of the finite and the infinite. This interaction gives rise to a new range of human feelings and emotions. Let us remember Borges again, who asserted that “the stories within stories create a strange feeling almost indefinitely, accompanied by a slight dizziness.”⁸ Furthermore, the author emphasizes the duality of the human psychological condition caused by perceiving “the text in the text”. People feel at once fascinated and horrified by the magic of endless narrative, because infinity is incomprehensible and mysterious, it denies death, giving hope for eternity and immortality, which, in

⁵ Borges, J. L. 1973. *The Aleph and Other Stories* (1933–1969). di Giovanni, N. T. (Ed.). London: Picador, 179.

⁶ Nicholas of Cusa. 2001. *Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Nicholas of Cusa*, Trans. by Hopkins, J., vol. 2. Minneapolis: Banning Press, 298.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 201.

⁸ Borges, J. L. 2004. *Seven Nights*. Weinberger, E. (Ed.). New York, NY: Viking, 79.

turn, gives rise to an existential fear of the infinite and conjures up thoughts of the limb. So, does the most magical fairy tale, but it “disturbs the soul”:

“On this night, the king heard from the lips of the Queen’s his own story. He heard the beginning of the story, which includes all the others, as well as himself [...] What if the queen never stopped talking, and the immovable king will listen to the unfinished story again and again, *The Thousand and One Nights*, endlessly repeating cycle.”⁹

It should be emphasized that from a psychological point of view, the endless repetition of a particular situation, not having a way out, or an end point, gives rise to a sense of absurdity of existence and tragic despair (think of Franz Kafka's novel *The Castle* or of the film director Harold Ramis *Groundhog Day*). Thus, the artistic technique *mise en abime* adds to paying attention to the main point of the perceiver, and creates the inexhaustible value of the infinite and finite, including those in being itself. Perhaps it is these circumstances that can be attributed to the popularity of the artistic technique *mise en abime*, and more broadly—to the recursive principle.

Later, in painting, the recursive principle finds itself in the so-called “Droste effect” in art reception, which is a special case of *mise en abime*. Although the former term originated in the twentieth century and is associated with advertising a cocoa firm Droste, the same reception of art was widespread in the Middle Ages (the first was an Italian painter Giotto di Bondone). A key role in this technique belongs to the mirror through which you can play endless reruns of correct images as well as of distorted ones. This kind of recursive image every time includes its own smaller version. We observe a similar effect today often exploited in cinema, animation, advertising, and virtual reality. In addition to the artistic techniques of the Droste effect, actively used by artists from the medieval era, there can be observed an anticipation of virtual reality, nowadays called “network to network.”

The specific use of the Droste effect can also be found in music, where the role of a mirror is played by a musical theme, which is encoded in the name of the composer—musical monogram. This technique is called *soggetto cavato dalle vocali di queste parole* (“theme created of words-like sounds” or “theme assimilating sound-combinations”), and it has become popular since the 16th century. The most famous name in the mirror is the music theme, which is in fact the encrypted name of Johann Sebastian Bach—BACH. In this, the issue of the composer’s name acts as a kind of personal familial print (all the Bach family was musically gifted). Other composers of this music tried to perpetuate through a mirror their names recalling the motif F-Es-CH represents Franz Schubert, Es-CHBEG—Arnold Schoenberg, D-Es-CH—Dmitri Shostakovich, BEBA—Bela Bartok, CAGE—John Cage, ABHF—Alban Berg.

⁹ Ibid., 18.

THE RECURSION PRINCIPLE AS A BASIS FOR INTERPRETATION

So, recursion as a special world-forming trend and a method of constructing hierarchical systems is characterized by self-replication and endless variations of itself by repetition/return and inward movement. This leads to a complication of the system based on recursion, which remains simultaneously simple and complex, whole and partial, continuous and discrete, single and in many ways more than a single, finite and the infinite. It is no coincidence that such a system can be described as Neo-Platonic, because without self-replication which generates an internal plurality, the system is unthinkable. The system can be regarded as recursive if it finds one or more similar “calls” to itself or to other systems.

In today’s world of action, a spectrum of manifestations of recursive systems is quite broad. It can be found in entire cultural space, especially in science, art, and within the internet reality. Recursion manifests itself as an artistic technique that enables the text to gain a lot of cultural values and interpretations. As a result of interpretation, there arises a “pattern;” and it is necessary to highlight the meaning being searched for, because the multiplicity of values is quite complex and confusing. But the essence of the complexity lies within the fact that it does not decompose itself into simple parts, and model them. Interpretation of the text itself is a recursive approach by which polyphonic interaction of many components of the new-born “co-possible” cultural worlds comes as a result. Artistic recursion focuses on the impact and perception of pieces of art.

“The aesthetic event” based on recursion is multifaceted. It is able to reveal the “inner intersubjective structure”, showing the grounds of artistic creation, the elements of impact and the elements of perception with its symbolism. A recursive system can be a characterization of life in general and the analysis of some of its phenomena. Any cultural phenomenon manifested in being is like picking herself out of her own “bundles” and “converging” life’s layers by detecting similarities (analogies) in every sphere. Therefore, we can proclaim that “to be”—means “being-in-the-recursion.”

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DISCOURSE STRATEGIES OF INDIVIDUALS IN BIOPOLITICS STRUCTURES

ABSTRACT

The article deals with the analysis of political strategies of individuals, emerging on the border of social subjectivity in the sphere of biopolitics. “The Politics of Silence” and its manifestation are considered forms of political activity of “excluded” individuals, confronting actions of biopower.

Keywords: biopolitics; biopower; *homo sacer*; “silence” politics; manifestation; protest; social subjectivity; political discourse; thinking and being.

In the post-political age the contemporary form of politics is biopolitics. (Foucault, 2008; Agamben, 1988) Modern biopolitics has a limiting relation to the Greek concept of political life as “βίος πολιτικός.” The concept holds the semantic distinction of the two terms, introduced by the Greeks: “*zoe*,” expressing the simple fact of life common to all living beings, and “*bios*” (“βίος”), indicating the form or way of political life. Modern biopolitics annihilates this distinction. In biopolitics an individual is a living animal, functioning as a living/biological body, existing at the edge of social subjectivity. The right to control the social body is delegated to power which turns out to be an immanent principle of how societal life is organized. (Foucault, 2013) In biopolitics the right of power evolves into the power of right which governs the rules and norms regulating societal life. State power becomes the authority to regulate and control the life of society, i.e. becomes biopower. (Foucault, 2008) Inside society biopower functions as the Big “Subject Supposed to Know.” (Žižek, 2006) The Subject is supposed to know more about the society than the society knows about itself. Guaranteeing certain social stability and order, biopower “excludes” society from the realm of decision making. Individuals acquire the status of *homo sacer*, denoting bare life, which exists in the state of exception. (Agamben, 1988) In the realm of biopolitics the extreme forms of political

activity of the excluded individuals becomes either freedom from elections or manifestation.

Freedom from elections allows individuals to actualize the only possible right—the right not to vote, which becomes decisive. As the right to vote belongs to an individual juridically, the individual becomes the mark of nonviolent resistance to the actions of State power. (Žižek, 2006) In these terms freedom from elections may be considered as a language act. Being the medium, the language defines the zones of social silence. Social silence marks the zero level of political discourse, where silence denotes the existence of language itself. That means that the silence of individuals presents an ultimate form of utterance formed in a discourse order. Social silence is an utterance and result, a societal response to the disciplinary order of state power. Consequently, silence opens up a post-language level of political life of individuals, where silence turns into “talking silence.” “Silence politics” of individuals may be considered as a form of political activity, allowing individuals to remonstrate against state power.

Social silence puts the right of the state power to speak on behalf of society under a ban, which individuals abandon to accept as their society and identify themselves as a part of this same society. State power cannot interpret social silence into words, and, thus, to assign votes of individuals. In case of social silence state power is at the limits of legitimacy.

Silence politics enables individuals to maintain distance from the political spheres. Social subjectivity is expressed through an ironic attitude of the society to political power. However, individuals’ irony to the state does not affect its basic concepts but leads to its empowerment of authority over individuals’ lives. Carried out silence politics gives freedom to state power and enables it to act for the convenience of authority, which state power represents like state interests. (Bauman, 2001) A particular trend appears, according to which the further individuals distance themselves from the realm of political life, the stronger the dependence of their everyday life on the decisions of political power grows. The dependence of everyday life from political power deprives individuals of such feelings as self-confidence, safety, security and stability. A sense of spontaneity arises in society. A sense of social insecurity becomes the source of outpouring everyday fear, a sort of fear of losing life, amenities and comfort. Due to the fact that the source of everyday fear is not thought over but experienced, the lack of reflection causes everyday fear to last on and on to renew a sense of social anxiety and insecurity. Social anxiety and insecurity are similar to mental disorder or depression, which come from a sense of helplessness or disability to act rationally and respond to life challenges adequately. Radical forms of political participation of individuals appear.

Manifestation becomes the ultimate political word of the excluded. Manifestation, as a form of address, shows itself to be on the limit of being a political “word,” becomes the ultimate individuals’ word which is not marked off from action.

This word fully expresses itself through the social body, or, by means of this word, the social body projects itself. In the structures of biopolitics the social body appears on the border of social being, where the body shows its simple natural life level in social existence, appearing when social order is destroyed. Otherness of social being emerges in the state of simple natural life. Otherness appears in the unconscious, irrational and instinctive existence of social body. Social crowd becomes the mark of zero social subjectivity. On the zero level of social subjectivity unconscious life instinct communicates by means of the social body, in other words, of the social unconsciousness. On the natural level there is no border of specific definiteness of individual being in a way that in the social body every individual becomes similar to all others. The loss of the Self means that each body of an individual is similar to another body, thus it becomes an undistinguished part of the crowd. In this manifestation the social body of the crowd acts to fully demonstrate the Self. In its presentation of the Self the social body fully projects and expresses itself. On a simple natural life level an utterance and/or speech on a pre-language level appear. But on this pre-language level the word is similar to a roar and/or uproar, the meaning of which is incomprehensible. The word makes sense only for the social body, but even for the crowd itself these sounds and/or shouts are the only possibility to utter. This pre-language word is a word out of speech. The lack of coherent speech points out the fact that manifestation is a clear non-structured flow of incoherent sounds, produced by the crowd as a social body. The social body of a crowd is a medium of meaningless societal life.

