

# KTÈMA

## CIVILISATIONS DE L'ORIENT, DE LA GRÈCE ET DE ROME ANTIQUES

### Grecs et non-Grecs de l'empire perse au monde hellénistique

Dominique LENFANT	Introduction.....	5
Dominique LENFANT	Les ambassades grecques à la cour du Grand Roi. Des missions pas comme les autres?.....	11
Margaret C. MILLER	Playing with Persians in Athenian Imagery of the 4 <sup>th</sup> Century BCE.....	53
Pierre-Olivier HOCHARD	Guerres, diplomatie et thésaurisation dans l'espace égéo-anatolien. Une autre approche des relations gréco-perses au IV <sup>e</sup> siècle avant J.-C.....	69
Eduard RUNG	The Persian King as a Peacemaker. The Ideological Background of the Common Peace Treaties in 4 <sup>th</sup> Century Greece.....	97
John O. HYLAND	Artabazos and the Rhodians. Marriage Alliance and Satrapal Politics in the Late Achaemenid Aegean.....	121
Thierry PETIT	Isocrate, la théorie de la médiation et l'hellénisation de Chypre à l'époque des royaumes.....	135
Anna CANNAVÒ	Kition de Chypre: du royaume phénicien à la cité hellénistique.....	155
Patrice BRUN	L'hellénisation passe-t-elle par le nom? L'exemple de la Carie aux IV <sup>e</sup> et III <sup>e</sup> siècles av. J.-C.....	175
Michel CHAUVEAU	Éviter la réquisition militaire ou une menace surnaturelle? À propos d'un contrat démotique inédit entre un Égyptien et un Grec ( <i>P. Carlsberg</i> 471, 251 av. J.-C.).....	205
Pierre SCHNEIDER	Une épigramme pour célébrer l'expansion lagide en mer Érythrée? À propos du papyrus d'El Hibeh (seconde moitié du III <sup>e</sup> siècle av. J.-C.).....	219
Yvona TRNKA-AMRHEIN	The Alexandria Effect. City Foundation in Ptolemaic Culture and the Egyptian Histories of Manetho and Diodorus.....	235
<i>Varia</i>		
François LEFÈVRE	Assemblées éphémères, assemblées spontanées, assemblées élargies: alternatives démocratiques en Grèce ancienne.....	261
Edith FOSTER	Devastation of Cultivated Land in Herodotus.....	301
Julien FOURNIER	Bases thasiennes pour des empereurs d'époque constantinienne. Les derniers feux d'une épigraphie civique.....	313

# The Persian King as a Peacemaker

## The Ideological Background of the Common Peace Treaties in 4<sup>th</sup> Century Greece

**ABSTRACT**–. This article is focused on the involvement of the Great King of Persia in the making of Common Peaces in Greece in the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC. It challenges the orthodox views originating from Isocrates and shared by some modern historians that the King's Peace was an instrument of the Persians in their diplomatic control of Greece from the end of the Corinthian war in 387/6 to the League of Corinth in 338/7. It argues that the Peace of 387/6, although it reflected Persian and Greek concepts of peace, possessed ideological significance for the Achaemenids rather than serving as an instrument of *Realpolitik*.

**KEYWORDS**–. Greeks, Persians, Achaemenids, diplomacy, ideology, King's Peace

**RÉSUMÉ**–. Cet article porte sur la participation du Grand Roi de Perse à la conclusion de Paix Communes en Grèce au IV<sup>e</sup> siècle av. J.-C. Il remet en question la vision orthodoxe remontant à Isocrate et reprise par des historiens modernes selon laquelle la Paix du Roi fut un instrument permettant aux Perses le contrôle diplomatique de la Grèce de la fin de la Guerre de Corinthe en 387/6 à la Ligue de Corinthe en 338/7. Il défend l'idée que la paix de 387/6, tout en reflétant des conceptions perse et grecque de la paix, avait pour les Achéménides une portée idéologique plus qu'elle n'avait de fonction dans la *Realpolitik*.

**MOTS-CLÉS**–. Grecs, Perses, Achéménides, diplomatie, idéologie, Paix du Roi

In his book *Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta*, P. Cartledge stresses the Persian king's role in the Greek world due to the Peace of 387/6: "Through this diplomatic instrument Artaxerxes achieved by the stroke of a stylus the formal suzerainty of Greece that Xerxes had failed to secure by a massive invasion a century earlier and the real sovereignty over the Greeks of Asia (now for the first time collectively thus described) that Xerxes had lost as a consequence of that failure".<sup>1</sup> It seems this statement reflects an orthodoxy, starting with Isocrates and shared by some modern historians, that the Persians in the fourth century B.C. dominated Greek affairs.<sup>2</sup> However, more recently J. Hyland stressed that already after the Peace of Callias, "the kings also claimed to maintain universal peace through interventions in disputes between distant peoples," that is, in the regions of *Pax Persica*.<sup>3</sup> He further makes an important conclusion about the ideological significance of the King's Peace for the Achaemenid monarch. Hyland concludes, that, according to the King's Peace, "the

(1) CARTLEDGE 1987, p. 369.

(2) On this issue see ZHRNT 1983, p. 250-252.

(3) HYLAND 2018, p. 8.

proclamation of autonomy for Greeks beyond Persia's borders was an expression of universal authority" of the king.<sup>4</sup> Finally, J. Rop states similarly: "The settlement of the war, known as the King's Peace, was a huge victory for the King and for Sparta. The Empire's western periphery was more secure and its influence in Greece stronger than it had been since at least the Peace of Callias in the mid-fifth century."<sup>5</sup>

My article argues that Artaxerxes regulated Greek affairs only formally. In reality, the Spartans, Athenians and Thebans benefited from relations with the Great King and manipulated him to achieve supremacy in the Greek world. They even did not use the Persian military and financial resources to the same extent as in the Peloponnesian and the Corinthian Wars. At the start I would like to discuss the possible Persian approaches to the peace with the Greek city-states.

### I. TWO CONCEPTS OF PEACE

Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.1.31) cites the king's rescript that proclaims peace for all the Greeks:

Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς νομίζει δίκαιον τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζομενάς καὶ Κύπρον, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖναι πλὴν Λήμνου καὶ Ἴμβρου καὶ Σκύρου: ταῦτα δὲ ὡσπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εἶναι Ἀθηναίων. ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται, τούτοις ἐγὼ πολεμήσω μετὰ τῶν ταῦτα βουλομένων καὶ πεζῇ καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ χρήμασιν.

King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him, as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the islands, and that the other Greek cities, both small and great, should be left independent, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; and these should belong, as of old, to the Athenians. But whichever of the two parties does not accept this peace, upon them I will make war, in company with those who desire this arrangement, both by land and by sea, with ships and with money.

E. Badian stressed that the King could not be imagined as swearing an oath, on equal terms, to a Greek city, but he could have sent down an edict setting out his terms, as they "seemed just" to him.<sup>6</sup> However, Badian did not explain how the King could have viewed a peace proposed by him to the Greeks. Indeed, there were two different concepts of peace in the Greco-Persian relations: one was Greek and the other was Persian.

The Greek approach to peace was expressed by Andocides (3.11) in his oration *On the Peace with the Lacedaemonians*. He makes a differentiation between εἰρήνη and σπονδαί as peace and peace treaty respectively: a peace is a settlement of differences between equals, a peace treaty is the dictation of terms to the conquered by the conquerors after victory in war.<sup>7</sup> It is clear that Andocides represents a Greek concept of peace,<sup>8</sup> according to which peace was usually concluded on equal

(4) HYLAND 2018, p. 166.

(5) ROP 2019, p. 97.

(6) BADIAN 1991, p. 37.

(7) εἰρήνη γὰρ καὶ σπονδαὶ πολὺ διαφέρουσι σφῶν αὐτῶν. εἰρήνην μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἴσου ποιοῦνται πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμολογήσαντες περὶ ὧν ἂν διαφέρωνται: σπονδὰς δὲ, ὅταν κρατήσῃ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, οἱ κρείττους τοῖς ἡττοσιν ἐξ ἐπιταγμάτων ποιοῦνται, ὡσπερ ἡμῶν κρατήσαντες Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῷ πολέμῳ ἐπέταξαν ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ τεῖχη καθαίρειν καὶ τὰς ναῦς παραδίδόναι καὶ τοὺς φεύγοντας καταδέχεσθαι. "There is a wide difference between a peace and a truce. A peace is a settlement of differences between equals: a truce is the dictation of terms to the conquered by the conquerors after victory in war, exactly as the Spartans laid down after their victory over us that we should demolish our walls, surrender our fleet, and restore our exiles" (transl. K.J. Maidment).

(8) On the Greek views on peace see VAN WEES 2002, p. 38-39; TRITTLE 2007, p. 180-181; RAAFLAUB 2016, p. 134-139; GRAY 2017. The popularity of the cult of goddess *Eirene* ("Peace") in the Fourth Century Athens is demonstrated by the

terms.<sup>9</sup> Xenophon, however, uses the word “peace” (εἰρήνη) relating to the peace treaty of 387/6 in such phrases as “the king sends down the peace” (*Hell.* 5.1.30: βασιλεὺς εἰρήνην καταπέμποι), “the peace which the King sent down” (*Hell.* 5.1.35: εἰρήνη ἢ κατέπεμψε βασιλεύς), and “the peace sent down by the King” (ὑπὸ βασιλέως καταπεμφθεῖση εἰρήνη) (*Hell.* 5.1.36).

The designation of “the peace which the King sent down” may reflect a concept of peace not in Greek, but in Persian representation, because only a king in an Ancient Near Eastern empire could have imposed a peace on the people. As a result, the phrase “the peace which the King sent down” may reproduce a Persian phrase with ideological significance.<sup>10</sup>

Cyrus the Great’s inscription from Ur declares the establishment of supremacy over other countries (“The great gods have delivered all the lands into my hand”), and states that he has made the land to dwell in a peaceful habitation.<sup>11</sup> The Nabonidus Chronicle records that when Cyrus entered Babylon, there was peace in the city and Cyrus decreed peace for Babylon (iii 18 ‘b-22 ‘a). In his *Cylinder* inscription Cyrus says: “When I went as harbinger of peace (*sa-li-mi-iš*) i[n]t[o] Babylon” (22); “My vast troops were marching peaceably (*šū-ul-ma-niš*) in Babylon, and the whole of [Sumer] and Akkad had nothing to fear” (24); “the population of Babylon call blessings on my kingship. I have enabled all the lands to live in peace” (*šū-ub-ti né-eh-ti ú-še-ši-ib*) (36).<sup>12</sup> It was apparently inspired by the style of royal inscriptions found as early as the Old Babylonian period and repeated throughout the Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian periods, in which the kings, among other merits, take credit for causing the people to dwell in peace.<sup>13</sup> Sargon II (721-705 BCE), for example, used the phrase “I allowed the people to live in peace” to describe putting a foreign country under his control (RINAP II, 1, 208b; 2, 463b; 8, 6; 82, 11b; 117, ii 64). The Sargonic phrase “I imposed peace” (*su-lum-mu-u ú-šá-áš-kin*) (RINAP II, 7, line 35) seems to be even closer to the description by Xenophon “the peace which the king had sent down”.<sup>14</sup>

There is little doubt that such frequent use of the word “peace” (*salīmu*)<sup>15</sup> in the Cyrus Cylinder text was intended for the creation of an image of a king-peacemaker among the local population

construction of the altar of Peace in the *agora* on occasion of making the peace treaty in 375 B.C. (Philoch. *FGrH* 328 F 151), establishing a sacrifice and festival to Peace (see ROOS 1949, p. 277; PARKER 1996, p. 229-230; LAMBERT 2012, p. 86).

