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Macedones, Persia et ultima Orientis

Alexander's Anabasis from the Danube to the Syr Darya

Edited by Marek Jan Olbrycht and Jeffrey D. Lerner
in collaboration with Michał Podrazik

ANABASIS 9 (2018)
STUDIA CLASSICA ET ORIENTALIA

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THE AFTERMATH OF THE PEACE OF CALLIAS[1]

Keywords: Persia, Achaemenids, Sparta, Athens, Greece

In recent decades, there has been a significant increase in historiographic interest in the history of Greco-Persian relations. The rethinking of the role of Persia in the political life of archaic and classical Greece is mainly connected with the shift from the study of military conflicts (the Persian Wars in particular) to the process of political interaction, primarily of a diplomatic nature[2].

John Hyland's book investigates the history of Greco-Persian relations in the post Persian wars period when the Peace of Callias in 449 BC ended the period of direct military confrontation between the Greeks and the Persians and opened a new era in which diplomatic interactions took the place of open warfare. This diplomacy was a significant factor in the development of Greco-Persian relations from the Peace of Callias up to the King's Peace of 386 BC.

Hyland's book consists of 8 chapters: chapter 1 "Achaemenid Persia and the Greeks across the Sea" (p. 1–14), chapter 2 "Artaxerxes I and the Athenian Peace" (p. 15–36), chapter 3 "The Peloponnesian War and the Road to Intervention" (p. 37–52), chapter 4 "Tissaphernes's War and the Treaty of 411" (p. 53–75), chapter 5 "The King's Navy and the Failure of Satrapal Intervention" (p. 76–97), chapter 6 "Cyrus the Younger and Spartan Victory" (p. 98–121), chapter 7 "Artaxerxes II and War with Sparta" (p. 122–147), chapter 8 "Persia, the Corinthian War, and the King's Peace" (p. 148–168).

[1] This is a review article of John Hyland, *Persian Interventions: The Achaemenid Empire, Athens, and Sparta, 450–386 BCE*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018 (272 p., 4 maps; ISBN 9781421423708).

[2] Lewis 1977; Cawkwell 2005; Rung 2008; Brosius 2012; Mariggiò 2013.

In the first chapter of his book (pp. 1–14) the author challenges the scholarly view that the actions of the Persians in Asia Minor during the period 450–386 BC were aimed at regaining control of Ionia's cities and protecting Ionia against the encroachments of Athens and Sparta by maintaining a balance between them and extending the conflict between Athens and Sparta without direct intervention (the balancing model). According to Hyland, this view is poorly substantiated. The author rejects the balancing model and offers his own interpretation of Greco-Persian relations (the interventional model). Hyland shows that "the kings also claimed to maintain universal peace through interventions in disputes between distant peoples" in the regions of *Pax Persica* (p. 8)[3]. He calls the time in which the kings made these interventions "the interventionist period". The author also pays attention to two principles of the worldview of the Achaemenids: "The claim to universal supremacy and the mandate to ensure stability in chaotic regions at the edge of the world" (p. 5). At the same time Hyland notes that it would be wrong to consider Persian foreign policy only through the prism of ideology.

In the second chapter (pp. 15–36) the period of the Peace of Callias is considered. Hyland realizes that the problem of the Peace of Callias is one of the most debated in historiography, but his review of various points of view on the authenticity of the Peace, its dating, etc. is very short (p. 16–18). The author asks why Artaxerxes I agreed to the conclusion of the peace with Athens. He explores this issue from the proposition of what the King could gain from the peace with Athens. According to Hyland, Artaxerxes could see Athens as a client state. That is why, according to the author, the "model of a lucrative peace" can explain the lack of interest of the King in restoring power over Ionia, at least until the Peloponnesian war, which led the Persians to recalculate the costs and benefits of such a reconquest (p. 16). Hyland assesses the economic losses of the Achaemenid Empire from the loss of Asia Minor (pp. 18–23). He notices that "Artaxerxes's decision for peace involved genuine economic sacrifice, not to mention the loss of a potent symbol of imperial power over the former tribute payers" (p. 22). Nevertheless, according to the author, these losses could be compensated by other gains in Asia Minor. Reducing of costs for building of fleet and the trade of Persian subjects with Athens was profitable for the king, so these were arguments for the long peace. However, the author does not raise the question of how ideological, political and economic benefits were correlated with each other. Which benefit was primary for the king? On p. 21 Hyland's book has two tables, conveniently showing the amount of tribute that the allies paid to Athens in the period 450/449–440/39 BC, which allows us to assess the economic losses that the Persians suffered. Nevertheless, according to Hyland's remark, these losses could be recovered by other incomes in Asia Minor, while the king benefited from his understanding of the comprehensive