Manifestation as a form of societal address is a challenge to state power which is supposed to respond. However, any clear reaction of power becomes the motive for new manifestations. In this case manifestation becomes the form of self-production inside protesting society. The lack of final goals gives manifestations occasional and irregular tone, which by no means affects the basis of biopower. Mobilization of society against power leads to the fact that protest creates unpredictable outcomes and uncontrolled situations. A greater part of society is captured with the desire to protest, the stronger social tension and proneness to conflict grow inside society. The growth of social tension causes extreme forms of protest like spontaneous acts of violence and everyday extremism.

Acts of violence represent a zero level of protest, when protestors do not put forward any demands but demonstrate pure act of action. The lack of demands in terms of language means that the protest can not be interpreted, i.e. it turns out to be a political discourse with a zero rate of subjectivity. At the limit of social subjectivity a radical form of manifestation appears: a "protest for the sake of protest." In the protest for the sake of protest protestors' violence is aimed at protestors themselves, thus manifestation turns out to be a form of self-destroying action. (Žižek, 2006) In the protest for the sake of protest the medium of communication turns out to be the message itself, i.e. the form of mani-

festation. Protest turns into a zero political message and functions only as a phatic act. This phatic function represents an empty contact, necessary for testing the channels for connection inside society, the ability of the society to comprehend its own messages. At the limit on a zero level of political discursivity manifestation takes a form of society self-address to itself.

In a demonstratively self-addressing society, the question is raised as to the ability of society to derive the meaning of its own messages. On a zero level of political message in a society there are two ways that may follow: either 1) a possibility for self-reflection emerges, when society meets its subjectivity: the ability to speak and act, or 2) the society keeps living in an objectified state as a non self-reflexive social community of individuals, where each individual is the object for biopolitical regulation. In the case of objectification, the essence of social existence becomes hatred, which means not only subjective emotion but objective and groundless anger and aggression in society. (Baudrillard, 2002) Hatred fills in private, autonomous spheres of social relationships and contacts: relationships with partners, family members, neighbors and co-workers. In modernity each of these spheres may be the arena for violence without apparent reason, having neither grounds for it, nor any sound explanation. (Bauman, 2001) The ultimate display of social hatred is terrorism as aimless self-negation of society.

On reaching this limit a possibility for self-reflection emerges in society, causing it to interrogate political life as a possible impossibility which appears on the border of social existence in the world of biopolitics. At this point the society as a whole unit is a free agent at the point of co-being of the political being, bringing the society to itself. Addressing the society is a reflexive act. In this reflexive act the "silence" of an individual as a state of inactive activity turns into an activity of mind to realize the dependence of life on politics. Reflection gives the opportunity for thinking on existence to appear. In such thinking the essential principle is "*cogito ergo sum*." Overpassing the borders of meaningless life allows an individual to position himself/herself not only as an existing but thinking political subject. The political subject demonstrates a proper political mode of life, which makes it possible for him/her to live in unity with himself/herself. In the world of thinking and being political subject finds consensus with himself/herself when an individual starts living in accordance with his/her words and begins speaking in accordance with life. Life, demonstrating thinking and being, becomes an objectification of the philosophical idea of political mode of life, which requires the necessity of thinking in every moment of life. The existence of the political subject is the intelligent being of a citizen, who with his mode of life resists biopolitical strategies of state power.

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EPATAGE AS AN ELEMENT OF THE MEDIA PERFORMANCE OF MODERNITY

ABSTRACT

The subject of this article is epatage, widely spread in modern culture thanks to digital technologies. Today epatage associated to media performance is deliberately constructed, imposing mass consumerism with a ready-made-fictional image, and operating “anti-values.” There are a lot of causes of the existence of the epatage image which violates certain cultural codes. Meanwhile epatage can be described as a response to certain objective and subjective calls. As a peculiar form of culture, epatage contains both positive and negative pulses.

Keywords: media performance; ready-made-fictional image; epatage; *Homo ludens*; epatage behavior; simulacrum.

INTRODUCTION

Modernity is often called the “society of theatre,” and numerous shows (political, scientific, religious, economic, including love and “flirt” with death) serve as an effective means of influencing people by manipulating their consciousness. Today all people, willingly or unwillingly, watch and often become the participants of theatrical performances with a large number of masks. In modern social media space performances are designed, introducing the already-made-fictional-images and related stories, and thanks to the media and the Internet, they instantly become the property of masses, without any doubt, and being actively discussed.

Media performance represents a flexible system without a detailed dramaturgical plan: it is spontaneous, creative, and unpredictable. The viewer cannot know “which way the process will act,” and “directors are ready to act upon any scenario ...” (Kara-Murza, 2009, 274) These attractive shows include elements

of tacit secrecy, and miracle; this is done by using the story outline, illogically woven, but very emotional, and workshops help to present and render it all effectively. The passive type of consumer is formed today; the audience never reflects on the real situation. The already-made-fictional image and the story are self-sufficient: infiltrating the human consciousness, they fill the inner world and govern the realm of values, becoming a “censor of acceptable or unacceptable, visible, striking eyes and departing into a shadow, overset and ignored.” (Savchuk, 2012, 40) Eventually a new situation sprang up, where it is not human beings that think about the images, but rather the images think about humans. Another thing is that the already-made-fictional-image is not the only example. In the arena of cultural space as a visual show goes on, there slop anti-values, enthusiastically perceived by people. As a result of introducing such information which is essentially simulative, and empty, into the minds of masses, there comes a change in the programs of lifestyle and worldview, and a drastic distortion of traditional values takes place. All this creates a situation of “transparency of evil.”

EPATAGE AS NIHILISM AND GAME

Epatage is a form of supportive implementation of negative information based on anti-values into consciousness. It is a transgressive step, brazenly tearing the boundaries of traditional, permissible and ordinary. This is an original overcoming of social by the provocative challenge claiming sensation, fame, and popularity. Epatage is accompanied by defiantly-scandalous behavior, shocking antics, aimed mostly at drawing attention to one’s own personality. Flashes of epatage manifestations have been repeated in social life throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. The most vivid of them are connected with the trends of modernism; later with the contra-culture manifestations of the 60–70-ies of the 20th century; today they are bound with the aesthetics of glamour.

Epatage acts as a nihilistic rejection of the existing world order, of its foundations, traditions and values, including morals. It is a most emotional explosion of personality, acting as an instrument of psychological defense against the alien, imposed on one by the Other (culture, society and people). Through the epatage a human being tries to resolve the related contradictions. It is associated with feeling “thrown into the world against will” (Erich Fromm). If a person is not self-sufficient, this triggers an “escape from freedom,” which manifests itself through the epatage-emotional outburst including deviant behavior. Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, a founder of futurism, in his *Manifesto* called for demonstrative behavior: “spit on the altar of art [...] destroy museums, libraries, and fight with moralism.” According to him only such behavior helps the true, eternal and absolute to be born. Epatage is a way of “metaphysical rebellion,” the rebellion of a human being “against his inheritance and against the whole of the universe” (Albert Camus), especially within social transformations. In the

framework of this rebellion a person commits to the transgressive breakthrough, thereby leaving the unstable conditions and finding a foothold in something new and innovative. Every contact with everything formal and dogmatic is torn, and the experiment upon a person itself is endeavored, searching for a new identity.

Let us recall Johan Huizinga: one of the alter ego of human existence and its characteristics is *Homo ludens*. The human being plays a lifetime and throughout the life the game is varied. The game, providing a large palette of positive emotions, giving courage and passion, allows for existence simultaneously in multiple worlds, trying lots of masks and living not only one life. In the modern times the game is left strictly assigned to its place—a playing field, but it has penetrated into all spheres of human existence (including, science, religion, politics, economics, etc.). In our context, one of the games where people manifest themselves is epatage.

EPATAGE AND CREATIVITY

This playing-games basis of personality, when harmoniously intertwined with creative domination, contributes to the birth of art. It is no coincidence that epatage is one of the components of art. As Maxim Shapir (1990) righteously considers, the effectiveness of any kind of art is that it can “strike, stir up, arouse.” Innovations in art, search for the new forces which allow the artist to cross the boundaries of the traditional and classical. It extends the old boundaries and opens up new horizons, often accompanied by a scandal. This provides a stunning effect on masses and attracts attention to innovations. Such epatage behaviour and speeches, for instance, were typical for a notable surrealist artist Salvador Dali. All in his appearance, behavior, words and paintings was a challenge, scandal, and shocking to the audience. In particular, he spoke publicly about his genius; and he always stated that “surrealism is Salvador Dali.” His *Diary of a Genius*, of shocking frankness, depicted the peculiarities of the life of his own body. Especially for epatage fashionists, he created the hats-cutlets or hats-shoes, earrings-phones, bags-apples, gloves with nails, phones-lobster and more. Epatage was the last request of the artist: bury him in the floor of his own home-Museum. In general, epatage was the signature style of Salvador Dali, with both lifetime and after life success.

Another cause that generates epatage behavior can be called a psychological factor, namely a shyness and modesty of a man who hides himself behind the mask. One of the epatage figures of the modern era was Alexander Nikolaevich Vertinsky, who created his unique performance style in a mask of Piero the clown. Researchers estimate that the mask of Piero was chosen under the influence of Alexander Blok’s poetry (his series *Mask*), though Alexander Vertinsky himself wrote in his memoirs that the image was born spontaneously and “was needed on stage solely because of the strong sense of uncertainty and confusion in front of a packed House.” The image of Piero helped Vertinsky to

overcome uncertainty, charging a strong emotional attitude. The epatage of Vertinsky image (his mask, manner of performance in a slightly nasal voice and uninstalled bitter plastic) influenced the public hypnotically, drawing all attention to the artist and his work.