(9) One can postulate a difference between the treaties declaring *koine eirene* for all the Greeks and previous Greek peace treaties (QUASS 1991, p. 41-42). First of all, the term εἰρήνη came into use as an official name for a peace treaty known also as συνθήκαι and/or σπονδαί. As we know, σπονδαί (truce, peace treaty) was widely applied to designate most peace agreements in Greece in the fifth century B.C., including those with the Persians. On the invention of εἰρήνη in the fourth century Greek diplomacy: TRONCOSO 2007, p. 209, 220-221; WILKER 2012, p. 107; LOW 2012, p. 124. FORNIS 2007, p. 158 emphasized that the terms συνθήκαι or σπονδαί meant “truce,” “suspension or cessation of hostilities”. This innovation therefore reveals a change of mentality that translates at least a desire to achieve conditions of stable and lasting peace. As for truces and peace treaties, the word σπονδαί is typical in Thucydides’ usage and occurs 141 times.

(10) TUPLIN 2017, in spite of the title of his article (“War and Peace in Achaemenid Imperial Ideology”), pays more attention to the role of war than the role of peace in the Achaemenid Empire.

(11) GADD, LEGRAIN 1928, p. 58, no 194.

(12) Translation: FINKEL 2013, p. 4-7.

(13) WATERS 2019, p. 36.

(14) BECKMAN 2017, 16 supposes that in their treaty practice the Achaemenid Persian kings inherited the imperial traditions of their Median, Elamite, Assyrian and Babylonian forbearers, and for the Neo-Assyrian kings, unilateral treaties were tools not of securing peace, but of extending their empire. This is right, of course, but I argue that the “peaceful policy” of the Assyrian as well as the Achaemenid kings must have been focused on the securing peace within *Pax Assyriaca* and *Pax Persica* respectively, involving states in the sphere of their direct or indirect influence. On the concept of *Pax Assyriaca* see FALES 2016; TORO 2021; on *Pax Persica* see BRIANT 2002, p. 79; BROSIUS 2005; 2010, p. 33; SILVERMAN 2020, p. 11-12.

(15) The word “peace” in the Akkadian *šulmu/šalmu*, *salīmu/salāmu/sulummū* tends to appear in the form of a hendiadys, for example, *fūbtu u sulummū* (“friendliness and peace”), *salīmum damqātum* (“good peace”), *abḫātu salāmu* (“brotherhood and peace”) (WEINFELD 1973, 191). Similarly, some Greek inscriptions referred to the King’s Peace as “the peace, the friendship, the oaths and the existing agreement” (τὴν εἰρήνην καὶ τὴν φιλίαν καὶ τὸς ὄρκ[ο]ς καὶ τὰς οὐσας συνθήκας) (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 34, lines 5-6) or “the peace and friendship” (ἡ εἰρήνη καὶ ἡ φιλία) (*RO* 22 line 13).

of Mesopotamia.<sup>16</sup> The Achaemenid royal inscriptions use the word *šiyātiš* in the meaning of “welfare,” “peace,” “happiness,” “prosperity”<sup>17</sup>; *šiyātiš* was perceived, like all other things in the world,—earth, heaven, mankind, as Ahuramazda’s creation; however, it may reflect a concept of peace in the following passage: “Saith Darius the King: If thus thou shall think, ‘May I not feel fear of (any) other,’ protect this Persian people; if the Persian people shall be protected, thereafter for the longest while happiness (*šiyātiš*) unbroken—this will by Ahura come down upon this royal house” (DPe § 3).<sup>18</sup>

The concept of peace is also suggested in another text. The Susa inscription underlines Darius’ role in pacifying his empire: “Provinces were in commotion; one man was smiting the other. The following I brought about by the favor of Ahuramazda, that the one does not smite the other at all, each one is in his place. My law—of that they feel fear, so that the stronger does not smite nor destroy the weak” (DSe § 5-6).<sup>19</sup> All these principles could be applied by the Achaemenids to foreign relations for maintaining peace among the peoples beyond the borders of the Persian Empire.

Like his predecessor Cyrus, who represented himself not as a conqueror, but as a liberator of Babylon, declaring peace to its people,<sup>20</sup> Artaxerxes II considered himself a peacemaker when he sent down peace to the Greeks. In the fourth century Artaxerxes, like his royal predecessors, Darius the Great and Xerxes, might have seen the Greeks in the sphere of his influence.<sup>21</sup> S. Medeniëks notes that the establishment of peace in Babylonia by Cyrus the Great from a religious perspective was associated very closely with the concept of a cosmic order, which depended on the harmonious relationship between the king and the gods.<sup>22</sup> Similarly, the reference by the king’s rescript to the righteousness of the King (Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς νομίζει δίκαιον, “King Artaxerxes thinks it just,” Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31) undoubtedly reproduces an Indo-Iranian religious-ethical concept of \*rta (“truth,” “cosmic order”),<sup>23</sup> reflected also in the inscriptions of Darius. The Bisotun inscription states: “For that reason Auramazdā brought me aid and the other gods who are, because I was not disloyal, I was no follower of Falsehood, I was no evil-doer, neither I nor my family, (but) I acted according to righteousness (*upari rštām upariyāyam*), neither to the powerless nor to the powerful did I do wrong, (and) the man who strove for my (royal) house, him I treated well, who did harm, him I punished severely” (DB § 63). The Naqsh-e Rostam inscriptions proclaim: “O man, the commandment of Auramazdā, let not that seem evil to you! Do not have the right path (*paθīm tayām rāstām*)! Do not be disobedient!” (DNa § 6); “By the favor of Ahuramazda I am of such a

(16) See BROSIUS 2012, p. 153.

(17) KENT 1950, p. 210; SCHMITT 2014, p. 248; BACHENHEIMER 2018, p. 217.

(18) Translation: KENT 1950, p. 136. LINCOLN 2012, p. 259 interprets this sentence as follows: “If the Persian people/army (*kāra*) should be protected, he promised, happiness will be undestroyed for the longest time” (Lincoln always translates *šiyātiš* as happiness). However, LINCOLN 2021, 20 also states that *šiyātiš* was an absolute bliss marked by peace, calm and freedom from friction or strife.

(19) Translation: KENT 1950, p. 142.

(20) This policy of peace is probably echoed in Aeschylus’ *Persians* (768-769), which, like Cyrus’ inscriptions, also presents Cyrus as a peacemaker: “...came Cyrus, a most fortunate man, whose rule brought peace (εἰρήνην) to all his friends”.

(21) On the imperial ambitions of the Achaemenids after Xerxes’ defeat see HYLAND 2018, p. 9-10. Cf. Pharnabazus’ speech to the Greek allies at Isthmus in which he encouraged them to carry on the war zealously and show themselves men faithful to the King (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.8).

(22) MEDENIEKS 2017, p. 137.

(23) HYLAND 2018, p. 165 noted that the opening phrase frames the royal decision in moralizing terms, echoing the boast of Darius I at Naqsh-e Rostam that “what is right, that is my wish”. WIESEHÖFER 2007, p. 125 emphasized that the inscriptions of the Achaemenid kings took the loyalty of the subjects for granted, presenting it as the necessary consequence of divine instruction and royal efforts to guarantee justice, “truth, and the well-being of all inhabitants of their realm. On the Persian concept of \*rta in general see: MALANDRA 1983, p. 13; SCHLERATH AND SKJÆRVØ, 1987, p. 649.

kind that I am friendly to right (*rāstam*), (but) I am not friendly to wrong” (DNb § 2); “What (is) right, that (is) my desire” (*taya rāstam, ava mām kāma*) (DNb § 3).<sup>24</sup>

One can conclude that Xenophon was proved correct following the Persian usage of the word “peace” when referring to the King’s Peace. As for the term “King’s Peace” (βασιλέως εἰρήνη), it was a shorter version of the phrase “the Peace which the King sent down”. Although it occurs only in the fragment of Philochorus (*FGrH* 328 F 151) and in the Athenian inscription of 369/8 B.C., which praises the tyrant Dionysius of Syracuse for his assistance in making “the King’s Peace, concluded by the Athenians, the Lacedaemonians, and the other Hellenes” (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 103, lines 23-26),<sup>25</sup> it became the most popular definition for the Peace of 387/6 in historiography. Philochorus (*FGrH* 328 F 151) mentions the Peace of 375/4 as “another King’s Peace” (ἑτέρας ἀπὸ βασιλέως εἰρήνης) which was similar to “the Peace of Antalcidas the Laconian” (παραπλήσιον αὐτὴν τῆι τοῦ Λάκωνος Ἀνταλκίδου). The phrase βοηθ[οῦσιν τῆι βασι]λέως εἰ[ρή]νηι, given in the present tense in the inscription in honour of Dionysius (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 103, lines 23-24), demonstrates that some peace was regulating the Greek interstate relations at the time of the decree, i.e. in 369/8. That is why the decree may only refer to the peace concluded at Athens in 371/0 when the Athenians and the Spartans were going to conclude a mutual alliance in order to challenge the Theban hegemony in Greece (*Xen. Hell.* 6.5.2). So, when the Greeks made an assessment of the Persian king’s role in negotiating this peace treaty, they termed it “the King’s Peace”; if their attention was focused on the role of Antalcidas and Sparta, then the Greeks obviously preferred to name it “the Peace of Antalcidas”.<sup>26</sup> When the universal character of the treaty was emphasized, the terms of which extended to all the Greek cities, but not only to the parties of the treaty, it was called a common peace (κοινὴ εἰρήνη).<sup>27</sup> The appearance of the various characteristics of the Peace of 387/6 was

(24) Translations: SCHMITT 1991; 2000.

(25) PHILLIPSON 1911, p. 185 suggested that the Athenians publicly praise Dionysius “for his zeal in maintaining the provisions of the peace of Antalcidas”. However, there is an opinion in scholarly literature that the Athenian decree referring to the King’s Peace honors Dionysius for his assistance in making the peace of 371/0 B.C. which was only one of the treaties which renewed the terms of the Peace of 387/6 (STYLIANOU 1995, p. 383).

(26) Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.1.36) refers to the King’s Peace as the “so-called Peace in the time of Antalcidas” (ἐπ’ Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνη καλουμένη). Such phrasing occurs elsewhere. Philochorus (*FGrH* 328 F 149a; 151) reports of the Peace of 387/6 “sent down in the time of Antalcidas the Laconian” (τὴν ἐπ’ Ἀνταλκίδου τοῦ Λάκωνος καταβάσαν εἰρήνην). Some other authors such as Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 F 103. 7), Demosthenes (20.54.2 with schol.), Polybius (1.6.2; 4.27.5; 6.49.5) Diodorus (15.5.1; 19.1), Strabo (6.4.2), Plutarch (Art. 21.5), Pausanias (9.1.4; 13.2), Arrian (*Anab.* 2.1.4; 2.2), Aelius Aristides (33. p. 412 Jebb; 38. p. 486 Jebb; 46. p. 286 Jebb cum schol.) referred to the Peace of 387/6 also as the Peace in the time of Antalcidas. Some scholars assume that the term Peace of Antalcidas may have related not only to the Peace of 387/6 (KEEN 1998, p. 376), but to other peace treaties of the fourth century B.C. which were negotiated by the Persian King and the Greeks in the fourth century B.C. and which reproduced its terms. However, scholarly arguments on this issue do not seem conclusive.

