

**RELATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC DURING THE
EVENTS OF 2005 AND 2010**

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Abstract. Article is devoted to the Russian-Kyrgyz relations during the periods of the state shocks in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and 2010 respectively. Relevance of this subject is caused by the geopolitical importance of Central Asia for the Russian Federation. Kyrgyzstan is not just one of five countries of the region. On one hand, it enters all Euroasian integration educations with participation of Russia, and on the other hand is the only country in the region where presidents were twice overthrown during the coups. The processes proceeding here can exert direct impact on a situation in all former Soviet Union. Article is directed to a research and comparison of communications of the Russian Federation and the Kyrgyz Republic during the periods of political crises and violent change of the power. The leading approaches to a research of this problem are descriptive and analytical and comparative methods. During the research the general was revealed and special in approaches of Russia to a situation during both coups. Special attention is paid to diplomatic contacts and the help from Russia to the Kyrgyz partners. Materials of article can be useful to scientific research on problems of Central Asia, for preparation of lectures and seminars during educational process.

Keywords: history, international relations, diplomacy, Central Asia, Russian Federation, Kyrgyz Republic, "color revolution", "Tulip revolution", "National revolution".

1. INTRODUCTION

Safety problems in Central Asia at the beginning of the 21st century acquired additional relevance after the events of 2005 in Kyrgyzstan. Due to placement here of U.S. Air Force base, the American military presence began to exert serious impact on internal political processes in the country. In Kyrgyzstan there was an extensive network of non-governmental organizations (Soros Kyrgyzstan, the Coalition for democracy and civil society, Freedom House fund, etc.) which in turn interfered with process of adoption of the state decisions and played a significant role in preparation of overthrow of A. A. Akayev. It was prepared and formed pro-American the adjusted lobby in the leaders of the Republic with further integration in the western structures (Kozhemyakin, page 107, 2014). It is interesting that right after the revolution in New York Times there was article with the characteristic name "The USA Helped to Pave the Way for a Revolt in Kyrgyzstan" (Craig, 2005).

Despite coming to power of opposition forces led by Kurmanbek Bakiev, the situation did not become more optimistic. The new leadership of Kyrgyzstan unlike previous appeared incapable to pursue consistent foreign policy and define a reference point in world processes. The commitment to a course of multi-vector nature and desire of family of Bakiev to be enriched at the expense of the state only aggravated an internal political situation and led the country to "color revolution" of 2010. Because for Russia there was priority a process of the Euroasian integration at the former Soviet Union, it was forced to react to any events in the countries of this region. Its interests demanded "preservation and temporary use of the modes which loyally concern to her and are ready to develop with her the relations" (Malashenko, page 21, n. d). Considering that Kyrgyzstan and today - the weak link in a security system of the Euroasian integration associations, is important to reveal features of the relations of Russia with it during the periods of shocks of "color revolutions", to draw conclusions, to make use of positive experience.

2. METHODS

Research methods were descriptive and analytical and comparative. They allow understanding the importance of Kyrgyzstan for Russia, to define a role of Russia in establishment of stability in Kyrgyzstan during the periods of coups and to compare its approaches to events of 2005 and 2010.

3. RESULTS

Relationship of Russia and Kyrgyzstan during "Tulip revolution".

"Tulip revolution" 2005 in Kyrgyzstan and its consequences became a serious geopolitical call for Russia in the region. Originally Russian side was lost and did not know how it is worth reacting to these events. So, in particular the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov in days of a mutiny declared: "We regret that in Kyrgyzstan there are victims. We urge to return to the legal framework and on the basis of the Constitution of Kyrgyzstan to settle a situation" (Knyazev, page 163, 2005). However, a bit later the position of Russia gained reserved, neutral character. Though Russia also considered unconstitutional change of the power in Kyrgyzstan, nevertheless it recognized the new government. The president V. V. Putin emphasized that the opposition which came to the power in the past in every possible way promoted development of the relations between Kyrgyzstan and Russia, and also hoped, as in the future the relations between the states will develop for the benefit of the people, having assured that Russia will make all in return (*Conference Following Russian-Armenian*, 2005).

Therefore, without looking, at a difficult internal political situation in Kyrgyzstan, the relations between the states continued to develop. The visit to Moscow of the Speaker of the Kyrgyz Parliament O. Ch. Tekebayev for a meeting with heads of both chambers of Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation - S. M. Mironov and B. V. Gryzlov is on April 3 an example. During these conversations questions of development of further partnership were discussed. On April 11-12 the meeting in Moscow of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan Roza Otunbayeva with Sergey Lavrov on whom the main questions of the bilateral relations in political, trade and economic and humanitarian spheres were considered took

place. Also, the important place was taken by questions of rendering assistance of Kyrgyzstan from Russia in normalization of a situation and the solution of problems of interaction of two countries within integration associations. On July 5 the meeting of the Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Acting President of Kyrgyzstan Kurmanbek Bakiev in Astana took place. Also telephone conversations between them were carried out. They have strengthened the Russian-Kyrgyz relations and humanitarian assistance in the first month after the revolution.