EPATAGE AND BOREDOM

Today the space of social gives birth to an artificial character—a simulacrum, living theatre, flaunting, provoking interest to itself with the epatage. These performances are nothing more than “vain attempts to generate life outside of that which already exists.” (Baudrillard, 2012, 8) Spiritual emptiness creating a visibility of true work gives rise to existential boredom. When overcoming this boredom is impossible, it remains in a person’s life as a vicious circle. According to Andy Warhol, the boredom of being is overcome by the new birth, but it is, in turn, gradually turning into a routine, transformed into boredom. Warhol, accentuating the presence of spiritual emptiness in modern culture, was the first who “imposed us the picture without quality, without the presence of desire,” where there are combined the “ideals of primitivism and cold purity.” But as a result of such images existing a paradox of the beauty of the dead was born, which is today actively made use of in cultural space.

The modern “star of nothing,” having imagined itself a Deity, boredom begins to behave strangely; an inadequately given reality, introducing “the uprising of the dead.” Many aspects of epatage behavior happen on the verge of pathology, although there might be no cleavage of human consciousness (schizophrenia). The unthinkable thoughts, or rather their absence, “the star of nothing” expresses through such a “unit of cultural information” as a *meme* (Richard Dawkins, “the selfish gene”), which is like a computer virus rapidly spreading/reproducing in space, revealing itself not only on the Internet, but in the media, advertisements, and daily life. The fact that it includes not only words and expressions (sometimes nonsensical) but also audio-visual segments that modern “society of theatre” perceives gladly, promotes the popularity of mem. “Dead thing” manifests itself and is asserting itself, showing ugliness, filth, cynical indifference and “black” despair instead of beauty and dignity. The result is a born-made-fictional-image of a media performance that indulges in circulation, attacking the human and producing negative effects.

CONCLUSION

Epatage is a form of culture which includes both positive and negative pulses. On the one hand, epatage contributes to the birth of the new, stimulating further development. But on the other hand, epatage parasites on spiritual emptiness and immorality. Epatage is becoming increasingly commonplace, it does not require reflexivity, it blatantly rips threads of traditions and violates any

borders, it embodies the festive and celebrating thoughtlessness, forming a passive type of consumer, which follows a call “Make it so!”

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PHILOSOPHY OF THE EARLY STOICS: THE RELATED AS A TENTATIVE CONSTITUENT OF THE SCOPE OF THE INCORPOREAL

ABSTRACT

The article considers the scope of the early Stoics' notion of "incorporeal" and the ontological concept of the incorporeal as being incapable of interacting with bodies. First, an interpretation is proposed that the incorporeal is an important part of the concept of meaningful conduct of *Homo sapiens*, as one can trace its direct relationship with his assents, desires and expectations as the elements preceding action. Second, a reconstitution has been suggested, one showing that in the scope of the incorporeal the Stoic system has a concurrent "as is said" type of predicate, or *lekton*.

Keywords: antique philosophy; stoicism; incorporeal; bodies; predicates; sayable; *lekton*; related.

INTRODUCTION

The distinction of the corporeal and the incorporeal is available in every section of the early Stoic system. The basic ontological provisions state that only the corporeal exists, acts and is acted upon; the incorporeal is not capable of acting, but it is real; there can be no interaction between the corporeal and the incorporeal. When working with doxographical materials—one of the main sources of information about scholarly philosophy—we can fail to notice that in some cases the term "incorporeal" stands in context, a context which reflects mutually exclusive interpretations, resulting from the fact that the doctrine is considered in the light of opposing philosophers, rather than following the authentic position of the early Stoics. As has rightly been said by Marcelo D. Boeri, some points of view of the doxographers mislead mainly "because either they take incorporeals to be secondary realities (bodies being the primary ones) or because they raise their objections to Stoic claims starting from quite a dif-

ferent conceptual scheme.”¹ The situation with the doxographical materials, on the one hand, distorts further the understanding of ambiguous theoretical provisions of the Stoics; on the other hand, it reveals the polemical nature of the terminology. From Sextus Empiricus we come to know that the term “incorporeal” is used in disputes of Hellenistic philosophical schools, while the scope and the content of the notion are still under development, also due to the necessity to persuade that this or that something the term signifies, is real:

“For, no matter what sort of incorporeal one says is taught, be it the Platonic idea or the ‘sayable’ of the Stoics, or be it place, void, time, or any other such thing—without making any rash statement about their existence or getting sidetracked in extraneous inquiries while demonstrating the nonexistence of each one, every one is obviously under investigation among the dogmatists and will be ‘as long as the water flows and the tall trees bloom’.”²

Sextus Empiricus further describes the positions of the arguing parties,

“... some insisting that they exist, others that they do not, and others undecided.”³

Thus, Sextus Empiricus acknowledges the disagreement among the philosophical schools concerning whether the incorporeal exists and what it is. The latter provided for essential conceptual transformations in trying to explain in the manner of the Stoics the issues bound up with the notion, popular in different traditions and not belonging solely to this system. *The Fragments* gives us only one testimony on which basis we make a conclusion about the standard early Stoic list of incorporeals, and again it belongs to Sextus Empiricus: “the incorporeals count four items, which is ‘*lekton*’ void, time and place.”⁴ This provision is considered as common for the Stoics, which is quite evident from the introductory remarks “the Stoic philosophers said.”⁵ The passage of Philo of Alexandria has no reference to the early Stoic doctrine, but indirectly it clarifies the applicable scope of the notion “incorporeal,” giving the following classification of the elements of its scope:

¹ Boeri, M. D. 2001. “The Stoics on Bodies and Incorporeals.” *The Review of Metaphysics*, 54, no. 4, 727.

² Sextus Empiricus. 1998. “Against the Professors of the Liberal Studies.” In: idem. *Against the Grammarians (Adversos Mathematicos I)*. Trans., introduction: Blank, D. L. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 8.

³ Ibid.

⁴ *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*. Collegit Ioannes Ab Arnim (Stuttgartiae: In: Aedibus B. G. Teubneri MCMLXIV), vols. 1–4. (abbreviated as SVF). SVF 2, 331.

⁵ Ibid.

“... incorporeal is divided into the complete (te>leia) and the incomplete (ajtelh~) [...] In its turn, the incomplete incorporeal is further divided into the so-called predicates, propositions and all the rest, being of minor importance.”⁶

The comparison of the above testimonies actualizes the following questions: what is the interpretation of the “propositions” in the early Stoic doctrine? Are there meant to be different lists of the early Stoic incorporeal objects—or different objects? Was the discrepancy in the commentators’ pieces of evidence a result of a later development of other opinions? A more general issue is becoming now ever more relevant, whether the early Stoics suggested any original concept of the incorporeal, which reduces itself to particular objects not capable of acting, including those not capable of interacting with bodies, in such a way, that the theoretical essentials of their own philosophical system would force them to hold to this incapability. Let us consider the scope of the notion and pay special attention to those elements of the concept that are responsible for making up the thesis “the incorporeal is not capable of interacting with bodies.”

CONSTITUENTS OF THE SCOPE OF INCORPOREAL

According to the early Stoics, in the course of transition from human sense data to human actions, the starting point of action is an estimation based on sensation and having an operant motive. This was mentioned by Stobaeus, “the assents refer to the judgments, while the desires refer to the predicates, which in this or that way make part of these judgments, to which the assent is given.”⁷ The idea is repeated in a condensed form, “our choices, aspirations, desires, as well as inclinations are formed on the basis of predicates.”⁸ The Stoics assigned the judgments and the predicates to the complete and to the incomplete type of the incorporeal, respectively. Man cannot reject sensation, acting on his body. The judgments and the predicates are incorporeal, therefore their effect is not so strong, they give room to hesitation and allow one to drop action, providing for person autonomy. Thus, the provisions of the decision-making mechanism played an essential role in supporting the Stoics’ position, that “the incorporeal is not capable of acting on a body.” In view of the above revealed importance of the predicates for anthropology and ethics, it seems vital to explain why the predicates and the propositions are interlinked not only in the cited above statement attributed to Philo of Alexandria. Again from Stobaeus, “Zeno states that the cause (aji>tion) is the thing because of which something happens, and the thing to which it is a course, is the result (sumbebhko>v). Then, the cause is the

⁶ Ibid. SVF 2. 182.

⁷ Ibid. SVF 3. 171.

⁸ Ibid. SVF 3. 91.

body, and that of which it is a cause is a predicate (kathgo>rhma).⁹ In another fragment Stobaeus reflects, “The predicates (kathgo>rhmata) are given in reality only as accidents (sumbebhko>ta), e.g. ‘to walk’ is available, when I am walking, but when I am lying or sitting, it is not.”¹⁰ So, in the first and in the second passages sumbebhko>v, sumbebhko>ta, translated as results, accidents, are referred to kathgo>rhmata—predicates. Two issues are being mixed, i.e. the physical one with its cause-and-effect, and result, and the logical one with its predicates and accidents. The difficulty was initiated and deepened by an acceptable but ambiguous translation: when answering the question, if sumbebhko>v should be considered to be one of the types of the incorporeal, dependent on the interpretation of the term we arrive at different understandings. The situation gets more complicated as the term “sumbebhko>v” is adopted by the Stoics from Aristotle’s works. Yevgeniy Orlov suggests to use the translation “related” for the term “ta sumbebhko>ta”¹¹ and highlights the following oppositions in Aristotle’s passages, “the related as such and related by coincidence.”¹² We employ the proposed translation variant and Aristotle’s interpretation of the meaning of “related as such”: “The related is something attributable to something else, of which is correctly said, but which is attributable not through a necessity and not completely.”¹³

Let us look back into the early Stoic treatise. Galen writes, “There also existed a doctrine on different qualities and accidents (sumbebhko>twn), which, as is stated by the Stoic successors, are bodies.”¹⁴ In other passages Galen speaks about related qualities (sumbebhko>ta), propositions (sumbebhko>v) and primary qualities, having corporeal nature.¹⁵ Thus, the propositions or the related, as was meant by the early Stoics, were also the corporeal, but not complete characteristics and qualities, subject to strengthening or weakening. Therefore, we should not be surprised that they are not among the incorporeal in a number of pieces of evidence. Let us refer to the passage attributed to Stobaeus, but with the comments we have made. “The predicates (kathgo>rhmata) are actually given only as the related (sumbebhko>ta): e.g. ‘to walk’ is given, when I am walking, but when I am lying or sitting, it is not ...”¹⁶ “The related” has in the context a different meaning than that which we have just mentioned (i.e. it does not mean only corporeal characteristics and qualities subject to strengthening or weakening). Discussed in this passage is the specific perception of the time in

⁹ Ibid. SVF 1. 89.