(27) Diodorus (15.5.1) seems to be the only source telling us of a common peace in the time of Antalcidas: “The Greeks were enjoying the common peace in the time of Antalcidas (κοινῆς εἰρήνης τῆς ἐπὶ Ἀνταλκίδου), in accordance with which all the cities had got rid of their garrisons and re-covered by agreement their autonomy”. Some scholars consider the Peace of 387/6 as the first *koine eirene* (MARTIN 1949, p. 131; PAYRAU 1971, p. 46; RYDER 1965, p. 36; QUASS 1991, p. 40-42; JEHNE 1992a, p. 110-111; STYLIANOU 1995, p. 163-164; SCHMIDT 1999, p. 82ff; FORNIS 2007, p. 158). However, there is an opinion in historiography that this peace treaty was not “a common peace”. LEWIS 1977, p. 146 believes that formally the King was settling a bilateral war, but no one could be in any doubt whose side he was on. BADIAN 1991, p. 43 states that the peace was not “a common peace,” but in principle a peace between the contending parties in the Corinthian War. Indeed, Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.1.35) writes: “This was the first peace between the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians and their allies after the war that followed the destruction of the walls at Athens”. Badian says that “nor should we be too much influenced by the fact that those who swore to the Peace can apparently be called ‘the Hellenes’”. A reference to “Hellenes” as those who had sworn to the peace along with the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians, is restored in the inscriptions of the Athenian alliance with Chios of 384/3 (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 34 line 8; 35 frg. a.1 line 6), in the prospectus of the Second Athenian League (RO 22, line 14), in the Athenian decree in honor of Dionysius of Syracuse (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 103, lines 25-26). One can conjecture that the original text of the Peace of 387/6, now lost, may have included a list of *poleis* sworn to the treaty similar to that which may be seen in the



hardly accidental. Although the term “King’s Peace” was used for the Peaces of 387/6, 375/4 and 372/1 B.C., there are no reliable data that the term “Peace of Antalcidas” was ever used for the designation of any other Persian-sponsored peace treaties but the Peace of 387/6. The name κοινή εἰρήνη was the only one that referred not only to all peace treaties in the fourth century involving Persia, but also to those that were negotiated without the Persians’ interference.<sup>28</sup>

## II. ROYAL RESCRIPTS AND INSCRIBED STELAE

The royal rescript setting the peace terms for the Greeks appeared for the first time in Greece in 393/2, just before the diplomatic conference in Sardis. This conclusion follows from Xenophon’s report: “Antalcidas said to Tiribazus that he had come desiring peace between his state and the King, and, furthermore, just such a peace as the King had wished for (οἷασπερ βασιλεὺς ἐπεθύμει). For the Lacedaemonians, he said, urged no claim against the King to the Greek cities in Asia and they were content that all the islands and the Greek cities in general should be autonomous” (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.14). The phrase οἷασπερ βασιλεὺς ἐπεθύμει may imply that the King had already stated his will by means of a rescript. The same rescript could have been discussed in the conference at Sparta in 392/1 because Andocides (3.15) reports that neither the King nor the allies agreed with the Athenians’ claims (οὔτε βασιλεὺς οὔτε οἱ σύμμαχοι συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν) for the return of the Thracian Chersonese, colonies and landed property abroad.<sup>29</sup>

Philochorus (*FGrH* 328 F 149a) seems to cite a condition from this royal rescript concerning the status of the Greeks of Asia Minor, which the Athenians rejected, when reporting of the peace negotiations at Sparta in 392/1:<sup>30</sup> “And the king sent down the peace in the time of Antialcidas (καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην τὴν ἐπ’ Ἀντιαλκίδου κατέπεμψεν ὁ βασιλεὺς), which peace the Athenians did not accept, because it was written there that the Greeks who lived in Asia would all be included in the house of the king (διότι ἐγγέγραπτο ἐν αὐτῇ τοῦ[ς τὴν Ἀ]σίαν οἰκοῦντ[ας] Ἑλληνας ἐν βασιλέως οἴκ[ωι π]άντας εἶναι συννενημένους).” The phrase from the rescript τοῦ[ς τὴν Ἀ]σίαν οἰκοῦντ[ας] Ἑλληνας ἐν βασιλέως οἴκ[ωι π]άντας εἶναι συννενημένους includes a reference to “the king’s house” (βασιλέως οἴκος), the term which some classical authors mention frequently and

decrees for the Second Athenian League (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 43 col. I, II.79) and for the Peace of Corinth (*IG* II<sup>3</sup> 1 318, frg. b. col. II). Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.3.19), for instance, makes a reference to such a list relating to the Peace of 372/1.

(28) Diodorus uses the term κοινή εἰρήνη in relation to the Peaces of 387/6 (15.5.1), 375/4 (15.38.1; 45.2), 372/1 (15.50.4), 366/5 (15.76.3), 362/1 (15.89.1; 90.2; 94.1), 338/7 (17.9.5), 302/1 (20.46.6) as well as the failed Peace of 369/8 (15.70.2). BUCKLER 1994, p. 120; 2003, p. 170 erroneously considers that “the term koine eirene is as remarkably absent from extant fourth-century sources as it is prominent in Diodoros’ later account of Greek affairs” and “the very concept of a Common Peace as a technical term is probably Diodoros’ own creation, perhaps the result of his acceptance of Stoic ideas of universality...”. However, κοινή εἰρήνη becomes a common term for designation of a treaty setting the peace terms for all the Greeks already during the peace negotiations at Sparta in 392/1, as the oration of Andocides (3.17, 28) clearly shows. The inscription from Argos, now lost, usually dated to ca 362/1, known in scholarly literature as “a reply to the satraps,” repeatedly refers to a peace (εἰρήνη) concluded by the Greeks among themselves (*IG* IV 556, lines 10, 13-14, 16); moreover, the inscription mentions twice κοινή εἰρήνη (lines 2, 5). The Athenian inscription for the Peace of Corinth in 338/7 may also be related to κοινή εἰρήνη, if restoration of this term in line 20 is correct (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 236).

(29) CAWKWELL 1981, p. 70 thought that it was another rescript which was discussed in a conference at Sparta.

(30) DeVOTO 1986, p. 200 casts some doubt on the fact that the issue of the status of the Greeks of Asia Minor was discussed in the peace negotiations in Sparta in 392/1: the phrase the peace that κατέπεμψεν ὁ βασιλεὺς is a clear confusion of the gathering in 392/91 with that of 387/86. KEEN 1995, p. 2 quite soundly suggests that Philochorus’ report could refer to the event of 392 for several reasons, thus rejecting the scholarly opinion that “the peace terms of 392/1 were not sent down by the Persian King Artaxerxes II, but by the governor Tiribazos, acting on his own initiative in response to Spartan overtures; the terms were subsequently repudiated by the King”.

which may well correspond to the Persian usage attested in the Achaemenid royal inscriptions.<sup>31</sup> This term in various contexts may mean a “king’s estate,” a “royal family” or “dynasty” as well as a “kingdom,” because a kingdom in the Near East was perceived as the king’s property. Herodotus, for example, uses the term βασιλέως οἶκος in each of these meanings (cf. Hdt. 5.31.4; 6.9.3; 7.194.2; 9.107.1). Thucydides (1.129) cites Xerxes’ letter to Pausanias: “an obligation is laid up for you in our house, recorded forever” (εὐεργεσία ἐν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ οἴκῳ ἐς αἰεὶ ἀνάγραπτος). The Achaemenid inscriptions also referred to the royal house (*viθ-*) not only as the king’s palace (DPc, DPi, DSg, XH; A11), but more frequently as the royal family (AsH; A2Hc § 3; DB § 14; 63K; DPe§3; DPh § 2; DNa § 5; DSe § 6).<sup>32</sup> Darius in his Bisotun inscription says about restoring order in his kingdom in the following manner: “The kingdom (*xšaçam*) which had been taken away from our family, that I put in its place; I reestablished it on its foundation”; “I reestablished the people (*kāram*) on its foundation, both Persia and Media and the other provinces”; “I strove until I reestablished *our royal house* (*viθam*) on its foundation as (it was) before” (DB § 14). It may be concluded that Philochorus cited a royal rescript that had prescribed the Asian Greeks to be in the King’s possession. A revised version of the royal rescript was later read out by Tiribazus, the satrap of Sardis, when he gathered the ambassadors from Greek *poleis* at Sardis in 387/6.

Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.1.31) explicitly reports that when Tiribazus ordered those to be present who desired to give ear to the peace which the King had sent down, all speedily presented themselves. And when they had come together, Tiribazus showed them the King’s seal (τὰ βασιλέως σημεῖα) and then read the writing (τὰ γεγραμμένα). Thus, the historian reports of the royal rescript which proclaimed the terms of the Peace of 387/6 B.C. Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.1.32; cf. 5.1.35) draws special attention to the fact that the Greeks swore to the peace according to the king’s rescript (ὥσπερ τὰ βασιλέως γράμματα ἔλεγεν).<sup>33</sup> However, a question arises how the peace terms of the King got known to the Greeks in 393/2 and 387/6. One can believe that the King could have sent his ambassadors to the principal Greek cities in 393/2, as he usually did when he wanted to dispatch a message. This is confirmed by Justin (6.6.6) who notes that Artaxerxes, king of the Persians, sent envoys into Greece (*legatos in Graeciam mittit*), with instructions that they should all lay down their arms, and assurances that he would treat as enemies those who should act otherwise and restored to the cities their liberty and all that belonged to them. However, the final version of the rescript which the Greeks must have sworn to at Sardis in 387/6 was undoubtedly received by Tiribazus from the King and was later recirculated across the Persian Empire and the Greek world.<sup>34</sup> There are some other cases in Greco-Persian relations when the Persian officials during their negotiations with the Greeks followed written instructions from the King.<sup>35</sup> In the case of

(31) LEWIS 1977, p. 146 supposes that this Philochoros’ phrase is tantalising in the extreme. It is alien to the Greek diplomatic language. CAWKWELL 1981, p. 72 believes that Philochorus’ phrase accords well with the Persian usage.

(32) LLEWELLYN-JONES 2013, p. 10 thinks that word *viθ-* meant “house,” “household,” and (by extension), “court” and “palace,” and also “dynasty” (p. 98).

(33) Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.1.32) says that the Thebans claimed the right to take the oath in the name of all the Boeotians. Agesilaus, however, refused to accept their oaths unless they swore, just as the King’s writing directed, that every city, whether small or great, should be autonomous.

(34) The closing lines of column IV of the Bisotun inscriptions record that Darius the Great ordered the inscription to be composed in Aryan both on clay tablets and on parchment. And it was inscribed and was read off before the King. Afterwards, this inscription was sent off by him everywhere to the provinces. The people unitedly worked upon it (DB § 70). To all appearances, this text describes how the Achaemenid Kings treated documents in their empire.