[3] On the concept of *Pax Persica* relating to the ideology and policy of the Achaemenids: Briant 2002, 171; Brosius 2005; Brosius 2010; Brosius 2012.

worldview that Anatolia was only part of the imperial universe (p. 23). Further, the problems of the construction of the fleet and its supply are dealt with in detail. The author concludes that the burden of spending on the fleet was a sufficient reason for restraint in foreign policy in the middle of the fifth century, even if Artaxerxes did not begin to doubt the ability to win sea battles. A wave of profit followed, as the Persian subjects from the Levant and Egypt intensified economic contacts with Athens, which gave value to the long peace (p. 28). Thus, according to Hyland, the economic benefits of peace were also arranged by the king. The attention to the economic factor in connection with the problem of the Peace of Callias gives a fresh look at this interpretation of the treaty. As a result, his interpretation of the "Athenian peace" (as defined by Hyland) supplements some other approaches in historiography to this Peace[4].

However, Hyland's viewpoint that Athens after the conclusion of the Peace of Callias, received a client status in the eyes of Artaxerxes I, who adhered to the universalist ideology (p. 34), is nothing more than another "theoretical model" and therefore is far from indisputable. The chapter concludes with a review of the war between Athens and Samos from the point of view of the intervention by the Persian satrap Pissouthnes in this conflict. Hyland notes that the Persians could consider the assistance of Pissouthnes to Samos as the establishment of justice, acting on the side of the affected party. Hyland supposes that "it is plausible that Artaxerxes approved of Pissouthnes's behavior on ideological grounds" (p. 35–36). Here we are faced with the question of how the satraps were independent in their policy toward the Greeks[5], which Hyland also discusses in the various chapters of his book (pp. 12, 45–47, 68–71, 77–79, 86–91, 156–158). Whatever it was, this intervention was of a limited nature and did not involve the clashes of Persia and Athens. Hyland criticizes the concept of S.K. Eddy of the "Cold War Model" between Athens and Persia[6], stating: "Yet this interpretation runs the risk of mistaking sporadic episodes for an overarching strategy" (p. 34).

The author notes that the Peloponnesian war could have increased tension in Persian-Athenian relations, but Artaxerxes I kept his policy towards Athens unchanged until the end of his reign. Hyland believes that Darius II's decision to intervene in Greek affairs in 413 BC "was an act of imperial opportunism", and "an effort to reconfigure Persian influence over the Greeks after Athens lost its value as an imperial client" (p. 36).

In the third chapter (pp. 37–52) Hyland notes that, despite the conclusion of Epilykos' peace treaty, the relations between Athens and Persia deteriorated as a result of Athens' support of the revolts of Pissouthnes and Amorges. Hyland

[4] The most fundamental treatment of the Peace of Callias has been undertaken by Badian (1987; 1993).

[5] On this episode: Waters / Claire 2010.

[6] Eddy 1973.

not only considers the Peace of Epilykos as a historical event (the conclusion of which he dates to the period between 423 and 421 BC), but also tries to determine how it was viewed through the eyes of the Persians: "It not only reaffirmed Persian tolerance of the Athenian lease on Ionia and indicated that the king would not support the Spartans but may have reestablished peace after Athens's clashes with Pissouthnes. From the Persian perspective, its conclusion would have advertised Darius's image as patron of earthly stability, his authority over peoples beyond the sea, and completion of his father's efforts. This was a message of particular importance given the initial opposition to Darius's succession by a portion of the royal family and Persian elite, which pressured the king to strengthen his image as a legitimate Achaemenid monarch in full conformity with ancestral ideals" (p. 43).