¹⁰ Ibid. SVF 2. 509.

¹¹ Orlov, Y. 1996. *Ecumenical in Theoretical Philosophy of Aristotle*. Novosibirsk: Science, 180–181.

¹² Ibid., 12.

¹³ Ibid., 21.

¹⁴ SVF 2. 377.

¹⁵ Ibid. SVF 2. 323, 381.

¹⁶ Ibid. SVF 2. 509.

the early Stoic tenet, according to which only the current moment is real. This drives us to the interpretation that in a statement some particular predicates are referred to a subject in view of the present, currently perceived conditions. They are rightful under the situation, in this particular case, under the circumstances, now. Aristotle also distinguishes the related both as the existent, and as the sayable. The early Stoics seem to have similar problems, and the example, mentioned by Sobaeus, illustrates the ambiguity.

CONCLUSION

The answer to the question, whether the related or the propositions, as described in the texts of the early Stoics, should be considered a specific particular type of the incorporeal, is negative. It goes without saying that the related items, conceived as bodily changes, are out of the question. In another meaning they are taken into consideration and are listed with the incorporeal as a kind of predicates, a subdivision of *lekton*. *Lekton* was included within the scope of the notion “incorporeal.” Thus, the reconstitution of the conceptualization of the incorporeal in the context of the action theory reveals a coincidence of objects in the early Stoic lists of the incorporeal, and suggests a model for interpreting the notions, uncovering their designation in the philosophical system of the Stoics.

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JUDITH BUTLER AND AN ETHICS OF HUMANIZATION

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that the question of the human is a major concern in Judith Butler's philosophy. I believe that although this concern is more visible in her relatively recent works on ethics and politics, in her earlier works it is always in the background. I read Butler as a deep thinker on the nature of the human, and argue that her thoughts on ethics and politics should be read as a (non-utopic) yearning for a human condition where a collectively inhabitable world becomes possible. This paper will explore the question of the human as Butler discusses this in its relation to intelligibility, critique, and the opacity of the subject not only to understand the terms of dehumanization but also to offer ways of conceptualizing a more humane world.

Keywords: Judith Butler; human; humanization; dehumanization.

This paper argues that the question of the human is a major concern in Judith Butler's philosophy. I believe that although this concern is more visible in her relatively recent works on ethics and politics, in her earlier works—where she ponders other issues such as gender, sexual difference, the body, queer, and performativity—is also always in the background. I read Butler as a deep thinker on the nature of the human, and argue that her thoughts on ethics and politics should be read as a (non-utopic) yearning for a human condition where a collectively inhabitable world becomes possible. In the preface to the second edition of her first groundbreaking work, *Gender Trouble*, she writes:

“What continues to concern me most is the following kinds of questions: what will and will not constitute an intelligible life, and how the presumptions about normative gender and sexuality determine in advance what will qualify as the ‘human’ and the ‘livable’?” (Butler 1999, xxii; emphasis added)

In other words, how do normative gender presumptions work to delimit the very field of description that we have for the human? What is the means by which we come to see this delimiting power, and what are the means by which we transform it?

This, I think, can be taken as an indication that the question of the human has preoccupied her from the outset. I believe that we can better perceive Butler's inherent concern for man and the collectively inhabitable world if we start from her more recent works about ethics and politics and work backwards towards the earlier ones. However, it would be improper to suppose that Butler's concern is to define what the human is (as if this were possible), or to give us a recipe for the "making" of the human. Rather, I think that she invites us to think about the primordial relationality of our existence and of our lives, which we pursue in a primary sociality as interdependent embodied beings.

Accordingly, I suggest that we need to distinguish the ordinary sense of the human from the sense in which Butler talks about the human—as something yet to come (if ever). As we will see, her critical approach, which targets the sense of the human as the human, is defined in terms of the norms of intelligibility. This is one of the primary reasons why Butler thinks that we need to reconsider the question of the human. Hence, it seems that because we suffer (paradoxically) dehumanization due to the present norms of the human, we should ponder this question in terms of humanization as an ethical and political aspiration. Butler writes in *Precarious Life*:

"I propose to start, and to end, with the question of the human (as if there were any other way for us to start or end!). We start here not because there is a human condition that is universally shared—this is surely not yet the case. The question that preoccupies me in the light of recent global violence is, who counts as human? Whose lives count as lives?" (Butler, 2006, 20)

INTELLIGIBILITY AND THE HUMAN

Since conflicting interpretations of what the human is and what it ought to be generate a site of contestation where intelligibility marks what is human and not-human, intelligibility seems to be the point of starting. In *Undoing Gender*, Butler writes:

"I propose to broach the relationship between variable orders of intelligibility and the genesis and knowability of the human [...] The relation between intelligibility and the human is an urgent one; it carries a certain theoretical urgency, precisely at those points where the human is encountered at the limits of intelligibility itself." (Butler, 2004, 57–8)

The questions preoccupying her—namely, "who counts as human?" and "whose lives count as lives?"—would not have arisen if there were no discours-

es (always operating within the opposition between the human and the inhuman) giving generalized descriptions of what “human” is and what counts as human life. As one realizes that certain lives, certain identities, certain humans are not accounted for—are “unspeakable;” are not considered “real” in the dominant discourse—one also comes to realize that there is a discursive impasse that is produced by reigning discourses. Butler says:

“The categories by which social life is ordered produce a certain incoherence or entire realms of unspeakability. And it is from this condition, the tear in the fabric of our epistemological web, that the practice of critique emerges, with the awareness that no discourse is adequate here or that our reigning discourses have produced an impasse. Indeed, the very debate in which the strong normative view wars with critical theory may produce precisely that form of discursive impasse from which the necessity and urgency of critique emerges.” (Butler, 2003b, 308)

As we will see, these “entire realms of unspeakability” present a problem for Butler because what is unspeakable is also in a sense not real and inhuman. The discursive impasse happens when the reigning discourse cannot account for that which it leaves out. Intelligibility discloses the mode of operation of the reigning discourse only when one looks at it with a critical eye in terms of the criterion of humanness. As the human is made over against the unreal, the less-than-human, the inhuman as a border “securing the human in its ostensible reality” (Butler, 2004, 218), the conditions of intelligibility for the genesis of the human mark the ontological status of any person as a human being. Being unintelligible—meaning that “the laws of culture and of language find one to be an impossibility,” hence unrecognized (since one is outside the norms of recognition)—is an exclusion of a peculiar sort: an exclusion from the domain of the human. Having perceived this as a problem, can one overlook it? Butler surely cannot. She needs to subject this problem to critique.

Following Michel Foucault in his characterization of critique as a mode of ethical self-questioning which is akin to virtue, Butler understands critique as an interrogation targeting the terms by which subjects are formed. Hence virtue comes to denote a critical and questioning attitude of the norms by which subjects are constituted. This also means that critique as virtue is a kind of performance, of self-making and self-transformation as one opposes the established order by way of which subjects are constituted in foreclosure and exclusion. (Butler 2003b, 304)

To critically think on the question of whether we have already known the human is crucial for Butler since ethics and any social transformation depends upon how we respond to this question. In other words, according to Butler, the humanly intelligible is circumscribed through the norms of the human and this has consequences for ethics as well as for any conception of social transfor-

mation. When we suppose that we already know the human, this taking for granted forecloses the critical and ethical inquiry which seeks to understand how the human is produced, reproduced, and deproduced. Referring to the question “whether we have already known the human” Butler says: “This latter inquiry does not exhaust the field of ethics, but I cannot imagine a responsible ethics or theory of social transformation operating without it.” (Butler, 2004, 36)

Since to be human means, in a sense, to be intelligible as such, and to be unintelligible is to be excluded from the domain of the human, a primary question seems to be: how is intelligibility defined? Furthermore, can we hold that intelligibility depends upon a universal, a form of humanness that is pre-given? Butler does not think so and is critical of this view of humanism, which she attributes to a certain understanding of philosophical anthropology. She explains this in her interview “Gender is Extramoral” (2009):

“In any case, if we agree that philosophical anthropology is a form of humanism that supposes that there is just one single idea of what it is to be human, and that it is possible to attribute defining traits to this human subject, then we are taking that which is human as something given, something that already exists.”

This would also mean that it is the human that determines the norms of intelligibility. But the situation seems to be quite the reverse. Intelligibility as the condition of possibility for humanness depends upon a certain production of the human as the effect of power operating in relation to that which is non-human or inhuman. According to Butler, “it is not just that there are laws that govern our intelligibility, but ways of knowing, modes of truth that forcibly define intelligibility.” (Butler, 2004, 57) These modes of truth produce intelligibility in and of a nexus of “knowledge-power” as it is coined by Foucault.

The criteria of this forced perception of the world (which we cannot completely escape or be outside of), which we accept as giving us the true/real understanding of how things are in the most general sense including how we should conceptualize ourselves, are the very norms of intelligibility to which we are subjected. It is through accepting a particular perception as truly representing the world that we differentiate the human from the inhuman, the normal from the pathological, male from female, man from woman, the heterosexual from the homosexual, the human life from the not so human life, the lives that are grievable from the ones that are not, and so on.