(35) For example, in 480 when Xerxes had left Greece after the battle of Salamis, as Herodotus (8.137, 140) says, the Persian general Mardonius sent Alexander I, son of Amyntas, the king of Macedon, to the Athenians on behalf of Xerxes. When Alexander came to Athens, he referred to Xerxes’ rescript, which was addressed to Mardonius and contained peace terms for the Athenians: “there is a message come to me from the king, saying” (ἐμοὶ ἀγγελίη ἦκει παρὰ βασιλέως λέγουσα οὕτω). (Hdt. 8.140A).



the Peace of Callias in 449/8 B.C., Artabazus and Megabyzus, the Persian generals in Cyprus, were authorized to conclude a treaty with the Athenians and their allies in accordance with the written instructions that had earlier been sent by the King (Diod.12.4.4).<sup>36</sup> However, in 387/6 the situation was somewhat different because the Greeks were forced to accept the peace terms by Tiribazus and the Spartans (Antalcidas and later Agesilaus: Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.32-34); and the royal rescript was addressed not only to the satrap, but also to the Greek ambassadors who had gathered to listen to it at Sardis. However, a rescript was only a natural form by means of which the king usually stated his will to the people throughout the Persian Empire<sup>37</sup> and even beyond its borders.

Diodorus (15.38.1) writes that in 375/4 Artaxerxes “sent ambassadors to Greece to urge the cities to enter into a common peace by agreement”. And as for the Peace of 372/1, the historian writes: “Artaxerxes the Persian King sent ambassadors, calling upon the Greeks to settle their internecine wars and establish a common peace in accordance with the covenants they had formerly made” (Diod. 15.50.4). Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.3.12) in the speech of Callistratus in favor of the Peace of 372/1 at Sparta states that “the King wrote that all the cities in Greece were to be autonomous” (βασιλεὺς μὲν γὰρ δήπου ἔγραψε πάσας τὰς ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι πόλεις αὐτονόμους εἶναι), so the historian confirms that the King had already re-issued his rescript to the Greeks.

Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.5.2-3) is the only author who reports of the Peace which was concluded at Athens in 371/0. The historian stresses that the Greeks swore to the peace terms the King had sent down: “I will abide by the treaty which the King sent down” (ἐμμενῶ ταῖς σπονδαῖς ἅς βασιλεὺς κατέπεμψε). The Athenians, after voting that both small and great cities should be autonomous, as the King wrote (ὥσπερ βασιλεὺς ἔγραψεν), sent out the officers charged with administering the oath and directed them to administer it to the highest authorities in each city.

The course of the discussion of a royal rescript at the King’s court may be clarified with the help of Xenophon’s story of peace negotiations at Susa in 367/6 when the Thebans, but not the Spartans, were already King Artaxerxes II’s favorites (*Hell.* 7.1.36-37):

ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ βασιλέως ὁ Πελοπίδας τί βούλοιο εἶναι εἶπεν ὅτι Μεσσηνίην τε αὐτόνομον εἶναι ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Ἀθηναίους ἀνέλκειν τὰς ναῦς: εἰ δὲ ταῦτα μὴ πείθοιντο, στρατεύειν ἐπ’ αὐτούς: εἴ τις δὲ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι ἀκολουθεῖν, ἐπὶ ταύτην πρῶτον ἰέναι. γραφέντων δὲ τούτων καὶ ἀναγνωσθέντων τοῖς πρέσβεσιν, εἶπεν ὁ Λέων ἀκούοντας τοῦ βασιλέως: νῆ Δία, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὦρα γε ὑμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἄλλον τινὰ φίλον ἀντὶ βασιλέως ζητεῖν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπήγγειλεν ὁ γραμματεὺς ἃ εἶπεν ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, πάλιν ἐξήνεγκε προσγεγραμμένα: εἰ δὲ τι δικαιότερον τούτων γινώσκουσιν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἰόντας πρὸς βασιλέα διδάσκειν.

Pelopidas was therefore asked by the King what he desired to have written for him; he replied, that Messene should be independent of the Lacedaemonians and that the Athenians should draw up their ships on the land; that if they refused obedience in these points, the contracting parties were to make an expedition against them; and that if any city refused to join in such expedition, they were to proceed first of all against that city. When these things had been written and read to the ambassadors, Leon said in the King’s hearing, “By Zeus, Athenians, it is time for you, it seems, to be

(36) Badian 1987, p. 27 argued that the Peace of Callias was not a treaty, but an edict, an order given by Artaxerxes I to Athens and her allies. This is partly right, but I think it was not an edict, but rather a rescript about peace which might have been recirculated across the Persian Empire and the Greek world, and was read out to the Greeks by the Persian satrap, as it was during the conference at Sardis in 387/6 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31), or by the King’s secretary as it was in the negotiations at Susa in 367/6 B.C. (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.36-37). It was not addressed exclusively to the Greeks. Nor was it “an order given by Artaxerxes I to Athens and her allies”. Beckman 2017, p. 8 rightly notes that considering the historical context it is unlikely that the Great King could have forced an edict upon the Athenians.

(37) Quass 1991, p. 39 states rather emotionally: “Considering the document reproduced by Xenophon of the king’s peace, it is immediately clear that this is a decree issued here of the Great King. It is not a peace treaty but rather a dictation that takes place before the actual conclusion of the treaty”. Badian 1991, p. 37 believes that “the peace based on the edict was not a peace between the King and the (or some) Greeks”.

seeking some other friend instead of the King.” And when the secretary had interpreted to the King what the Athenian had said, he again brought out a further writing: “And if the Athenians are aware of anything juster than these provisions, let them come to the King and inform him.”

Next the Thebans called together representatives from all the cities to Thebes to hear the letter from the King (παρὰ βασιλέως ἐπιστολή), and the Persian who bore the document, having shown the King’s seal, read what was written therein (καὶ ὁ Πέρσης ὁ φέρων τὰ γράμματα δείξας τὴν βασιλέως σφραγίδα ἀνέγνω τὰ γεγραμμένα). When the Greeks had listened to the king’s letter, the Thebans directed those of them who desired to be friends of the King and themselves to swear to these provisions (ὁμνύναι ταῦτα ἐκέλευον βασιλεῖ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς τοὺς βουλομένους φίλους εἶναι).

The royal rescripts were taken as a basis of the peace treaties from the period of the King’s Peace to other Persian-sponsored treaties of *koine eirene*. There are no surviving *stelae* of them; in all probability they were demolished after each of peace treaty was officially broken. The prospectus of the Athenian Second League included a reference to the terms of the Peace of 387/6 which was intentionally erased and restored quite recently.<sup>38</sup> So, there is only scattered evidence concerning the *stelae* with this peace in written sources. Isocrates asserts that the King compelled the Greeks to engrave the treaty of 387/6 on stone *stelae* and place them in public temples (4.180: καὶ ταύτας ἡμᾶς ἠνάγκασεν ἐν στήλαις λιθίνοις ἀναγράψαντας ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς τῶν ἱερῶν καταθεῖναι; 12.107: ἀλλὰ τὰς τοιαύτας συνθήκας αὐτοὶ τ’ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς τοῖς σφετέροις αὐτῶν ἀνέγραψαν). The *stelae* with this treaty were referred to in the inscriptions of the Athenian alliance with Chios of 384/3:

συμμάχος δὲ ποι|εῖσ[θα]ι [Χι]ος ἐπ’ ἔλευ[θε]ρίαι καὶ αὐτον|ομί[α]ι μὴ παραβαίνω[ν]τας τῶν ἐν ταῖς σ|τήλαις γεγραμμένων [π]ερὶ τῆς ἐρήνης | μηδὲν, μηδ’ ἔαν τις ἄλ[λο]ς παραβαίηνη π|ειθομένος κατὰ τὸ δυ[να]τόν

make the Chians allies on terms of freedom and autonomy, not contravening any of the things written on the *stelae* about the peace, nor being persuaded if anyone else transgresses, as far as possible.<sup>39</sup>

Diodorus (14.110.3) seems to cite the main conditions on which “the King said to make the Peace” (ὁ βασιλεὺς ἔφησεν ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰρήνην), but his phrasing reminds us very much of the formal language of the inscriptions and looks like an abridged version of the royal rescript:<sup>40</sup>

τὰς μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ὑπὸ βασιλέα τετάχθαι, τοὺς δ’ ἄλλους Ἑλληνας ἅπαντας αὐτονόμους εἶναι: τοῖς δὲ ἀπειθοῦσι καὶ μὴ προσδεχομένοις τὰς συνθήκας διὰ τῶν εὐδοκούντων πολεμήσειν.

The Greek cities of Asia are subject to the King, but all the other Greeks shall be autonomous; and upon those who refuse compliance and do not accept these terms one shall make war through the aid of those who consent to them.

There is no mention in the sources of *stelae* containing other Persian-sponsored peace treaties. The fragmentary Athenian inscription usually dated to the early 330s B.C., referred to τ]ὴν στήλην τὴν περὶ τῆς εἰρ[ήνης] (*IG II<sup>3</sup> 1 448* lines 2-3) organizing some religious festival in Athens (possibly the

(38) RHODES 2001, p. 137 thinks that this erasure is in fact puzzling, because at the only time when Athens would be likely to want to delete that reference, in 367 when the Persians had given their blessing to anti-Athenian terms put to them by the Thebans, Athens had for two years been allied to Sparta and we might expect the preceding hostile reference to Sparta to be deleted at the same time.

(39) *IG II<sup>2</sup> 34* lines 16-20. Cf. *IG II<sup>2</sup> 35* lines 12-16.

(40) WILCKEN 1941, p. 16 assumes that the rescript of Artaxerxes was an extract from the peace treaty. MARTIN 1944, p. 23 believes that it referred to the articles of the treaty which were of interest particularly to the King.

Greater Panathenaea, in which there was a musical contest as well as a gymnastic one), however, it is unclear what peace treaty it was.<sup>41</sup>

### III. THE KING'S ROLE IN THE TREATIES: GUARDIAN OF THE PEACE?

According to the royal rescript, the Persian king appointed himself a guardian of a peace (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31), but the text of the treaty, as far as we can infer from Diodorus' account (14.110.3), did not assign this role to anyone. C.D. Hamilton rightly notes that in the treaty itself, there is no evidence of the establishment of any mechanism, whether process of appeal or formal court proceedings, whereby alleged violations of the autonomy clause could be addressed. We must also distinguish between the process of ratification of this treaty, which brought hostilities to a conclusion, and future situations in which the principles of this peace might be invoked.<sup>42</sup> As for the effect of this peace treaty on Greek interstate relations, Isocrates in his *Panegyricus* emphasized the king's role (4.121): the Persian king decided the issue of the war, directed the terms of peace, and presided over the present affairs (καὶ τοῦ πολέμου κύριος ἐγένετο, καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπρυτάνευσε, καὶ τῶν παρόντων πραγμάτων ἐπιστάτης καθέστηκεν). Isocrates (4.175) also says that the Persian king was "guardian over the peace" (φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης).<sup>43</sup> S. Payrau seems to think that this title (and not *hegemon*) was the official designation of the Persian king among the Greeks,<sup>44</sup> but this term does not occur in other authors. It was at least used by Isocrates himself: "the barbarian cares tenderly for Hellas, and stands guard over her peace" (ὁ μὲν βάρβαρος κήδεταί τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης ἐστίν). Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.1.36) uses the term "protectors of peace" (προστάται τῆς εἰρήνης), but it is not clear whether it was an official designation for the champions of peace. But there were the Spartans, as Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.1.36) confirms, who gained a far more distinguished position as *prostatai* τῆς εἰρήνης.