Hyland also supposes that the orator Andokides (3.29), who accused Athens of the senseless support of the rebel Amorges, son of Pissouthnes, in fact simplified the situation; it was the revolt of Pissouthnes that was originally intended to cause complications in the relations between the Athenians and the King (p. 42). After a brief review of the historiographic discussion about whether or not Athens really supported Pissouthnes' revolt or only Amorges' one, Hyland comes to an assumption that first rebellion may be quite sufficient to cause the displeasure of the king with the Athenians (p. 44) (at least on the grounds that the leader of the mercenaries of this rebellious satrap was the Athenian Lykon: Ctes. *FGrHist* 688. F. 53). In speaking about the circumstances of the "Persian intervention" in the Peloponnesian War on the side of Sparta, Hyland considers an incentive for this to be the Athenian disaster in Sicily in 413 BC. By his decision to demand from the coastal Greek cities of Asia Minor for tribute the king returned them to the financial and administrative domains of the satraps (p. 46), thereby pushing his governors in Asia Minor to hostile actions against the Athenians and to seek an alliance with Sparta (p. 47). Hyland names Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos the "agents of intervention" of the King (p. 47), who enforced Darius II's policy of supporting Sparta and seeking to defeat Athens, which, according to Hyland, was not a policy of maintaining balance between Athens and Sparta. The role of the "imperial client" had simply shifted from Athens to Sparta (pp. 36, 47, 52). Having considered the "intervention" of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos in the Peloponnesian War, Hyland asks the question why the satraps so generously promised subsidies to the Spartans, if the demand of the king of arrears for tribute had put them in a strained financial situation, and Darius did not offer them royal money, so they had to rely on their own resources (p. 51). Hyland supposes that the victory over Athens must have seemed as if it would happen quickly, and this would not require the mobilization of the Phoenician fleet, so that the satraps could rely on relatively small means that would be the decisive factor in a fleeting war (p. 51).

In the fourth chapter (pp. 53–75) the policy of Tissaphernes in 412–411 BC and the treaty between Persia and Sparta in 411 are studied. According to Hyland's

opinion, the speculations of Thucydides (8.46.1, 52.2, 85.2) that Tissaphernes was influenced by Alcibiades in his conducting of balancing policy towards the Greeks do not support the theory of Achaemenid *Realpolitik*, presented in many modern interpretations, but reflect a misunderstanding of the claims of Alcibiades himself (p. 53). Hyland examines in detail the conditions of the three treaties between Sparta and Persia and accepts the most widespread historiographic opinion that the first two treaties were only "drafts" (pp. 56, 62, 64–65, 68, 70, 74–75, 79, 85), which were never ratified in Sparta[7]. The analysis of the agreements, undertaken by the author, is quite interesting. Thus, in the case of the first treaty (Thuc. 8.18), Hyland believes that it spread the influence of the King in the Aegean, and he considers the point, which provided for the king's assistance to the Spartans in the war against the rebels, not merely a formality, due to the need to balance the terms of the treaty (since the other claim was the support of the Spartans in the fight against the rebels against the King and was directed against Amorges), but meaning Tissaphernes' readiness to protect the interests of their friends, even at the cost of interfering in the affairs of Greece (p. 56).

As for the second treaty (Thuc. 8.37), according to Hyland, most of it established new rules for the behavior of the Peloponnesians in Persian territory, beginning and ending with the conditions for mutual nonaggression clauses, which could seem dissonant in the light of recent cooperation and perhaps pointed to tension between the troops of Tissaphernes and the Spartan allies (p. 63). Although Darius, as Hyland supposes, again approved the treaty, the refusal of the Spartans to recognize the terms of the previous agreements led to the resumption of Persian-Athenian diplomatic contacts. Hyland considers all these events from the viewpoint of the claim of the Persian king to world dominance, and calls attention to the reaction of the Greeks to such claims. He notes: "Nevertheless, Achaemenid ideology dictated the king's world supremacy, whether direct or indirect, and the equation of Darius's power with that of his ancestors had particular meaning in light of the revolts that characterized the early years of his reign. Lichas's protest sounded like a denial that Darius was as strong as previous Achaemenid rulers or that he deserved to claim universal hegemony" (p. 68). The subsequent attempt by Tissaphernes to conclude a treaty with Athens (Thuc. 8.56), Hyland considers as follows: "Tissaphernes's talks with Peisandros are better understood as a genuine effort to persuade Athens into surrender and acknowledgment of Persian supremacy. Darius may have been willing to restore a state of *philia*, as envisioned in the Peace of Epilykos, if the Athenians atoned for their misdeeds by accepting a redefinition of their relationship and the loss of the territories that Persia had once allowed them to exploit. This would explain the king's conditions, reasonable in a surrender document but

[7] Gomme / Andrewes / Dover 1981, 40; Kagan 1987, 48; Mitchell 1997, 115. D.M. Lewis (1977, 90–95) does not touch upon the issue of whether the first two treaties were formalized. E. Levy (1983) believed that there was no reason to consider the third treaty more formalized than the previous two, and he challenged the view that the first two treaties were only "drafts".

unacceptable to Athenians who thought they had come to negotiate a military alliance" (p. 70).