Important event was K. S. Bakiev's visit to Moscow on May 8, 2005 during which questions of transfer of the idle enterprises by Kyrgyzstan on account of its debt to Russia were discussed (*Beginning of a Meeting with Acting President of Kyrgyzstan Kurmanbek Bakiev*, n. d). After the spring events of 2005 the government of Kyrgyzstan counted on active participation of Russia in investment cooperation. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan A. D. Dzhekshenkulov trip to Moscow in November, 2005 became significant. The arrangement on participation of Russia in completion of construction of Kambaratinsky hydroelectric power stations - 1 and 2 and constructions of the plant on aluminum processing was as a result signed (Luzyani, , page 232, 2004-2008).

Also the first official visit to Moscow K. S. Bakiev as the President of Kyrgyzstan was on September 5, 2005 of great importance. Its result was signing of the whole series of agreements, in particular about settlement of debt of Kyrgyzstan on earlier granted loans and about mutual protection of the rights to results of intellectual activity. Questions of interaction of Russia and Kyrgyzstan within integration associations were discussed, the possibilities of joint investment cooperation, and also cooperation in electrical power, gas and mining spheres are considered. The parties agreed about acceleration of coordination and signing of intergovernmental agreements that gave an additional impetus in development of the relations (Putin, n. d).

Thus, the relations in difficult conditions of carrying out and consequences of "Tulip revolution" not only kept at the high level, but also went deep. First, it was promoted by a constructive position of Russian government. Secondly, the western countries, having disowned from riots and

collisions of "Tulip revolution", did not give the support so necessary for the new authorities in the conditions of split of the country and a sowing campaign. Russia readily provided to fraternal people humanitarian aid. And, at last, thirdly, leaders of opposition were natives of former political elite and had close contacts with Russia and its government.

Relationship of Russia and Kyrgyzstan during "National revolution" 2010.

The events of "National Revolution" of 2010 which led to K. S. Bakiev's overthrow and destabilization of a situation in Kyrgyzstan also disturbed Russia. However its reaction was rather reserved. The Russian Foreign Ministry made the brief statement in which it expressed interest in political stability in Kyrgyzstan, and also called for the solution of problems in a legal order. The president of Russia D. A. Medvedev noted that "the events are an internal affair of Kyrgyzstan, but how the protest is expressed, testifies to an extreme form of indignation of authorities in power at simple people" (Medvedev's, n. d).

Partly this results from the fact that on the eve of "The national revolution" the Russian-Kyrgyz relationship developed is problematic. In economic area Russia had claims to the Kyrgyz leaders because of inappropriate use of two credits of 450 mln. dollars of the USA used for implementation of commercial projects of family of K. Bakiev. Also Russia opened the facts of illegal re-export of oil products with a total amount of 370 thousand tons which it delivered on preferential terms of Kyrgyzstan when the Bishkek combined heat and power plant had acute shortage of fuel oil.

In military-political cooperation of the relation developed also not easy. Preservation of the further bargaining around Manas military base and creation in Batken Province of training center which to finance serially were invited Russians, Americans, steel for Russia by unpleasant surprises.

However the most burning issue was the growing drug traffic from Kyrgyzstan. From 10 routes of transportation of the Afghan heroin 6 passed through the Kyrgyz Osh (Chernyavsky, page 51-52, 2010).

At the same time Russia was permanently aimed at development of the relations and stabilization of a situation in Kyrgyzstan. Soon after the revolution there came the deputy minister of foreign affairs of

Russia Grigory Karasin twice. During the meetings from Ag. President Roza Otunbayeva, and also Ministers of Foreign Affairs and finance Ruslan Kazakbayev and Temir Sariyev he discussed ways of normalization of life in Kyrgyzstan and rendering by Russia to its population humanitarian aid.

In the middle of April, 2010 there was a series of attacks on the Russian-speaking population, cases of manifestation of nationalism not only in Bishkek, but also in a number of the regions of Kyrgyzstan became frequent. Attempts of Embassy of Russia to draw attention to the events were not crowned with success. At the request of the President D. A. Medvedev the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation took measures for safety of the Russian citizens in Kyrgyzstan and on strengthening of protection of the Russian objects.

Due to the unstable internal political situation Russia gave versatile help to Kyrgyzstan. So, in May, 2010 interest-free grants of 20 and 10 mln. dollars of the USA, and through banks - the credit of 30 mln. dollars of the USA were allocated to its government. Through the Ministry of Emergency Situations more than 400 tons of humanitarian aid, and also duty-free 20 tons of diesel fuel and 1,5 thousand tons of seeds grain were provided. Medical care was provided to seriously wounded in hospitals of Moscow. Besides, Russia transferred to the Ministry of Education of KR a batch of office equipment, textbooks, computer disks, office supplies for schools (*Russian Foreign Ministry's Comments on the Situation in Kyrgyzstan*, n. d). It was decided to increase import of the Kyrgyz vegetables and fruit that was very important as Kyrgyzstan annually delivered them to Russia for the sum of 200 mln. dollars of the USA.