προστάται γὰρ γενόμενοι τῆς ὑπὸ βασιλέως καταπεμφθείσης εἰρήνης καὶ τὴν αὐτονομίαν ταῖς πόλεσι πρᾶττοντες, προσέλαβον μὲν σύμμαχον Κόρινθον, αὐτονόμους δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν Θηβαίων τὰς Βοιωτίδας πόλεις ἐποίησαν, οὐτὲρ πάλαι ἐπεθύμουν, ἔπαυσαν δὲ καὶ Ἀργείους Κόρινθον σφετεριζομένους, φρουρὰν φήναντες ἐπ' αὐτούς, εἰ μὴ ἐξίειεν ἐκ Κορίνθου.

For by having become *prostatai* of the peace proposed by the King and by establishing the independence of the cities they gained an additional ally in Corinth, made the Boeotian cities independent of the Thebans, a thing which they had long desired, and also put a stop to the doings of the Argives in appropriating Corinth as their own, by threatening to call out the ban against them if they did not depart from Corinth.

(41) There is an opinion in historiography that it was the Peace of Corinth concluded by Philip II with the Greek states in 338/7 (LAMBERT 2018, p. 292), which peace was recorded in the Athenian inscription referring to oath giving about peace – [περὶ τ]ῆς εἰρήνης ὤμνου (IG II<sup>3</sup> 1 318 line 14).

(42) HAMILTON 1991, p. 120.

(43) Isocrates was very critical of the King's Peace in his *Panegyricus* (ca 380 B.C.) (4.121, 175), more restrained in his *Plataicus* (ca 375 B.C.) (14.41), and favorable to this peace treaty in his oration *On the Peace* (ca 355 B.C.) (8.16). He states in his oration *On the Peace*: "We should make peace... with all mankind, and that we should adopt, not the covenants of peace which certain parties have recently drawn up, but those which we have entered into with the king of Persia and with the Lacedaemonians, which ordain that the Hellenes be autonomous, that the alien garrisons be removed from the several states, and that each people retain its own territory". Isocrates even concludes: "We shall not find terms of peace more just than these nor more expedient for our city" (τούτων γὰρ οὔτε δικαιότερας εὐρήσομεν οὔτε μᾶλλον τῇ πόλει συμφερούσας) (8.16). On the change of Isocrates' attitude toward the King's Peace in his orations from *Panegyricus* to *On the Peace* see ZÄHRNT 2000, p. 307; JANSEN 2017, p. 256.

(44) PAYRAU 1971, p. 44.

Some scholars infer from Xenophon's statement that the peace treaty immediately assigned the role of its guardians to the Spartans.<sup>45</sup> R. Seager, however, notes: "The royal rescript did not assign to Sparta or to any other city the role of *prostates* ('protector') of the peace. The King himself appeared as the sole guarantor of the peace as the self-appointed leader of those who would fight to bring it into being. Yet Persia showed herself ready and willing to let Sparta assume the *prostasia* of the treaty, for those implications of the peace that came at once to occupy the foreground and needed a *prostates* to enforce them were of vital importance to Sparta but no direct concern of the King who thus had no reason to become involved".<sup>46</sup> It seems possible that the Spartans took *prostasia* of a peace because they considered themselves *hegemones* of all the Greeks and benefited from the eternal treaty of alliance with the Persians (Isocr. 4.128: πρὸς δὲ τοὺς βαρβάρους εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον συμμαχίαν πεποιημένους). However, there is evidence that at least the Athenians did not consider the Spartans to be the guardians of peace, but blamed them for peace-breaking. In their decree for the alliance with Mytilene in 369/8 the Athenians praised the Mytileneans that "they called on the other allies to go and render the support due to the Athenians, abiding by the oaths, against those contravening the treaties" (ἐπὶ τοὺς π[αραβαίνοντας τὰς] σπονδάς) (*IG II*<sup>2</sup> 107 lines 45-49). These lines probably referred back not to a specific peace treaty, but to all previous peaces (that of 387/6, 375/4, 372/1 and 371/0) because they declared the Spartans to be "contravening the treaties," but in the time of the decree in 369/8 the Athenians and the Spartans were already allies and were fighting together against the Theban hegemony in Greece. Interestingly, the conditions of the peace treaty of 372/1 did not assign the role of guardian of peace to anyone, and yet they included such a provision (Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.18): "And if any state should act in violation of this agreement, it was provided that any which so desired might aid the injured cities, but that any which did not so desire was not under oath to be the ally of those who were injured". Therefore, the Mytileneans' call for the other allies "to go, abiding by the oaths, against those contravening the treaties" may have been in agreement with the provision of the peace treaty of 372/1 as it is reported by Xenophon. There is little doubt that this provision of the peace treaty in 372/1 differed from that of the peace treaty in 387/6. So, if in the case of the King's Peace the war was to be waged against those who did not accept the terms, in the case of the treaty of 372/1 it was to be against those who violated them. According to the draft of the peace treaty in 367/6 the King did not proclaim himself as guardian of a peace, as he did in his rescript of 387/6 and did not assign a role of protector to any Greek state. Therefore, the provision for protection of a peace was similar to that in the Peace of 372/1 (Xen. *Hell.* 6.3. 18; 5.2). The only difference was that in 372/1 it provided reprisals by the Greeks against the state that first violated the treaty, and in 367/6, as it was in case of the Peace of 387/6, against the one who would not accept this treaty (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.36): "if they refused obedience in these points, the contracting parties were to make an expedition against them; and that if any city refused to join in such expedition, they were to proceed first of all against that city". In 387/6 the Spartans took informal protection of the peace, enjoying the Persian King's support. Having convened the congress at Athens in 371/0, the Athenians evidently decided to take over the role of the protectors of peace from the Spartans because of the difficult position of Sparta after the

(45) WILKEN 1941, p. 17; QUASS 1991, p. 49; URBAN 1991, p. 126; JEHNE 1994, p. 40-41; MORITANI 1988, p. 573. PAYRAU 1971, p. 47 considers that in the King's Peace it was the Persian king himself who, at least theoretically, as φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης must initiate the response to aggression and lead the campaign against those who have violated the peace. In practice the Persian king never intervened, leaving to his Spartan allies, as προστάται τῆς εἰρήνης, care to make observed by the Greeks the terms of the treaty. HAMILTON 1991, p. 121 says that the Spartans might have been able to convince their fellow Greeks that they were worthy of the title *prostates tes Hellados* (protectors of Greece). Instead, they appear to have employed their self-appointed position as enforcers of the peace to their own advantage.

(46) SEAGER 1974, p. 38. FORNIS 2007, p. 167 also suggests that the royal decree of Artaxerxes did not assign to any Greek state the *prostasia* of peace. It was Sparta that granted herself this power, with the connivance of Persia.

defeat at Leuctra. However, it was only a peace congress in which the Athenians made the Greeks swear to the peace treaty, “sent down by the King” (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.2-3).

Some years later, in 367/6 the Thebans also considered themselves Persian-backed *hegemones* of Greece. According to Plutarch (*Pelop.* 30), Artaxerxes proclaimed the Thebans to be the King’s ancestral friends (Θηβαίους δὲ πατρικὸς φίλους νομιζεσθαι βασιλέως). The Thebans attempted to compel the Greeks to accept the terms of the peace with Persian support. They called together representatives to Thebes from all the cities to swear to peace terms. Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.1.39-40) writes that the representatives from the cities replied that they had not been sent to give their oaths, but to listen, and if the Thebans had any desire for oaths, they bade them send to the cities. Accordingly, inasmuch as those who had come together refused to take the oath at Thebes, the Thebans sent ambassadors to the cities and directed them to swear that they would act in accordance with the King’s letter, believing that each one of the cities taken singly would hesitate to incur their hatred and that of the King at the same time. When, however, upon the arrival of the ambassadors in Corinth, their first stopping-place, the Corinthians resisted the proposal, and replied that they had no desire for oaths shared with the King, then other cities also followed suit, giving their answers in the same terms. Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.1.40) sums up: “Thus it was that this attempt on the part of Pelopidas and the Thebans to gain the leadership came to its end”. However, the treaty was later signed. At the new congress, the Thebans, Phliasians, Argives and other Greeks concluded a peace treaty on the condition that each of the states would preserve its own territory (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.10-11). But Xenophon says nothing of the participation of the King in the convocation of the congress. Diodorus (15.76.3) reports that Artaxerxes in 366/5 sent envoys and succeeded in persuading the Greeks to settle their wars and make a common peace with one another. So, one cannot be sure that any *stela* with the terms of the Common Peace treaty, unlike the royal rescript of 387/6, ever included a clause of the king’s sanctions against those who had not accepted or broken the peace. There is no evidence that after 387/6 the King ever employed his military forces and navy against the Greeks.

#### IV. THE KING’S STATUS ACCORDING TO THE PEACE TREATIES

Some scholars assume that the peace treaty of 387/6 included the Persian king as a contracting party,<sup>47</sup> but others consider that it was only a treaty among the Greeks who bound themselves by common oath to the King. C.D. Hamilton notes: “That there was no question of a peace treaty between Artaxerxes and the other Greeks, for the reason, pure and simple, that he was not at war with them”; “But there was no question of any formal, legal treaty or agreement between Artaxerxes and the Greeks at Sardis in 387. Artaxerxes was not at war with anyone but Sparta, and he had already concluded this war at Susa”.<sup>48</sup> E. Badian writes: “The peace based on the edict was not a peace between the King and the (or some) Greeks... It follows from this alone that the King was not intending to be (and in fact was not) a party to the peace which the Greek belligerents were instructed to work out among themselves. He therefore did not swear to the King’s Peace”. He continues: “As for what was ‘written on the stela’ of the peace... that could not have included an oath by the King, since the peace was not one between the King and any Greek state (or ‘the Greeks’), as we have already noted”; “It was not a peace between the King and any Greeks, nor (at least in origin) was it a ‘common peace’ including all the Greeks. The wording of the edict makes it

(47) CAWKWELL 1981, p. 77.