TO BE UNDONE BY ONE ANOTHER

Although there is no outside of subjugation, it is possible to contemplate a more humanized world where the dehumanizing effects of subjugation are minimized as we become aware of our common vulnerability and the responsi-

bility that arises from this common human condition. Butler thinks that we definitely do have a primordial responsibility towards others. I believe that according to Butler the question of “what are our obligations to people we do not know?”—in the sense of our primordial responsibility towards other individuals—is a question that frames the philosophical perspective which anchors the question of humanization. This “to know” seems to exceed the sense of “being acquainted with.” People whom we do not know are, in a more fundamental sense, the ones rendered unintelligible. To limit responsibility in terms of the people who are like us (where this like us is determined by the norms of intelligibility) presupposes that we are self-knowing, self-transparent, and autonomous subjects. However, according to Butler, the subject is neither self-transparent nor autonomous but opaque to itself. As we not only realize that we all share in this condition of opacity, but also that responsibility is not restricted by knowing and that, indeed, it precedes knowing, there is hope that responsibility will be extended to include everyone who is other to me. That “our primordial sociality determines us as beings who live in an interdependent world” is a point that Butler makes over and over again, especially in her more recent books, articles, and interviews. However, by virtue of our primordial sociality, our interdependence acquires an ontologico-ethical sense since it exceeds the limits of the interdependence required for survival. At the same time, responsibility towards others comes to denote the obligation to respond to the demand that the Other (in Levinas’ sense) makes on me before any social contract where survival is secured in a community, a nation, a legal framework, and so on. Butler, drawing on Levinas, says:

“On the matter of responsibility I am interested in the productive formulations made by Levinas. For Levinas, I am not responsible for my actions—though in fact I also am—but rather responsible for the Other, for the demands of the Other. And any demand made by the Other is prior to any possibility of social contract: whatever the demand the Other puts before me, it affects me, it involves me in a relation of responsibility.” (Butler, 2009)

According to Butler, it is opacity that is the source of our ethical responsibility. Although one becomes intelligible and recognized within this regime of truth, it is also the site where one relates to oneself. As what “I am” is in a sense produced but not deterministically set by the norms, I can challenge the norms and transform myself by questioning these norms that produce me. In terms of this ethics, self-transformation of the subject is made possible through resistance to obedience, through “the right that the subject gives herself to question truth on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of truth” (Butler, 2003b, 314), that is to say through the right of critique that the subject gives to herself. This account of “coming to be” of the subject by way of the productive effect of power but at the same time by resistance to it, make it that

the conditions of the emergence of the subject can never be fully accounted for, and this is why “the subject is opaque to itself, not fully translucent and knowable to itself.” (Butler, 2005, 19) Butler strongly believes that the opacity of the subject can serve the humanization of our world. Explaining opacity, Butler writes:

“Moments of unknowingness about oneself tend to emerge in the contexts of relations to others, suggesting that these relations call upon primary forms of relationality that are not always available to explicit and reflective thematization. If we are formed in the context of relations that become partially irrecoverable to us, then the opacity seems built into our formation and follows from our status as beings who are formed in relation to dependency. The postulation of a primary opacity to the self that follows from formative relations has a specific implication for an ethical bearing toward the other. Indeed, if it is precisely by virtue of one’s relation to others that one is opaque to oneself, and if those relationships are the venue for one’s ethical responsibility, then it may well follow that it is precisely by virtue of one’s opacity to itself that it incurs and sustains some of its most important ethical bonds.” (Ibid., 20)

In *Giving an Account of Oneself*, through a dialogue with Foucault, Butler discusses the questioning of a regime of truth in so far as it amounts to “giving an account of oneself,” in order to suggest that the desire to recognize and be recognized by the other, when found to be impossible in a regime of truth (since oneself and/or the other does not conform to the norms of intelligibility), equally compels me to adopt a critical attitude towards these norms. (Butler, 2005, 22–6) I believe that it is the realization that we are interdependent creatures desiring to be recognized and the awareness succeeding it that open up the possibility of a more humanized world for Butler.

Accordingly, by questioning the norms through which my being is given, I question them in relation to my own being in the sense of my own recognizability as a person. Moreover, this questioning also involves a questioning of the other, as well as the role of the other in terms of the possibility of my becoming a recognizable subject.

FOR A HUMANIZING ETHICS

Butler takes on the task of showing that the opacity of the subject has a greater potential to give rise to a more humanized ethics. This is what she is after in her book *Giving an Account of Oneself* as she converses with other thinkers (Foucault, Theodor Adorno, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jean Laplanche) who have articulated a conception of the opaque self. Accordingly, it is not the transparency of the subject but opacity that is the resource for humanizing eth-

ics. She claims that it is “my own opacity to myself [that] occasions my capacity to confer a certain recognition on others. It would be, perhaps, an ethics based on our shared, invariable, and partial blindness about ourselves.” (Ibid., 41) It is by virtue of this opacity that I can feel responsible to the others whom I do not know. I believe this “to know” has a double but interrelated meaning. It means at once those with whom I am not acquainted as well as those I do not recognize because they fall outside of the norms of intelligibility that govern the domain of the human. Those with whom we are not acquainted are automatically judged in terms of the norms of intelligibility.

As social beings destined to relationality, we demand of and impose upon others recognition since, as we come to realize that it is impossible to fully recognize and be recognized by others, this “apprehension of epistemic limits” (ibid., 43) brings about a more ethical and humanized world. We are interdependent beings and this primary relationality is a condition that none of us escape from, as much as we sometimes will to do so. The discussion of the opacity of the subject shows us that we are never “isolated islands” but that we are always affected by others in ways that we cannot control or will away. We are undone by each other. Butler says: “I think we are affected by others in all kinds of ways [...] It just seems to me that there are ways in which we have to accept something like our own permeability to other people. We are affected by others.” (Butler, 2003b) However, this primordial relationality and affectability is ignored when we uncritically suppose that we can delineate the borders of the human in terms of the norms of intelligibility, so creating a domain of the inhuman that can be omitted.

Finally, according to Butler, our increased attunement to our general fragility and vulnerability will make us more humane. This very simple idea may appear naïve to some; but I believe that it is rich idea worthy of serious consideration. I want to close with a quote from Butler that I believe can be read as a call to join her in the task of making our world more humanized. Referring to the political structures necessary to make this happen, she says:

“This does not mean I am capable of making these structures come into existence—responsibility is not the same as efficacy—but rather that I can fight for a world that maximizes the possibility of preserving and sustaining life and minimizes the possibility of those forms of violence that, illegitimately, take life, or at least reduce the conditions that make it possible for this to happen.” (Butler, 2009)

Regretfully though, she observes that in the present state of our world we seek primarily to “eviscerate and to establish our impermeability.” (Butler, 2003b) Far from traveling towards a better world, unfortunately, we seem to be going in the opposite direction.

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ON GLOBALIZATION AND GLOBALISM

ABSTRACT

In this paper an attempt is made to comprehend the global historical process. The paper claims that the revolutionary progress in information and communication technologies, integrative tendencies in economic and cultural spheres, problems on safeguarding, security and peace are not factors of globalization. They are rather social manifestations, which sustain its development. According to author's position, there is a spiritual factor underlying globalization. The two similar processes/concepts—globalism and globalization—are substantially different from each other.

Keywords: globalization; globalism; intellectual evolution of mankind; immanent development; unified consciousness of mankind.

Numerous academic works show that there is no consensus among scholars about the essence of globalization yet. Depending on the choice of main factors or their combined effects, opinions of specialists concerning the process of globalization are also differentiated. The lack of a consensus may be due to the fact that most researchers try to study globalization by adopting an externalist approach, i.e. they refer to external factors, such as economic, informational, social and so forth. According to my position an externalist approach not only fails to reveal the essence of globalization, but it also fails to reveal the beginning the process which was initiated in the ancient times. As I believe, it is necessary to indicate spiritual factors in order to reveal the gist of the objective, law-governed and immanent process which is globalization. The contemporaneity of this process is defined by the fact that society gradually perceives itself as an indivisible unity. According to Pitirim Sorokin, the development of any sociocultural system should be researched by the immanent change principle.¹

¹ Sorokin, P. A. 2006. *Social and Cultural Dynamics*. Moscow: Astrel, 797–818.

I am convinced that it would be of help to put forward a new pattern of development of the intellectual evolution of mankind.

The objective historical laws are seen as reflected in the “age” periodization of the intellectual progress of mankind. On the basis of many archaeological, ethnographical and other scientific materials the comprehensive research of the hypothesis is justified. Proceeding with the evolution in ontogenesis we can take that society has entered into the “teenage period” of its present intellectual evolution. It is a kind of development in ontogenesis where an individual begins to perceive himself and define his place in society following a new ability to reflect. According to philogenesis, it means that the people of the modern period regard themselves as a part of an indivisible society with increasing dynamics. It should be emphasized that in last years the outstanding scholars began to talk about the indivisible social consciousness. In the book written together by Stanislav Grof, Erwin Laszlo and Peter Russel the concept of the indivisible consciousness of society has been introduced.² The phenomenon of the formation of collective consciousness attracts more and more attention.

From Robertson’s definition it is seen that the essence of globalization has to be understood by people’s perceiving this process.³ The analogy of ages runs as follows. Each year in child’s life is analogous to 3000 years in humanity’s intellectual evolution. From the end of the 2nd century to the beginning of the 3rd century mankind ends its childhood and begins to treat itself as an indivisible unity. The main thesis of new hypothesis is that society will reach its “13th birthday” of intellectual evolution during the middle of the third millennium.

The humanitarian and sociocultural sides of globalization are precisely the peculiarities of the modern age as these manifestations did not occur until the second half of the 20th century.

Some specialists identify the essences of global problems and globalization, and unite the content of these two essences under the term of “globalistic.” I believe that global problems and globalization are different as regard their essence and content. The emergence of global problems is first of all associated with world wars, ecological problems and demographic problems, among others those posing dangers to the 20th-century mankind. Globalization, however, is defined with regard to the transformation of mankind into an indivisible unity. If global problems are subjective, globalization is, contrariwise, performed as an objective process.

For the first time the concepts of globalization and globalism were distinguished by Ulrich Beck.⁴ However, in Beck’s view, globalization is a process of the formation of social relations, whereas globalism is a neoliberal policy.

² Grof, S., Laszlo, E., Russel, P. 2004. *Evolution of Consciousness: Transatlantic Dialogue*. Moscow: Izdatelstvo “AST”, 28.

³ Robertson, R. 1992. *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*. London: Sage Publications, 8.

⁴ Beck, U. 1999. *What Is Globalization?* Cambridge: Polity Press.

I believe that globalization is immanent, being a natural-historical process, while globalism is a neoliberal ideology created by the West against other civilizations. Globalism has an expansionist character. Globalization is a manifestation of mankind's mental desire.