Due to the deterioration in an internal political situation in the republic, and especially in the south in Jalal-Abad and in Osh, to Bishkek there arrived the Russian President's representative on development of the relations with Kyrgyzstan Vladimir Rushailo holding consultations with the Government. At the same time Russia did not support a request of Kyrgyzstan for introduction to the Republic of troops of the CSTO. It was connected with the fact that crisis in Kyrgyzstan had internal political character, but was not the act of the external aggression demanding the collective answer. This circumstance could lead to condemnation of Moscow by the world community

and recognition by its military aggressor (Weitz, , page 8, 2010). Thus, crisis in Kyrgyzstan brightly showed need of response to new calls of threats to security in Central Asia and imperfection of the regional organizations [13, page 6]. However the possibilities of normalization of a situation in the country were considered at the regular meeting of Committee of secretaries of the security councils of the CSTO on June 14, 2010 that led to development of new strategy of crisis reaction, providing collective actions for protection of safety and stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty of member states of the CSTO [3, page 31].

By August, 2010 the external debt of Kyrgyzstan to Russia made 340 mln. dollars of the USA. At the same time its government suspended process of transfer of stocks of the Dastan plant to Russia. At the same time it expressed readiness for negotiations on creation conditions in the country of new Russian base in the south of Kyrgyzstan. Such situation was violation of the agreements reached during rule of K. S. Bakiev and could be treated as the next attempt to bargain additional preferences. However Russia still persistently sought for constructive dialogue. Continuation of the relations became a meeting in September, 2010 of Sergey Lavrov with Roza Otunbayeva "on fields" of the United Nations General Assembly in New York and Grigory Karasin's visit to Bishkek for participation in March, 2011 in the international forum. And after on December 1, 2001 Almazbek Atambayev became the President of Kyrgyzstan, the relations began to develop still intensively.

Thus, another revolution did not stop the friendly and allied relations of Russia and Kyrgyzstan, despite tragic events of 2010, refusal of some earlier reached agreements and misunderstanding of the parties in connection with possible introduction of troops of the CSTO

4.DISCUSSIONS

Relationship of Russia and Kyrgyzstan at the beginning of the 21st century was mentioned in the works by various researchers. The American authors Richard Waitz and Alexander Cooley investigated a role of the regional organizations in the field of safety in Central Asia, drawing great attention to a role of the CSTO in collective security in the Kyrgyz crisis. Authors specified that the behavior of the Russian Federation in the

Kyrgyz crisis of 2010 was apprehended by many countries as manifestation of weakness and lack of initiative. However they understand that Russia did not want to receive in the address mass charges of aggression (Weitz, 2010), (Cooley, 2011). And Eric McGlinchey emphasizes in connection with a revolution of 2010 that the international partners of Kyrgyzstan have to use more efforts for overcoming the international conflicts in the Republic (McGlinchey, 2011).

The Russian researchers E. Ionova and V. M. Tatarintsev investigate problems and prospects of the Russian-Kyrgyz relations, also focusing attention to influence of external factors (Ionova, 2011), (Tatarintsev, 2011). So E. Ionova, specifies that the Russian Federation needs to take steps for assistance and preservation of stability in Kyrgyzstan, otherwise split at an aggravation of an internal political situation can threaten the republic. The last is fraught with the decision of the internal interethnic conflicts with participation of troops of the USA and allies on NATO. V. M. Tatarintsev also emphasizes that the destiny of the mode generally depends on an external factor.

From Kyrgyzstan it is possible to distinguish work of I. V. Kravchenko who considers that, having only united from authors, Russia and Kyrgyzstan will be able to play one of crucial roles in the global world (Kravchenko, 2010), and S. V. Kozhemyakin pointing to the western trace in a coup [1]. There is a special wish to note the book "Coup on March 24, 2005 in Kyrgyzstan" under the editorial office A.A. Knyazev [4] mentioning many aspects of the Russian-Kyrgyz relations during "The tulip revolution".

5.CONCLUSIONS

Thus, relationship of Russia and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and 2010 carried though difficult, but in general positive character. The new oppositional government in Kyrgyzstan which came to the power led by Kurmanbek Bakiev sought to get support of Russia, considering it as the allied state capable to help with the solution of external and internal problems. In turn, for Russia it was important to obtain guarantees of preservation of

own influence on territories of Kyrgyzstan after the revolution and stability in the region.

Russia also remained the faithful ally during the period, difficult for Kyrgyzstan, in 2010, having refused to interfere with internal affairs and having in due time provided financial support. However, feature of approach of Russia to a situation during disorders in 2010 is desire not only to keep own influence on territories of Kyrgyzstan but also and to provide a further possibility of more active actions within the CSTO. The general in approaches of Russia to a situation during both coups can call readiness of Russia to give support in settlement of a situation and to provide much-needed humanitarian aid. It shows that at the weighed and patient position of Russia it is possible to overcome negative consequences of "color revolutions".

6.RECOMMENDATIONS

Materials of this article can be of interest to the experts investigating political processes in Central Asia. They can be used by students, masters and graduate students of students on the corresponding specialties.

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