Concerning the third treaty between Sparta and Persia, the author concludes that in the spring of 411 BC, "adherence to the terms of alliance seemed the most direct way to complete Darius's Greek intervention and promote his image as the world's ruler, capable of rewarding supporters, punishing enemies, and restoring peace across the sea", but further events prevented realization of the treaty (p. 75).

The fifth chapter (pp. 76–97) deals with the possibility of providing Persian military assistance to his Spartan allies, in particular, the use of the Phoenician fleet in the war against the Athenians. Concerning the discussion of why the Phoenician fleet did not reach the coast of the Aegean Sea and delayed in Aspendos, Hyland believes that this happened on the orders of the King, who could hope to settle relations with Athens after the oligarchic coup of 411 BC[8]. Tissaphernes, who was accused by the Greeks of "doing evil to the fleet", in fact was not responsible (p. 79). As for the problems with the payments by this satrap of the wages to the sailors of the Peloponnesian fleet, which Tissaphernes had to provide with under the terms of the third treaty, the author also removes his responsibility in this, explaining these actions by a lack of funding from the King (p. 79). Thus, Hyland examines the actions of Tissaphernes, which led to the fact that the Ionian cities rebelled against the Persian garrisons, and the Spartans did nothing to change the situation, which caused Darius' anger and the final withdrawal of the fleet which was supposed to help the Spartans. Hyland asks the question: why did Darius allow his satraps to continue funding the allied fleet, and why would Tissaphernes have offered excuses instead of informing Sparta that the ships had gone home in retaliation for their misconduct? The answer, according to the author, may be that Darius, despite his anger at Spartan behavior, saw little benefit in such a confrontational stance, which would have threatened a permanent breach in the alliance, exacerbated instability in the Ionian cities, and displayed Persia's lack of influence over its clients and inability to decide the Greek war (p. 91).

Therefore, the King allowed Pharnabazos to continue to provide subsidies to the Spartans (pp. 90–91). The question of how the actions of Darius, on the one hand, and Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos, on the other hand, correlate with each other, remains unclear. At the end of the chapter Hyland emphasizes that despite the actions of the satraps on the Hellespont (pp. 91–96) the naval victory of Athens and the destruction of the Spartan fleet indicate Pharnabazos' inability to protect the main coastal cities that led the Persian alliance with Sparta to collapse (p. 96).

In the sixth chapter (pp. 98–121), the actions of the satraps in the years 410–408 and issues related to the embassy of Boiotios (Xen. *Hell*. 1.4.2) are studied. The hypothesis of the "Treaty of Boiotios" was first proposed by D.M. Lewis, and was discussed in the subsequent literature[9]. Hyland, however, is skeptical toward

[8] See discussion in historiography: Lewis 1958; Lateiner 1976.

[9] Lewis 1977, 125. For discussion see: Tuplin 1987; Podrazik 2015.

the idea that a new treaty was concluded between Sparta and Persia after 410 BC (p. 106). The author points out that Darius intended to defeat Athens, but waited until Sparta showed more respect for his authority. After the embassy of Boiotios satisfied this expectation, Darius supported Sparta, which was to lead her to victory (p. 104). Hyland writes that in ideological terms, Spartan victory would proclaim Persia's power more effectively than a negotiated truce after a series of allied defeats, which might have indicated the king's inability to carry out his original threats against Athens (p. 105). In completing the task of helping Sparta Cyrus the Younger played a great role. On p. 110 and 117 tables clearly show Cyrus' expenses for the maintenance of the Peloponnesian fleet, and on p. 119 the author provides a summary table of all Achaemenid expenditure for the support of the Spartan fleet in 412–404 BC. As a result Hyland argues that Sparta's victory was Persia's as well, displaying the empire's strength and commitment to its clients' success (p. 120). As for the economic benefit from the defeat of Athens, the events that followed the death of Darius II prevented its achievement (pp. 120–121).