(48) HAMILTON 1979, p. 314-315.



clear that it was imposed only on the two sides at war”; “Those who swore, of course, had to swear in accordance with the King’s edict, i.e. both to leave Asia and Cyprus to the King and to recognise the autonomy of all Greek cities not in Asia. This by itself does not necessitate an oath on the part of those whose autonomy was thus recognised, any more than it necessitates an oath by the King”.<sup>49</sup> G. Cawkwell, however, notes: “But a representative of the King swore to the peace as the Chios decree... shows”.<sup>50</sup> Indeed, the inscriptions of the Athenian alliance with Chios of 384/3 refer to the peace (εἰρήνη), the friendship (φιλία), the oaths (τὸς ὄρκος) and the existing agreement (καὶ τὰς οὐσας συνθήκας), to which the King had sworn (*IG II<sup>2</sup> 34* line 5-7; 35 frg. a.1 line 3-4), i.e. the King’s swearing to the treaty is clearly expressed in the text—ᾧμοσεν βασιλ[εὺς] (*IG II<sup>2</sup> 34* line 7); ᾧ[μ]οσεν βασιλεὺς[ς] (*IG II<sup>2</sup> 35* frg. a.1 line 4).<sup>51</sup>

The King as swearing to the peace treaty is surely mentioned in the decree of the Athenian Second League (RO 22, line 14). Moreover, most classical authors unanimously attest that the peace treaty of 387/6 was the peace of the Greeks with the King (Isocr. 8.16; 12.60.2; Dem. 15.9.29; Diod. 14.117; Theop. *FGrH* 115 F 103.7). E. Badian poses a question whether the King swore to the peace in person. This may be answered based on the proposition that the Greeks could have seen the King as a party in the treaty, not as a person who had sworn to the peace, but who was involved in its making and secured its implementation. The use of the word ὀμνυμι (“to swear”) in this context may be misleading, but it can be interpreted not as meaning that the King actually had sworn to the peace, but that, as Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.1.35) reports, “the states had sworn that they would abide by the treaty which the King had sent down”. Arrian’s references (*Anab.* 2.1.4; 2.2.2) to the treaties concluded by the Mytileneans and the Tenedeans with “King Darius in the time of Antalcidas” further clarify the King’s role in the treaty of 387/6. Of course, the name Darius should be excluded from the lines of the text which refer to the treaty “in the time of Antalcidas,” but this testimony may show that the Persians considered the Greek cities which had been previously proclaimed autonomous according to the Peace of 387/6 (the Mytileneans and the Tenedeans as islanders would not have been subjected to the Persian King), as the allies of Darius III in the period of Alexander’s expedition to Asia. However, the status of σύμμαχοι of the Persian King obviously belonged only to the Spartans (Isocr. 4.128). The Peace of 387/6 does not seem to have assigned such a status to any other Greek *poleis*. That is why the terms of the Mytileneans’ and Tenedeans’ agreements with Darius III about an alliance with the King, in reality may refer to the declaration of peace and friendship (εἰρήνη καὶ φιλία) which was stated in the heading of the peace treaty inscribed on a *stela* (*IG II<sup>2</sup> 34* frg.a-d.1 line 5; 35 frg.a.1 line 3; RO 22 line 13).

The peace treaties dated to the period of 370s and 360s B.C. were considered by the Greeks as ones concluded with the King. Demosthenes in his oration *On the Liberty of the Rhodians* (15.9) records that the Athenians in 366/5 sent Timotheus to help Ariobarzanes and added a clause to their decree, “provided that he does not violate a treaty with the King” (προσγράψαντες τῷ

(49) BADIAN 1991, p. 37.

(50) CAWKWELL 1981, p. 77. It should not be ruled out that the satrap Tiribazus, of course, might have sworn to the peace treaty at the gathering of the Greek envoys in Sardis on behalf of the King in 387/6 because there is an example of such swearing in the past. Xenophon (*Hell.* 1.3.11-12) reports of the procedure for taking oaths at the conclusion of an agreement in Calchedon in 409 B.C.: Alcibiades made oath at Chryso polis to the representatives of Pharnabazus, Mitrobates and Arnapes, and Pharnabazus at Calchedon to the representatives of Alcibiades, Euryptolemus and Diotimus, both parties not only giving the official oath but also making personal pledges to one another. However, it was a private agreement between Alcibiades and Pharnabazus as commanders about the status of Calchedon, not involving the Athenian *demos* and the King (see AMIT 1973).

(51) Almost the same phrase can be read in Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ biography of Lysias for the Peace of 375/4 B.C.: μετὰ γὰρ Ἀλκισθένην ἄρχοντα, ἐφ’ οὗ τὴν εἰρήνην Ἀθηναῖοι τε καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ βασιλεὺς ᾧμοσαν, “after Alcisthenes’ archonship, under which the Athenians, the Lacedemonians and the King swore the peace” (D.H. *Lys.* 12).



ψηφίσματι μὴ λύοντα τὰς σπονδὰς τὰς πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα). Timotheus, seeing that Ariobarzanes was in open revolt against the King and that Samos was garrisoned by Cyprothemis, who had been stationed there by Tigranes, the King's subordinate, abandoned his intention of helping the satrap, but used his force to liberate the island. So, this general was initially commanded by the Athenians to provide Ariobarzanes with military support against Autophradates because both satraps seemed to have been in a "private conflict" with one another. However, when Timotheus learned that Ariobarzanes was opposed by Autophradates on behalf of the King, he changed his mind and decided to remove the pro-Persian tyrant from Samos, since this action did not contradict the peace treaty and could be easily explained to everyone as an act of care to restore the Samians' *autonomia*. When Timotheus abstained from breaking openly the peace treaty with the King, it seems possible that he followed the Athenians' instructions who were strictly observing the recently concluded treaty, i.e. the Peace of 366/5. There is little doubt that the Greeks ceased to consider the Persian King as a contracting party sometime after 362/1 B.C., when he was not involved in a common peace. The inscription from Argos (IG IV 556, lines 8-17) that includes the so-called reply to satraps dated probably after 362/1 makes clear that the King had already abstained from the peace.<sup>52</sup>

[β]ασιλεῖ δὲ οὐδένα πόλεμον οἶδα[ι]σιν {οἶδασιν} ὄντα· ἔφα[ς] | ἄν <ἡ>συχίαν ἔχη καὶ μὴ συνβάλλῃ τοὺς ἔχοντα[ς] τῆγ <γ>εγενημένην ἡμῖν εἰρήνην ἐπιχειρή[σει] | [μηδ]εμίαι μηδὲ μηχανῆι, ἔξομεν καὶ ἡμεῖς [ἐς β]α[σι]λέα· ἐὰν δὲ πολεμῆι πρὸς τινὰς τῶν[δε ἢ πρ]ά[γ]ματά τισι παρέχη ἐπὶ διαλύσει τῆς εἰρή[νη]ς ἐναντίον τοῖς Ἑλλησιν τοῖς τήνδε [ποιήσασ]ιν, ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἐκε<[>νου χώρ[ας, ἡμεῖς] | [πάν]τε[ς] ἀξίως τῆς τε νῦν γεγενημένης εἰρήνη[ς] ἀμυνοῦ[μεν] [καὶ τῶν προγόνων]

They are not aware that the King has any war against them. If, therefore, he keeps quiet and does not embroil the Greeks, and does not attempt to break up the peace that has come into being for us by any craft or contrivance, we too shall keep quiet in matters with regard to the King; but if he makes war on any who have sworn the oath or provides money for the breaking-up of this peace, either himself in opposition to the Greeks who have made this peace or anyone else of those from his territory, we shall all resist in common, worthily of the peace that has now come into being and of what we have done before now.

This inscription in theory may refer to either common peace from the peace treaty of 362/1 or to the Peace of Corinth of 338/7, but the mention of satraps makes scholars think that it should be dated to the Great Satraps' Revolt in 362/1 B.C.<sup>53</sup> J. Rop has proposed that it relates to the decision of the League of Corinth,<sup>54</sup> however, the content of the inscription, although it reflects a panhellenic rhetoric, is not anti-Persian but rather neutral. It is hardly possible that Philip II as an architect of the League of Corinth may be seen responsible for this decision.

However, one can propose that this document placed at Argos was a resolution by the Amphictyonic League (in which Argos was a member) with an answer to the invitation by the Persian envoys coming from the satraps on behalf of king Artaxerxes III Ochus to reassert agreements and provide the King with Greek military support on the eve of the Persian expedition to Egypt in 344/3. Diodorus (16.44.1) reports that the Persian King, thinking it a matter of great importance, in view of his former defeat, in order to overthrow Egypt, dispatched envoys to the greatest cities of Greece requesting them to join the Persians in the campaign against the Egyptians. The Athenians and the Lacedaemonians replied that they continued to observe their friendship with the Persians (τὴν φιλίαν ἔφασαν τὴν πρὸς Πέρσας τηρεῖν), but were opposed to sending troops as allies. The Thebans and the Argives provided the Persians with their military support

(52) JEHNE 1994, p. 98.

(53) The date of 362/1 is commonly supported in historiography (RYDER 1965, p. 142-144; PAYRAU 1971, p. 49, MOYSEY 1991, p. 111-120).

(54) ROP 2017, p. 304-322.

(Diod. 16.44.2-3). However, Androtion (324 F 53), Anaximenes (72 F 28) and Philochorus (328 F 157) record the Athenian reply to the Persian request which was almost the same as in the inscription from Argos:

τοῦ Φιλίππου ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Λυκίσκου Ἀθήναζε περὶ εἰρήνης πέμψαντος, βασιλέως πρέσβεις συμπροσήκοντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλὰ ὑπε[ρο]πτικώτερον ἢ ἐχρῆν διελέχθησαν αὐτοῖς· εἰρηνεύειν γὰρ πρὸς Ἀ[ρταξέρξ]ην, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπὶ τὰς Ἑλλην[ίδας] ἦι [πόλεις· ἀφηγοῦν]ται [αὐτ]ᾶ Ἀνδροτίων ὃς καὶ τ[ιστ]· εἶπε (?) καὶ Ἀναξίμενης· εἶη δ' ἂν ἄμεινον [τὰ τοῦ Φιλοχόρου παραγράψαι· προθεῖς γὰρ οὐ[τος ἄ]ρχοντα Λυκίσκ[ον] ὑποτίθησιν “ἐπὶ τούτου βασιλέως πέμψαντος Ἀθή[να]ζε πρέσβεις καὶ ἀξιούντος τὴν [φιλίαν διαμενεῖ]ν ἑαυτῶι τὴν πατρώϊαν, ἀπε[κρί]να<ν>το [τοῖς π]ρέσβεσι Ἀθήνησι (?) διαμε[νεῖν] βασιλεῖ[τ] τὴν φιλίαν, ἐὰν μὴ βασιλεὺς ἐπ[ὶ] τὰς] Ἑλληνίδας ἦι πόλεις”.

When Lyciscus was archon, Philippus sent proposals for peace to Athens, and at the same time the Athenians received envoys from the king, but they replied to the envoys in a more disdainful manner than was necessary. They said that they would be at peace with Artaxerxes, if he did not attack the Greek cities. These events are described by Androtion, who also [spoke] at that time, and by Anaximenes. It will be best to quote the words of Philochorus here. In his account of [the year] when Lyciscus was archon, he says: “When he was archon, the king sent envoys to Athens and requested that the city should remain in friendship with him, as it had been with his father. They replied to the envoys at Athens that the friendship with the king would continue, so long as the king did not attack the Greek cities”.<sup>55</sup>

It seems such a reply may be given to the Persians not only from every Greek city visited by envoys, but together from all the Greeks on behalf of a certain panhellenic organization which was the Amphictyonic League. The intimate relations of the Argives with the Persians since the Persian Wars may be a good reason for bringing the *stèle* to Argos. In this case a common peace referred to in the inscription was the Peace of Philocrates in 346/5.