I claim that mankind's future is not connected with neoliberal globalist ideology but with "human-imaged" globalization. This kind of globalization preserves the dialogue of ethnicities, nations and peoples in order to set a global society and universal values, and it does not accept the policy of double standards.

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RELIGIOUS FAITH IN THE CONTEXT OF PERSONALITY SELF-DETERMINATION

ABSTRACT

The spread of Christianity reveals a new interpretation of human existence. In it temporality is regarded as a universal characteristic of the human race. The interpretation of God's word is based on a medieval understanding of being, as the Word. In the theocentric perspective Jesus Christ's personality is a unique form of human self-consciousness. Christian thought unveils within it the dialogue between a faithful mind and a personal God, the relationship of "You" *versus* "Me." Dialogic activity of a human agent is kept up by the constant renewal of religious communication contexts that arises from the process of spiritual contemplation. Theocentric thinking explains the self-sufficiency of human existence through the infinity of the knowledge of God that gives a person the opportunities of self-improvement and self-fulfillment. Faith is equal to finding one's inner self; that is why it always considers a person as a personality containing unlimited perspectives for personal self-determination.

Keywords: faith; self-determination; Aurelius Augustine; God; human being.

Human existence differs from other types of life on Earth, as a person can be aware of the current and the desirable way of life. Moreover, human being can clearly realize the purpose of his or her own life. This determines the general understanding of the meaning and purpose of human existence, as well as of dominant life motives. These ideas regulate behavior in this or that particular situation. Still sometimes a person comes inevitably to the thought that "the fate of human beings is like that of the animals; the same fate awaits them both: as one dies, so dies the other. All have the same breath; humans have no advantage over animals." (Eccles. 3:19) It is rather difficult to find any encouraging opposition to such futurity.

Therefore a human's inner activity is always aimed at finding the layers of being that can become a firm basis for human existence. Everyone who turns to

the Gospel does not just want to only get some positive knowledge of God, but to experience God's presence in his life. The first questions we want to clarify are: "What is my place in this world?" and "What is my relation to God?" Christianity introduces first of all a new concept of self-determination. The person is no more considered as "a child of mortal men, but a child of the eternal and everlasting God".¹ In Christianity it is impossible to realize human nature without reflecting on the truth about God, as a man is His image and likeness. According to the Revelation, in the context of medieval perception of the world, a man's status varies from the one so clearly defined by the Old Testament author. The Middle Ages create a world-view that becomes a foundation for the peculiar discourse of European philosophy, initially relying on the experience of human self-consciousness as the image and likeness of God. With the help of Greek terminology medieval thought acquires its own status, consolidating and justifying the presence of the personal in God and the divine in man. It argues for a personal perspective of existence.

The Christian idea of theomorphism puts man into essential relation to God, reflecting the self-sufficiency of human existence. The Christian God is a personal God; therefore He passes on this feature to man, allowing a man to realize himself as a personality with freedom of self-determination. It does not mean that a person loses his identity. On the contrary, the invariable relation to God reveals one's identity and makes its ontological content more certain. In this existential depth of existence a human still remains unique: "Peter remains Peter, Paul remains Paul and Philip remains Philip. Each of them filled with the Spirit stays in his own nature and essence."² That is why, in spite of the contradictory opinions of medieval philosophers, we may assert that personality in Christianity is always considered in an ontological dimension as the existential basis of a particular person. Personality reflects its essence and unique self. For medieval philosophers personality has nothing to do with human nature. At the same time they interpret identity as the presence of specific traits that distinguish one man from another.

Therefore in the context of medieval philosophy only faith gives a person a real opportunity to become a personality. Faith, being in personal relation to God, does not exist without personal self-consciousness within the process of which everyone turning to God cognizes his or her own nature. The inner state that is experienced during a prayer, communicating with God, certainly gives rise to new perspectives of existence. The meaninglessness of life becomes replaced with the feeling of a firm and indestructible foundation that a person acquires with faith.

¹ A newly discovered work by St. Irenaeus of Lyons. 1907. *Proof of the Apostolic preaching*. Trans. Sagarda. N. St. Petersburg: M. Merkushev Printing Office. Available at <http://www.areopag.com> (Accessed May 2011).

² 1992. *St. Macarius the Great. Homilies about Christian Life*. The Philokalia, vol. 1. The printing establishment of the Laura of the Holy Trinity and St. Sergius, 274.

As a result, theocentric thinking is always concentrated not only on understanding the meaning and purpose of human existence but also on the issue of personality self-determination. Thereby, the faith experience of Aurelius Augustine influenced his creative and personal life. On the external level it led to the denial of prior opinions and a change of lifestyle. Internally it changed his prior way of self-comprehension. Therefore Augustine is always thrilled with the issue of changes that occur “in the very beginning when former non-believers turn to God and start willing things they never wanted and have faith they never had,”³ when a human discovers his or her inner divinity and personal origins common with God.

According to Aurelius Augustine, the most difficult stage in consolidation of faith as a fundamental basis of existence is the denial of natural human intentions. It is not easy for a man to stop living for himself and believing in his independent ability to reach life goals. Accepting the wrong character of such ideas is equal to an internal revolution that inevitably triggers internal rebellion. In his autobiography *Confessions* Augustine carefully describes the episode of stealing pears that he committed in youth. Evaluating that deed from the positions of Christianity, he infers “I, like a captive, created a weak illusion of freedom. I committed forbidden actions remaining unpunished. I was fascinated with the false shadow of omnipotence.”⁴ Augustine comes to the conclusion that the stronger such inner human self-consciousness is, the more non-free this person is from the Christian point of view. Such thinking is inadmissible because it makes the person estranged from God and *ipso facto* loses it.

Beginning to acquire a new self-consciousness, one changes one’s judgments of existence. In such a manner the faith suggested by Augustine is a totally new perspective of life. Out of faith a person is unable to have a really full life: because of the Fall our mind is deprived of peace. In the Middle Ages life in the universe was full of desire for heavenly being that could not be compared to terrestrial one. At any moment of life a person had to be ready for hearing the appeal of Christ: “Leave all and follow me.” Medieval people justified that point of view with the help of the Gospel that blamed caring about terrestrial affairs. The Gospel of Matthew runs:

“Seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be yours as well. Therefore do not be anxious about tomorrow, for tomorrow will be anxious for itself. Let the day’s own trouble be sufficient for the day.” (Matt. 6:34–35)

³ Aurelius Augustine. 2008. “Epistle 217. To St. Vitalis of Carthage. The Works of Anti-Pelagians of Late Period.” In: *Saint Augustine*. Fokin, A. R. (Ed.). Trans. from Latin and notes Smirnov D. V. Moscow: AS-TRAST Press, 294.

⁴ Aurelius Augustine. 1998. *Confessions; Pascal Blaise. The Provincial Letters*. Simferopol: Renome, 40.

Medieval thinking postulated that a man could not exist attributing himself only to the material world that does not have any ontological basis. Existence in the material world is temporal. This world does not belong to human beings, as their life is just a temporal adobe, they are eternal wanderers. The tension of experiencing the transcendence of being gave birth to thinking turned to the utmost boundaries of being. Anthony the Great said that “reflection on the latest and the most memorable things” helps one’s soul to overcome sins. If a person spent each day as the last one, he would not commit any evil. Such an attitude, of course, creates an absolutely different world image, it is an attitude towards external reality, as well as a new paradigm of existence.

Such an obligatory life position was predetermined for every believer by the Apostle Paul a long time ago. He said: “... and those who deal with the world as though they had no dealings with it. For the present form of this world is passing away.” (1 Cor. 7:31) This led to the necessity “to prefer spiritual law to human one”⁵ and to transform one’s consciousness and behavior to make a person always ready for the Supreme Court. Even the works of Epichristian thinkers frequently showed the invariable feeling of loss connected with terrestrial human existence. That feeling was usually accompanied by the hope for eternal life and meant distancing oneself from the world without any regret and aversion.

The same kind of worldview strengthened in the consciousness of medieval people. The Greeks were concentrated on the present. The medieval worldview was concentrated on the future. The idea of temporality in the light of eternity and immortality became the key element of the self-determination of the man “who was a carrier of his own mortality and the evidence of his sin.”⁶ In such a context the world became hostile to humans. It prevented them from the divine mission based on the definite eschatology. According to that eschatology the ultimate goal of a man’s existence was to find the truth inaccessible to trivial consciousness, that meant “super-cognition of super-incomprehensible.”

The consciousness of medieval thinkers rejects the world and censures it, constantly emphasizing the fatality of absorption by it. This is clearly shown in the works of Augustine: “Being ignorant, people appreciate temporal as they consider such things to be the source of bliss. Subsequently these things enslave their owner, as he follows them and becomes afraid of anyone who can potentially steal them. A sparkle of fire or a little animal can become thieves. In addition to numerous misfortunes time necessarily destroys everything temporal.”⁷

⁵ *The Creations of the Holy Fathers*. Russian translation by the Moscow Theological Academy, vol. 7, part 1. The printing establishment of the Laura of the Holy Trinity and St. Sergius, 1846, 217

⁶ Aurelius Augustine. 1998. *Confessions; Pascal Blaise. The Provincial Letters*. Simferopol: “Renome,” 23.

⁷ Saint Augustine. 1998. “Of True Religion. On the Immortality of the Soul.” In: *idem, Creations*, vol. 1. St. Petersburg: “Aleteya” Press. Kiev: UTSIMM-Press, 438.

The true mission of humans in the world is to long for the “future age.” That is why they have to be free from the interest for terrestrial existence and involvement in it, since the “current age,” “makes a human soul suffer from any contact with reality not connected with God,”⁸ as Augustine infers. Hereafter the idea of rejecting the world was shared by Benedict, Francis, Thomas a Kempis and most of the Greek Church Fathers.