The seventh chapter (pp. 122–147), devoted to the war between Sparta and Persia, examines the issues of Persian politics in Ionia and the Spartan-Persian relations before the war, the relationship between Cyrus the Younger and the satraps of Asia Minor. Hyland touches upon issues related to perspectives of Greco-Persian relations in the case of the prince's misfortune, analyses the events of the conflict between Sparta and Persia. According to the author, Artaxerxes II was to inherit power over the Anatolian Greeks and patronage over Sparta from Darius II, but everything was confused by the ambitions of Cyrus the Younger, who gained support in Ionian cities, turned to the Spartans for help, and recruited Greek mercenaries who would help him fight for the crown (p. 122). After the failure of Cyrus, Artaxerxes needed to regain authority in western Anatolia and thereby complete the suppression of the uprising. This led to a clash between the king and Sparta, who took on the role of defender of the Greeks of Asia Minor. However, when the Spartans invaded Ionia in 399 BC, Artaxerxes, although he considered them "the most shameless of all mankind" (Plut. *Artax*. 22), allowed his commanders to be with them for a long time truces and negotiations. The use of such a diplomatic strategy by the king, according to Hyland, reflected the desire of Artaxerxes to subjugate the Anatolian Greeks and restore their influence over the "trans-Aegean" Greeks with minimal expenses (p. 127).

The eighth chapter (pp. 148–168) is devoted to the Persian intervention in the Corinthian War and the King's Peace. Hyland points out that the mission of Timokrates of Rhodes can be considered as the beginning of the intervention of the Persians in the war (p. 150)[10]. The author makes important conclusions about the ideological significance of the King's Peace for the Achaemenid monarch. Par-

[10] On the importance of Timokrates' mission to Greece: Cook 1990; Rung 2004; Schepens 2012. Scholars differ on the issue whether the Timocrates' money were bribes or subsidies.

ticularly, Hyland concludes, that, according to the King's Peace, "the proclamation of autonomy for Greeks beyond Persia's borders was an expression of universal authority" of the king (p. 166). Some issues considered in the book, obviously, will be studied further, as Hyland hopes "that future studies will devote greater space to these interventions as critical moments in the diplomatic history of Persia, Athens, and Sparta and that historians of later states with aspirations to universal dominance may also benefit from attention to Persia's interactions with clients at the margins of empire" (p. 172).

So, summing up the analysis of the monograph by Hyland, one can note that we have an outstanding work, suggesting some reflections on how ideological doctrines exerted a direct influence on foreign policy and international relations. Interest in theoretical constructions and models is certainly the most strong side of the work. Of course, one can agree that the imperial ideology of the Achaemenids was inherent in both the period of the great Persian conquests from Cyrus the Great to Xerxes, and the period when the conquering activity of the Persians was declining. However, it is hardly possible to support the author in the opinion that the Persians were not interested in balancing Greeks, and their interferences in interstate relations in Greece were not determined by the desire to support a weaker party against a stronger one. Besides, Hyland does not take into account the obvious fact that the Greeks themselves were ready to deliberately allow the Persians to interfere in their affairs according to their own interests, and, at last, he considers "Greek interventions" as simple interferences in the affairs of Persia, such as the Athenian military support of Zopyrus, the son of Megabyzus and Amorges, the son of Pissouthnes (p. 41). Hyland, in fact, does not comment at length on the Spartan support for the rebellion of Cyrus the Younger (a few words on pages 122, 126 are said about it), and he does not pay attention to the goals of Agesilaus' campaign in Asia Minor. Despite some disputable points, the monograph has undoubtable merits and will be important for those who study Greek and Persian history. The book is a significant contribution to the historiography of Greco-Persian relations.

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Abstract

The paper discusses the history of Greco-Persian relations from the Peace of Callias to the Peace of Antalcidas in the light of recently published book by John Hyland, *Persian Interventions: The Achaemenid Empire, Athens, and Sparta, 450–386 BCE* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018). This is an outstanding work, suggesting some reflections on how ideological doctrines exerted a direct influence on foreign policy and international relations. Of course, one can agree with the book's author that the imperial ideology of the Achaemenids was inherent in both the period of the great Persian conquests from Cyrus the Great to Xerxes, and the period when the conquering activity of the Persians was declining. However, it is hardly possible to support the author in the opinion that the Persians were not interested in balancing Greeks, and their interferences in interstate relations in Greece were not determined by the desire to support a weaker party against a stronger one. Besides, Hyland does not take into account the obvious fact that the Greeks themselves were ready to deliberately allow the Persians to interfere in their affairs according to their own interests, and, at last, he considers "Greek interventions" as simple interferences in the affairs of Persia.