## V. THE KING'S INTERESTS

One needs to pay some attention to the position of the Asian Greeks who were proclaimed subjects of the Persian King according to the Peace of 387/6. According to Diodorus (14.110.4), the Lacedaemonians consented to the terms of the peace treaty and offered no opposition, but the Athenians and Thebans and some of the other Greeks were deeply concerned that the cities of Asia should be left in the lurch. But since they were not by themselves a match in war, they consented of necessity and accepted the peace.<sup>56</sup> Indeed, the decree for Erythrae shortly before 386 demonstrates the Athenians' concerns about the fate of the Asian Greeks. It records a reply of the Athenian people (now lost) to the Erythraeans' request not to give up Erythrae to the barbarians (RO 17 lines 11-16: *περὶ δὲ τοῦ μὴ ἐκδίδοσθαι Ἐρυθραίους τοῖς βαρβάροις, ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς Ἐρυθραίοις, ὅτι δέδοκται [τῶ]ι δῆμῳι τῶι Ἀθηναίων*). The Athenian decree for Clazomenae of 387/6 B.C. referred to the King in an uncertain context (*IG II<sup>2</sup> 28* line 26).<sup>57</sup> The decree establishing the Second Athenian League

(55) Didym. in *Demosth.* 10, 34 col. 8, 8.

(56) Platon in his *Menexenus* (245b-e) follows his panhellenistic bias to criticize the Athenians' consent to abandon the Asian Greeks to the Persians: “None the less, we were isolated once again because of our refusal to perform the dishonorable and unholy act of surrendering Greeks to barbarians” (ὅμως δ' οὖν ἐμονώθημεν πάλιν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐθέλειν αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀνόσιον ἔργον ἐργάσασθαι Ἑλληνας βαρβάροις ἐκδόντες). Aelius Aristides in his *Panathenaic oration* (293) justifies this by the necessity to wage a war on many fronts: “For they were the last of the Greeks to concede the peace and not before they realized that they would not only have to wage a simultaneous war with the Lacedaemonians, the King, Seuthes, Dionysius, and the Peloponnesians, since they were prepared for this, but also with their own allies. Thus, they were betrayed”.

(57) On the relations of Erythrae and Clazomenae with the Athenians and the Persians in the period of the King's Peace see LANZILLOTTA 1981; SATO 2006. On the impact of the King's Peace on the Greeks of Asia Minor in general see DEBORD 1999, p. 279-282.

intentionally excluded the Greek *poleis* which were the king's subjects from the list of the Athenian allies: "If any of the Greeks or of the barbarians living in Europe or of the islanders, who are not the King's (ὄσ[οι μὴ βασι]λέως εἰσίν), wishes to be an ally of the Athenians and their allies, he may be—being free and autonomous" (IG II<sup>2</sup> 43, lines 15-25).

There is no doubt that the Asian Greeks under Persian rule after 386 B.C. started again paying a tribute<sup>58</sup> and serving in the Achaemenid army and fleet,<sup>59</sup> while being considered by the Persians as autonomous as it was established by the reform of Artaphrenes who after the Ionian revolt in 494 B.C. "restored to the cities their laws and laid upon them fixed tributes according to their ability to pay" (ἀπέδωκε τοὺς νόμους ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τακτοὺς φόρους κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπέταξεν) (Diod.10.25.4). In the last years of the Corinthian war the Persian King was already restoring his satrapal administration in the Greek coast of Asia Minor. The satraps may have served as mediators in resolving intra-*poleis* disputes as the inscription from Miletus recording the arbitration between Miletus and Myus just before the Peace of 387/6 shows (RO 16).

This arbitration was probably made also on the basis of Artaphrenes' settlement, about which Herodotus (6.42) writes: "Artaphrenes, governor of Sardis, summoned ambassadors from the cities and compelled the Ionians to make agreements among themselves that they would abide by the law and not rob and plunder each other".<sup>60</sup> The Milesian inscription (RO 16), dating to the period from 391 to 387 B.C., records that the Ionian jurors charged with resolving the dispute for the territory in the Meander valley, turned to the Persian king and resorted to the arbitration of Struthas (Struthas: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.17-20; Diod. 14.99.1-3) the Persian, who is entitled in the inscription as the satrap of Ionia (ἐξαίρατης ἐὼν Ἰωνίης). The inscription lists jurors from Erythrae, Chios, Clazomenae, Lebedos and Ephesus (the names of other Ionian cities did not survive). As for the process of arbitration, the lines 19-32 of the inscription report the following with reference to the jurors:

καὶ τ[ε]θείσης τῆς δίκης ὑπὸ Μιλησίων καὶ Μυησίων καὶ τῶμ | [μ]αρτύρωμ μαρτυρησάντων ἀμφοτέρ[ο]ις καὶ τῶν οὐρῶν ἀποδεχθέντων τῆ[ς] γῆς, ἐπεὶ ἔμελλον οἱ δικασταὶ δικ[ᾶν] τὴν δίκην, ἔλιπον τὴν δίκην Μυή[σ]ιοι· οἱ δὲ προδικασταὶ ταῦτα γράψ[α]ν[τες] ἔδοσαν ἐς τὰς πόλεις αἴτινε[ς] | τὴν δίκην ἐδίκαζομ, μαρτυρίας εἶν[αι]. ἐπεὶ δὲ Μυήσιοι τὴν δίκην ἔλιπον, Στρούσης ἀκούσας τῶν Ἰόνων τῶν [δ]ικαστέων, ἐξαίρατης ἐὼν Ἰωνίης, [τ]έλος ἐποίησε τὴν γῆν εἶναι Μιλησ[ί]ων.

The lawsuit having been undertaken by the Milesians and Myesians, the witnesses having witnessed for each party and the boundaries of the land having been displayed, when the jurors were about to judge the suit, the Myesians abandoned the suit. The *prodikastai* wrote this and gave it to the cities which were judging the suit, to be a witness. When the Myesians had abandoned the suit, Struthas the satrap of Ionia heard the Ionians' jurors and made the final decision that the land should belong to the Milesians.

From the data of this inscription it is clear that the process of arbitration took place in two stages. At first, the case was considered by the jurors, elected in the same number from each city of Ionia, however, if the decision for some reason was not made, or did not satisfy one of the sides, then the jurors turned to a higher authority, which was the local satrap and the King himself. Struthas' arbitration in Asia Minor took place in the period between his appointment as satrap after the failure of peace negotiations at Sardis in 393/2 (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.17; Diod. 14.99.1-3) and the return of

(58) Isocrates (4.123) asserts that the Greeks of Asia Minor must have been forced to pay a tribute (δαμολογεῖσθαι) and their *acropoleis* were occupied by their foes, i.e. the Persians.

(59) Diodorus (15.2.2) says that Orontes and Tiribazus, being appointed by the Persian king commanders of the Persian army and fleet in the Cypriote war, took over the armaments in Phocaea and Cyme, two Greek *poleis* in Aeolis. According to Isocrates (4.135), most of Tiribazus' fleet had been brought together from Ionia.

(60) On Artaphrenes' reforms in Ionia see EVANS 1976, p. 344-348; WEISKOPF 2008, p. 83-91. According to this settlement, disputes between cities might be resolved by arbitration (SCOTT 2005, p. 535).

Tiribazus in 387 B.C. Then the Persian King issued his decree that prescribed the Asian Greeks to be included in the “king’s house,” i.e. in the possession of the Great King of Persia.

Other significant evidence for the Persian activity in Asia Minor after the Peace of 387/6 occurs in the treaty of alliance between Sinope and Heraclea Pontica, both cities formally subjected to the King, dated to the mid-fourth century B.C., that includes a defensive clause concerning involvement by the King and satraps (*IK Sinope* 1, lines 2-15):

ἄν τις ἐπὶ | Σάτυρον ἢ τοὺς Κλεάρχου παῖδας ἢ Ἡρ[α]κλείαν ἢ [τὴν] | χώρ[ην] ἐπιστρατεύεται  
 πλὴν βασιλέως βοηθεῖν | Σιν[ωπ]ίας παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ ἰδύνατον καὶ ἄν τις ἐπὶ | Σ[ιν]ωπίας  
 στρατεύεται ἢ τὴν χώραν πλὴν βασιλέω[ς] | [βο]ηθεῖν Σάτυρον καὶ τοὺς Κλεάρχου παῖδας παντὶ  
 σθένει | κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ἐὰν δὲ ὁ ἐπιστρατεύων ἐπὶ Σάτυρον ἢ τοὺς Κλεάρχου παῖδας ἢ  
 Ἡρακλείαν ἢ τὴν χώραν | ἢ Σινώπην ἢ τὴν χώραν φῆι μετὰ βασιλέως ἐπιστρατεύειν | πέμπειν  
 μετὰ τοῦ ἐπιστρατεύοντος ἀγγέλους πρὸς βασιλέα | καὶ αὐτὸν κελεύειν ἀναχωρεῖν ἐκ τῆς χώρας· [ἐ]  
 ἂν δὲ μὴ | θέληι ὁ ἐπιστρατεύων συμπέμπε[ιν ἀγγέλους καὶ ἀναχωρεῖν] | [ἐ]κ τῆς χώρας βοηθεῖν  
 ἀλλήλοισι π[αντὶ] σθένει κατὰ τὸ {vac.} | δυνατόν.

If anyone, for excluding the King, will go to war against Satyrus or the sons of Clearchus or Heraclea or her *chora*, then the Sinopians should provide help by all possible means, and if anyone, for excluding the King, will go to war against Sinope or against the *chora* of Sinope, Satyrus and the sons of Clearchus must provide assistance by all possible means. If the attacker on Satyrus or the sons of Clearchus, or Heraclea, or the *chora* of Heraclea, or Sinope, or the *chora* of Sinope will say that he attacked on behalf of the king, then the ambassadors should be sent along with the attacker to the king and demand from him (the attacker) to leave the territory. If the attacker will not want to send ambassadors and clear the territory, then one should help each other with all possible means.

This provision concerns not only a specific status of the two cities in the southern Black Sea region, which may be also considered as autonomous in relation to the Persian King in the Achaemenid Empire even after the Peace of 387/6, but probably attests to more typical practice.<sup>61</sup> As it follows from this documentary evidence, the citizens of the two Greek *poleis* in Asia Minor under Persian rule may defend themselves unless they are attacked by a subject (satrap?) of the King; in the latter case they should appeal to the King for a settlement.

The special reference of the royal rescript to Cyprus needs no comment because it formally deprived Euagoras of Athenian military support and led the Cypriote War to its end, whereas the mention of Clazomenae requires an explanation. S. Ruzicka soundly proposed: “Given Persia’s compelling need by late 387 to use the Gulf of Smyrna for preparations for the Cypriote War, Artaxerxes was certainly concerned with ending Athenian involvement in the Gulf of Smyrna region and with precluding the possibility of any direct Athenian interference which might impede Persian preparations. It was undoubtedly this concern that lay behind Artaxerxes’ specific claim to Clazomenae in the edict of Sardis in late 387”.<sup>62</sup> However, it is not clear whether the text of the treaty on a *stela* really included the clauses about Clazomenae and Cyprus (it is surprising that Diodorus did not mention this: Diod. 14.110.3). There are no data in the sources that other Persian-sponsored peaces included any references to terms which immediately concerned the King.

(61) As for the Greeks of Asia Minor, *autonomia*, in the Persian interpretation of this Greek term, meant self-government with paying a tribute to the King (SEAGER, TUPLIN 1980, p. 144). Tithraustes’ peace proposals to Agesilaus after the battle of Sardis in 395 and the execution of Tissaphernes are stated as follows: “the King deems it fitting that you should sail back home, and that the cities in Asia, retaining their *autonomia*, should render him the ancient tribute” (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.25: τὰς δ’ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις αὐτονομοῦσας οὐσας τὸν ἀρχαῖον δασμὸν αὐτῷ ἀποφέρειν).