The acceptance of the gospel truth is really impossible without such withdrawing from the world. Otherwise a person will consider this truth to be detached from reality and therefore impracticable in everyday life. Subsequent to it Augustine starts analyzing the nature of the laws of this world. He addresses the issue of the influence of principles and views that exist in society on the life and deeds of a particular person. Augustine asserts that destructive self-consciousness is mainly determined by the human desire to prove one’s superiority over the others. Frequently being afraid of public disapproval, a person tries to look worse than he really is: “I, being afraid of public disapproval, became more vicious. If the deed which could assimilate me to other villains did not exist, I invented it not to be despised.”⁹ That is why Augustine condemns the bonds of friendship calling them “friendship of enemies.” He says: “For the sake of friendship humans allow themselves to commit sins. Immoderate bent for such vile actions move a person away from the Best and the Holiest.”¹⁰ Moreover, a man frequently chooses his walk of life and pursuit in conformity with the opinion of the society he lives in. He chooses the activities that are considered “honorable.” The reason for it is “... a weak soul that has not connected to the firm truth yet. This soul is whirled by the windstorm of words and opinions.”¹¹ Augustine illustrates this human trait in his *Confessions*.

That is why medieval literature narrates so much about “keeping silence” and the meaning of solitude. Only in this state a person is able to see her own spiritual essence and realize her as a personality. Solitude in the context of a theocentric world-view is regarded as a condition that helps to get rid of everything that impedes spiritual growth: “We keep distance from our nearest and dearest or some places not because of hate towards them (let it never happen). We do it to avoid harm they can cause.”¹² The problem is that in solitude everyone faces one’s own inner imperfection that is called in Christianity sinfulness. One has to have a constant fight with it which means per se the fight with oneself. Only in this situation one’s consciousness is able to be above trivial judgments and to come to a new world-view. Faith in this situation is a dynamic

⁸ Aurelius Augustine. 1998. *Confessions*; Pascal Blaise. *The Provincial Letters*. Simferopol: “Renome,” 56.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 37.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 38.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 56.

¹² The Ladder of Divine Ascent. Abba John, Abbot of the monks of Mount Sinai. The Laura of the Holy Trinity and St. Sergius. 1898, 21.

condition under which a man moves to God. This perfects a man in all respects, causing deep changes in the goals of existence. Therefore in the process of reflection a believer's look is aimed not at himself but at the Object of his faith.

We cannot deny that in such cases faith penetrates one's spiritual and corporal life, providing people with the opportunity for spiritual regeneration and improvement. A human is a spiritual being having thirst for Holy things that are indisputably valuable and supreme. In front of this Holiness a soul naturally feels its worthlessness but namely this feeling opens up new vistas, helps the soul out of the preceding dimension and consolidates its spiritual dignity. Faith makes a person infinite. It helps in overcoming the greatest paradox of human life and self-consciousness—I exist but my existence does not belong to me. Faith copes with the difficulty, making the desire to obtain knowledge of God the main goal and sense of one's terrestrial existence. Faith encourages a human to reach the fullness of spiritual being, using personal experience as one of the sources of true religiousness.

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Shamil N. Burnaev

CONCEPTS OF IDENTITY, SPIRITUALITY AND SPIRITUAL ENVIRONMENT

ABSTRACT

In different social and human sciences researchers apply different concepts of personality, spirituality and the spiritual environment. In this paper I propose new definitions of them.

Keywords: individual; social individual; person; personality; spirituality; forms of social consciousness; social environment; community psychology; spiritual environment.

This paper attempts to reveal the plurality of the concepts of personality, spirituality and the spiritual environment in the social sciences and in the humanities, and to redefine those concepts.

In jurisprudence personality signifies a citizen who acquires civil rights and duties when becoming 18 years old. Personality affects man's actions, and makes him a responsible being—towards the law, society, the state, and themselves.

In religions such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam it is stated that God created man whose mission is to fulfill all the requirements of God, serving him and honoring him. God has endowed man with reason and gave him freedom of action, and he will be answerable to God for all he does. God himself is the perfect person, and the human desires to be perfect. In Sufism, the murid waives his ego to merge with God. Prophets as perfect personalities are the mediators between the man and God; prophets indicate the correct way on which people should directly receive instructions from God, and they tell how people should live to reach the kingdom of God after death, for man was created from dust, and he is destined to return to dust until the judgment day. Personality—unlike the Sufi concept claims—does not waive its ego, because it is depersonalized. Everyone has his own spiritual world, a world which must be respected.

The artist as a person is a creator of beauty, while others are its consumers. In ethics, moral identity is regarded as a subject of moral activity. In political science, the person is considered as a subject of politics (which actively or passively protects interests), who needs or uses his ability and opportunity to influence the course of events. Thus, the person is involved in the political life of society and the state, exercising and combining his interests with the common political interests of society, the state, citizenry of which he is a member. In economics, the person is not only a manufacturer or a consumer of goods, but at the same time it is in the hands of their masters. In sociology, personality is defined differently, among others as follows: “Personality—1) person as the subject of public relations and conscious activity, and 2) a stable system of socially significant features that characterize the individual as a member of society.” In teaching, in addition to training, education harmoniously develops personality as its main objective. “The concept of ‘identity’ characterizes the social essence of man and denotes the set of *in vivo* produced by him his social characteristics and qualities.”¹ Mental health is the primary criterion of the term “personality”—the person in society, conscious of its role in it.

Who can be called the person from the philosophical point of view? According to V. P. Tugarinova, neither infants nor the insane are persons,² and neither are the primitive savages. When talking about the person, we should use the term “social individual” rather than the term “individual,” as the latter includes not only people, but animals as a specimen of genus. The concepts of social individual and of human individual “show that the individual belongs to the human race, as only a person in society is formed as a person entering into all social relations with his peers, it is a sane person, educated and conscious.” In other words, people are biosocial beings who possess the capability of speech, consciousness, they create and use spiritual and material values, have all the achievements of the socio-cultural experience of humanity, and are responsible for their actions. The human being is a biosocial being, as it is part of nature. Its biological and social needs are met when it comes to social relationships with other human beings, since the human being is socialized, gaining a social status and playing a role in society by applying skills taught earlier in its social life. Personality contains the natural and social characteristics of the particular individuals. According to I. I. Rezvizhkiy, personality is something that “captures the notion of a person’s identity as containing socially significant human traits peculiar to him as an individual,” and “as an individual personality the person creates its own way, and is the author of its actions; the individual ‘I’ is the center of personality, its inner core.”³

¹ See: Charlamov, I. F. 1990. *Pedagogika*. Moskva, 60.

² *Ibid.*, 61.

³ Rezvizhkiy, I. I. 1984. *Litschnost. Individualnost. Obstchestvo: Problema individualisatsi i ie sotsyalno-philosophicheskij smysl*. Moskva: Politisdat, 25–34.

In the literature of the subject one can find different definitions of the term “spirituality.” However, scholars’ attempts to formulate a universal definition of this concept have not been fully successful. I propose here a new view of spirituality though based on already known ones. This view combines together various known senses of spirituality in a more encompassing one. I claim that the concept of spirituality is multifaceted. Spirituality is a collection of human spiritual values, expressed in different forms and at different levels of collective consciousness. It is created in intellectual activity, also in men’s inner individual worlds. Moreover, spirituality is formed by using moral principles and norms of behavior, customs, rights and responsibilities. In sum, spirituality is the set of moral and intellectual values and all forms and levels of social consciousness, developed throughout the history of culture.

Various social relations have different effects on the formation of man as an individual; the man becomes a person only if he is being socialized. The environment, in which the child grew up, has largely formed him. Everything he saw from birth, living in his family, at schools, in the process of communicating with friends and relatives, had an impact on his mentality. Let us appose the concepts of spiritual environment and cultural environment. The spiritual environment includes all forms of social consciousness, namely political, religious, moral, aesthetic, legal consciousness, scientific and philosophical. It embraces individual consciousness, ordinary and theoretical levels of collective consciousness, and ideology. All those factors shape man’s spiritual world, and his way of life. The spiritual environment helps to shape human personality, perfecting it, bringing it to a harmoniously developed personality form.

“The spiritual sphere of society is the spiritual unity of production (in the broadest sense) as a process and its result. It includes art, science, morality, legal and political consciousness, religion and philosophy. All of these social phenomena can be considered as elements of the spiritual sphere (or rather, as its subsystems).”⁴

In other words, the spiritual sphere of society includes the collective and the individual consciousness. The concept of spiritual sphere of society is broader than that of spiritual environment, because the former includes spiritual production, whereas the latter only concerns that what is on this stage. A new philosophical field, i.e. personology could be more clearly than hitherto distinguished within philosophy of man. It should be noted that personology (the theory of personality) already functions in psychology as a separate research field.

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⁴ Achmedova, M. A., Tchana, V. C. 1998. *Utchebnik po filosofii*. Tashkent, Usbekistan.

Charles Brown

**JENS JACOBSEN'S UNIVERSAL PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE:
DIALOGUE AND THE INCLUSION OF
"A WIDER SEGMENT OF MANKIND"**

The recent World Congress of the International Society for Universal (ISUD) Dialogue held in Craiova, Romania returned to a central concern of Jens Jacobsen by choosing as its guiding theme "The Human Being: Its Nature and Functions." The congress featured 83 participants from 19 countries who engaged in five days of dialogue, debate, and good will. The ISUD continues to remain true to its founding vision, first articulated by Janusz Kuczyński and subsequently adopted by Jens Jacobsen, of promoting a dialogical world culture in search of non-violent construction of shared values and peaceful coexistence with differences. ISUD remains dedicated to the ideal of including a "wider segment of mankind" in philosophical dialogue.

In 1990 Jens Jacobsen attended the Second International Symposium for Universalism in Berlin and became a member of the International Society for Universalism (ISU), now the ISUD. In 1991 he visited Warsaw and delivered his lecture on *The Universal Philosophy of Life* at Warsaw University. In 1992, at the Fourth International Symposium on Universalism in London, Mr. Jacobsen presented his paper *Universal (Meta) Philosophy of Life as the Foundation of Universalism*.

His philosophy or—as he termed it—"metaphilosophy of life" involved the ideas that human existence could be improved with a richer understanding of humanity's relation to the natural world. In his essay, *Jens Jacobsen's Conception of Wisdom*, John R. A. Mayer writes that Jacobsen was able formulate truths in a simple, jargon free language that points to a harmonious and prosperous future.¹ Central to Jacobsen's thinking are the twin ideas that mankind is a product of the evolutionary forces of nature and that nature is best understood,

¹ Mayer, J. R. A. 1992. "Jens Jacobsen's Conception of Wisdom." *Dialogue and Humanism*, vol. II, no. 3-4, 101-103.

not as an abstraction, but as a creative and dynamic life force. Jacobsen argues that values are ultimately expressions of needs that reflect the dynamic and self-organizing forces of nature.

He believed that by properly understanding humanity's relation to "nature," a term he considers excessively abstract² and in need of philosophical clarification, we may begin to overcome egoism, racism, and nationalism. He sees these "isms" as socially constructed conceptual frameworks that create the illusions of separate selves, separate races, and separate national identities. Social realities constructed on the false ideology of separate identities promotes disharmony by viewing the natural and social world as the site of struggle between competing forces and thus concealing the inherent drive toward balance and harmony within nature.

As a "product of nature" the human capacity for self-consciousness and philosophical reflection is an emergent property of the dynamism of life and nature. As a self-conscious moment in the on-going self-organization of the natural world, humans experience the dynamism, energy, and drive inherent in "nature" but misinterpret this as an expression or manifestation of one's own individuality. The experience of a self-maintaining telos of "nature" is misinterpreted as a drive for personal self-preservation.

The resulting attachment to an egoistic notion of self alienates humans from other selves, races, and national identities and even from "nature" itself. Jacobsen believed that by understanding humanity as integral to "nature," as a "product of nature," we could begin to rethink the ideology of separation. This ideology of separation, supported by the illusion of the separate and atomistic ego leads us to see the world and nature itself as the site of completion and constant strife, i.e., as being at war with itself. This frame of reference further leads us to understand compassion and love for the other as irrational impediments to the pursuit of self-interest. This frame of reference undermines our ability to find wholeness and unity as well as the natural striving for balance and harmony within the organic and social world.

Jacobsen's "philosophy of life" bears remarkable similarities with a variety of contemporary and historical philosophical systems. His rethinking of the traditional human/nature dichotomy shares much in common with contemporary environmental philosophers. His attempt to expose the illusory nature of the isolated ego and cultivate attitudes of non-attachment to the self is consistent with Buddhist thinking. His ideal of finding value and purpose in the natural world recalls the natural law theory developed by Thomas Aquinas. His rethinking of the nature of the self and attempt to develop a transpersonal perspective resembles some post-modernist and some feminist thinkers.

² Anderson, A. A. 1991. "Nature and Its Products: A Dialogue with Jens A. B. Jacobsen." *Dialogue and Humanism*, vol. I, no. 3-4, 149-162.

It is easy to see that some tension exists between these various strands of Jacobsen's thinking. Jacobsen was repeatedly drawn to philosophical thinking and the work of contemporary philosophers to help extend and clarify his own ideas. Towards this end he sought dialogue and interaction with social scholars and philosophers. He was interested in involving a "wider segment of mankind in our deliberation"³ and explicitly endorsed an effort to include politicians, journalists, and others in philosophical dialogue.

Like other thinkers, Jacobsen understood the tensions between the differences within the strands of his own thinking but continued to search for an overall wholeness or universality that could gather these various strands into a comprehensive vision. After becoming acquainted with Janusz Kuczyński and the work of the ISU Jacobsen began to use the Kuczyńskian concepts of dialogue and universalism to describe his philosophy of life.

Kuczyński's use of the concepts "dialogue" and "universalism" grew from his attempt to allow diverse and often conflicting philosophical systems to coexist within an ethos of dialogue. Kuczyński sees diverse and historically influential cultural and philosophical perspectives as revealing important truths about self and world as well as concealing important truths about self and world. Only through a dialogue among these ideologies and conceptual frameworks may we best overcome the limitations of single perspective.

Both Jacobsen and Kuczyński view the current social and political climate as a period of transition and as a striving for harmony. Both see the possibilities for a new and positive movement for peace and enlightenment on a global scale. Both wish to reclaim an element of universality or wholeness lost in the current mindset of the primacy of the individual and particularity of the self as an isolated ego defined through the false separation from others and from nature.

In a recent letter to the members of the International Society for Universal Dialogue, Kuczyński writes: "My own program of universal dialogue was a vision encompassing all other philosophical systems as path toward peaceful coexistence could be established that would build a foundation for a better world. This vision was not confined to academic pursuits. We hoped that that spirit of dialogue could be extended to the political, cultural, and personal dimensions of our lives. We still believe in this path toward global cooperation, dialogue, and peace."

Not only did Jens Jacobsen become an active member of ISU but he also generously supported the efforts of the society and its journal (then titled *Dialogue and Humanism* and now *Dialogue and Universalism*) to pursue their missions of promoting global cooperation, dialogue, and peace. He supported and funded several philosophical meetings as well as the Jacobsen Research Prizes for philosophical work making an "original contribution to universal thinking and human issues."

³ Ibid.

After his death in the mid 1990's Jacobsen's estate has supported the biannual World Congresses of the ISUD and the coveted Jacobsen Research Prizes awarded at each. During the twenty-five years since its founding, the International Society for Universal Dialogue continues to pursue the vision of its founder Janusz Kuczyński and his collaborator, Jens Jacobsen, of cultivating and expanding a universal dialogue among the sciences, philosophical traditions, and cultures.

ISUD NEWS BULLETIN

The University of Craiova in Craiova, Romania hosted the 10th World Congress of the International Society for Universal Dialogue (ISUD) from July 4—9, 2014. The Congress was dedicated to the theme of “The Human Being: Its Nature and Functions.” More than 83 scholars from 19 countries participated in four days of dialogue and discussion.

During the opening session of the Congress, Janusz Kuczyński, Honorary President and founder of the society, sent his warm greetings and invited the ISUD to host its next World Congress in Warsaw, Poland. Professor Kuczyński informed the participants that the University of Warsaw and the Polish Academy of the Sciences wished to help sponsor the 2016 Congress. Professor Kuczyński’s warm greetings and invitations were appreciated by all and set the tone for collegial and intellectually productive meeting.

The opening day featured Keynote Addresses by distinguished professors Basarab Nicolescu and Georgia Zanthaki. Basarab Nicolescu is Professor and honorary theoretical physicist at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Laboratoire de Physique Nucléaire et de Hautes Énergies, Université Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris, France, Member of the Romanian Academy. Georgia Zanthaki is Professor and Head of the Department of Philology, University of Peloponnese, Greece.

Professor Nicolescu’s address entitled “How Can We Enter into Dialogue? Transdisciplinary Methodology of the Dialogue between People, Cultures, and Spiritualities” discussed the possibilities of inter-cultural dialogue from a transdisciplinary perspective and Professor Zanthaki’s paper entitled “Moral and Social Values in the Ancient Greek Tragedy” discussed the philosophical significance of moral values in Greek Tragedy.

The first evening concluded with a banquet featuring Romanian cuisine. Old and new friends joined in celebrating the year of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the society.

Congress participants enjoyed a variety of cultural events including:

— the play *Rhinoceros* by Eugene Ionesco staged at the National Theatre of Craiova,

— the play *A Letter ...* by Ion Luca Caragiale performed by the Theatre Department of the University of Craiova,

— an open air concert of the Philharmonic Orchestra “Oltenia” of Craiova,

— a daytrip to the native house and sculptures of Constantin Brancusi, the Tismana Monastery, and the Polovragi Cave

— a reading of scenes featuring philosophical dialogues from Dr. Thomas Robinson's play "*Reaching for Democracy*" by participants of the Congress.

Participants celebrated a successful congress with a banquet featuring Romanian folk dancing and music by the renowned Zorina Balan. All enjoyed a spirited evening of song and dance as participants were invited to join the Romanian folk dancers.

The Congress closed with its General Assembly and business meeting in which Professor Kuczyński's invitation to host the 2016 World Congress in Warsaw was unanimously accepted.

Participants elected Chris Vasilopoulos (USA) and Panos Eliopoulos (Greece) to second terms as ISUD President and ISUD Vice President while electing Charles Brown (USA) as ISUD Treasurer and Emily Tajsina (Russia) as Secretary. The new ISUD Board of Governors was also elected. The new Board now consists of Jean Campbell (USA), Hope Fitz (USA), Raghunath Ghosh (India), Columbus Ogbujah (Nigeria), Athena Salappa (Greece), Adriana Neacsu (Romania), Ashok Malhotra (India-USA), Amita Valmiki (India), Keqian Xu (China), Manjulika Ghosh (India).

In his post-congress message to those who participated in the congress, ISUD President Chris Vasilopoulos thanked the congress organizers and participants for the generosity of their time and talents and for their spirited participation in the panel discussions. President Vasilopoulos writes that for many participants the extraordinary dinner/dance held near the end of the Congress was "the highlight of our visit to Craiova ... The feeling that permeated the room, a feeling that transcended cultures, continents, academic disciplines and personal experiences, gave undeniable expression to what ISUD stands for: our common humanity and our common virtue."

Charles Brown
professor, Emporia State University

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The submitted manuscript should contain information about the author. This should be no longer than up to approximately 100 words. It should include academic degree, scholarly affiliation, membership in important organizations, especially international ones, up to five titles of the author's most significant books or papers with bibliographical data, the author's address, and e-mail.

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the Editors

Forthcoming:

BETWEEN AESTHETICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNICS. INTERDISCIPLINARY MOTIVES OF GERNOT BÖHME'S PHILOSOPHY

Gernot Böhme — Meditation as the Exploration of Forms of Consciousness

Gernot Böhme — What Kind of Society Do We Want to Live in?

Gernot Böhme — Being Human Well

Gernot Böhme — My Body—My Lived Body

Gernot Böhme — The Voice in Bodily Space

Gernot Böhme — Light and Space. On the Phenomenology of Light

Stanisław Czerniak — Between Philosophy of Science and Philosophical Anthropology. Gernot Böhme's Critical Philosophy of Technology

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Beata Frydryczak — Landscape Garden as a Paradigmatic Model of Relationships between Human and Nature

Teresa Pękala — On the Aesthetic Experience of Nature and Time