(62) RUZICKA 1983, p. 108; 1992, p. 65; 2012, p. 81.

## VI. THE KING'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE GREEK ARRANGEMENTS

To all appearances, the peaces in the fourth century B.C. must have been viewed by the contemporaries as “common peaces” because their clauses of *αὐτονομία καὶ ἐλευθερία* concerned all the Greeks, except those who were in Asia Minor under Persian rule.<sup>63</sup> One can propose that there was a difference between the Greek and Persian interpretations of these principles. If the Greek concept of *αὐτονομία καὶ ἐλευθερία* in the fourth century B.C. meant that the Greeks were “governed under whatever form of government their wished, neither receiving a garrison nor submitting to a governor nor paying tribute,”<sup>64</sup> the Persian approach did probably imply self-government under the King's direct/indirect influence.

The appearance in the royal rescript of the provision about Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros as belonging to the Athenians may, at first sight, be considered as Persian interference in the Greek affairs, but it looks like a success of the Athenians who by means of diplomacy returned their control over these three cleruchian islands lost since the end of the Peloponnesian war. Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.8.15) says that the Athenians' fear of losing these islands prevented them from accepting Antalcidas' peace proposals, including the terms about *autonomia* for all Greeks, in the conference at Sardis in 393/2. Andocides (3.12, 14) emphasizes that the Athenians' claims for these islands had already been recognized by the Greeks in the course of the peace negotiations at Sparta in 392/1. In the 370s and 360s the decisions of the Greeks and the Persian King regarding the recognition of the Athenian rights to possess Amphipolis and the Thracian Chersonese may serve as an example of the King of Persia's participation in resolving Greek affairs.

Demosthenes in his oration *On the false Embassy* (19.253) reports that the King of Persia and all the Greeks recognized Amphipolis as an Athenian possession. In another speech of the Demosthenic corpus (9.16), it is stated that the Athenians' claim to the Chersonese was recognized by the King of Persia and by all the Greeks. Much controversy in historiography is caused by three interrelated questions: 1) Was the decision about Amphipolis and Chersonese part of the same document, or two documents that appeared at different times and on different occasions? 2) Which peace congress or congresses of the Greeks in the fourth century B.C. recognized the Athenian rights to these territories? 3) Were the decisions taken by the king and the Greeks jointly on the recognition of Amphipolis and Chersonese for the Athenians, or were they taken on different occasions and independently of each other? Initially, scholars believed that the decisions of the Greeks on the recognition of the Athenian claims to Amphipolis and Chersonese belonged to the same case and were taken simultaneously with their approval by the King of Persia. This view was held, for example, by F. Hampl, who dated these events to the time of the peace congress of the Greeks at Sparta in 375.<sup>65</sup> S. Accame, on the contrary, believed that the Greeks and the King made

(63) On the meaning of *αὐτονομία καὶ ἐλευθερία* in the fifth century B.C. see KARAVITES 1982. CAWKWELL 1981, p. 72-75 traces changes in clauses of *autonomia* in various peace treaties. KARAVITES 1984, p. 191 concludes that the term *ἐλευθερία* was used in the fifth century to describe the state of freedom from all external coercion, while *αὐτονομία* denoted some sort of voluntary or involuntary coercion. In the fourth century *ἐλευθερία* used in conjunction with *αὐτονομία* (*ἐλευθερία* and *αὐτονομία*) became a fourth century formulaic locution, with the concomitant loss of all distinction between the two terms. In this context, *αὐτονομία* is used interchangeably with *ἐλευθερία* whereas *ἐλευθερία* was sometimes used where *αὐτονομία* had earlier been employed.

(64) πολιτ[ευομέν]ωι πολιτείαν ἦν ἂν βόληται μήτε [φρορ]ὰν εἰσδεχομένωι μήτε ἄρχοντα ὑπο[δεχ]ομένωι μήτε φόρον φέροντι (*JG II*<sup>2</sup> 43, lines 19-24). On the Greek concept of *autonomia* relating to the Common Peace treaties see MORITANI 1988, p. 574-575; WILKER 2012, p. 104-106. WILKER 2012, p. 103 suggests that the autonomy clause was to be codified as a permanent, valid structuring principle for interstate relations in Greece. This represented a critical transformation and, for the first time, formulated what would be a key element of all later Common Peace treaties: a general autonomy guarantee of unlimited term that, at least in principle, would involve all of the Greek states.

(65) HAMPL 1938, p. 18.



their decisions on different occasions, but, as for the decision of the Hellenes, he attributed it to the peace congress at Athens in the spring of 369 B.C.<sup>66</sup> This opinion was accepted by G. Cawkwell who argued that, firstly, the decisions of the Greeks regarding Amphipolis and Chersonese were taken on two different occasions, and, secondly, their approval by the king could not necessarily be synchronous with the adoption of the decisions by peace congresses of the Greeks. So, as for the Chersonese, then, according to G. Cawkwell, the decision on it should have belonged to the so-called Common Peace of 366/5; then the Persian King could have approved both decisions of the Greeks (about Amphipolis and Chersonese) at the same time.<sup>67</sup> Despite the different approaches to defining the chronology of the decisions of the Greeks regarding Amphipolis and Chersonese, most scholars prefer to date their approval by the Persian King to the period after the peace congress at Susa in 367/6 B.C.<sup>68</sup> This dating was also argued by J. Heskell, however, only in relation to Amphipolis. As for Chersonese, she adheres to a paradoxical point of view that the Athenian rights to Chersonese were recognized by the satrap Ariobarzanes on behalf of the king during a conference at Delphi in 369/8 B.C.<sup>69</sup> R. Sealey, agreeing that the Greeks and the Persian king could have recognized the Athenian rights to Amphipolis and Chersonese in Athens in 369, however, allowed another possibility. He made a suggestion that the decision could be attributed to the congress of 372/1.<sup>70</sup> Let us now turn to the sources.

The basis for dating the decision of the king about Amphipolis is the report of Demosthenes (19.137) that after the execution of Timagoras, ambassador to the King in 367/6, by the Athenians, the Persian king again recognized the Athenian claims to this city. However, the adverb *πάλιν* (“again”) used by the orator when talking about this event, speaks in favor of the fact that after 367/6 Artaxerxes had already agreed for the second time to approve the Athenian rights to Amphipolis (but not to Chersonese, about which Demosthenes does not say anything at all here). The need for such a decision was caused by the fact that the Persian king, having been convinced by the Thebans at the negotiations in Susa, declared Amphipolis an independent city, a friend and ally of the Persian King (τότε σύμμαχον αὐτοῦ καὶ φίλην ἔγραψεν). Thus, it must be assumed that the first decision of the king regarding Amphipolis was made sometime before the congress at Susa in 367. R. Sealey made a suggestion that the decision could have been taken at the congress of 372/1. This opinion seems to be the most convincing. On the one hand, the peace treaty concluded in the congress at Sparta in 372/1 was based on the royal rescript and, on the other hand, the Athenians could have gotten the Spartan support for their claims. The phrases of Demosthenes βασιλεὺς καὶ πάντες οἱ Ἕλληνες (9.16; 19.253) and οἱ Ἕλληνες καὶ βασιλεὺς ὁ Περσῶν ἐψηφίσαντο (7.29) attest to a joint decision by both the Greeks and the Persian King at a peace congress.<sup>71</sup> Aeschines’ words (2.32) that a common decree of the Greeks (τὸ κοινὸν δόγμα τῶν Ἑλλήνων) concerning Amphipolis was taken at the meeting of the Lacedaemonians and their allies immediately refer to the peace congress at Sparta. There were only two congresses involving the Persian King and they were held at Sparta in the 370s (in 375/4 and 372/1). Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.3.2-17) reports that the Athenian envoys spoke at the meeting of the Lacedaemonians and their allies in 372/1. Aeschines’ testimony (2.32) that Amyntas III, the king of Macedon, supported the Athenians’ claim to Amphipolis makes it possible

(66) ACCAME 1941, p. 155.

(67) CAWKWELL 1961, p. 80-81; 2005, p. 188-189.

(68) JUDEICH 1892, p. 199; RYDER 1965, p. 81; SEAGER 1974, p. 62.

(69) HESKEL 1996, p. 103-113.

(70) SEALEY 1993, p. 75-76.

(71) JEHNE 1992b, p. 275-276.



to propose that it was the congress of 372/1 which took place between Amyntas' alliance with the Athenians in the late 370s (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 102) and the death of this king of Macedon in 370/69.<sup>72</sup>

The recognition by the Greeks and the Persian king of the Athenian claim to Amphipolis was actually a violation of the declared principle of autonomy of large and small Greek cities, stated in the text of the treaty of 387/6 and repeated in the peace treaty of 375/4, but this provision could have been considered by the Greeks as an exclusion from this principle like the recognition of the Athenian rights to Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, and the Persian ones to Clazomenae and Cyprus. As for the Athenian claims to the Thracian Chersonese, it is only on one occasion that Demosthenes (9.16) says that they were recognized by the Persian King and the Greeks (βασιλεὺς καὶ πάντες οἱ Ἕλληνες), and therefore it is impossible to come to any certain conclusion about the circumstances of this decision.

The problem of Messenia in the 360s was the most important controversy in Greek interstate relations in the resolution of which the Persian king was immediately involved. As we know, during the first Boeotian campaign in the Peloponnese in 370/69, Messenia was torn away from Sparta and in 369, on the initiative of Epaminondas, the city of Messene began to be rebuilt (*Diod.* 15.66.1; 67.1). The Persian king, still supporting the Spartans, sent Philiscus to Greece in 369/8 with a proposal to conclude a common peace which would have reflected the changes in the military situation due to the Boeotians' invasion of Peloponnese and conclusion of the Athenian-Spartan alliance in 370/69 (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.27; *Diod.* 15.70.2). Philiscus gathered the Greeks at the conference in Delphi.<sup>73</sup> The Persian proposals to the Greeks at the conference in Delphi may have required the participants to agree to the principles of αὐτονομία and ἐλευθερία as they had done at earlier peace congresses at Sparta in 375/4 and 372/1 B.C. and at Athens in 371/0. A new political development was that Messenia had become independent in 369.<sup>74</sup> The recognition of its status was one of the important tasks of Theban diplomacy in the 360s. The Great King in his support of the Lacedaemonians, however, refused to recognize its autonomous status and instead insisted on its continued subjection to Sparta. The Athenians might have supported the Spartan-Persian demand for Messenia's subjection, just as the Spartans had earlier supported the Athenian request for control of Amphipolis and the Thracian Chersonese, but the Thebans were opposed to this demand. The congress in Delphi in 369/8 yielded no result and the problem with the status of these territories led to diplomatic debates among the Greeks at a number of congresses in which the Persian King was deeply involved. Sometime later, in 367/6, Artaxerxes II in the conference at Susa was prompted by the Thebans to include in the draft of the common peace the condition of autonomy for Messenia (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.36) and proclaimed Amphipolis to be an autonomous city, as well as an ally (*Dem.* 19.137). As part of the conditions of the Common Peace of 366/5, the Messenians won recognition as autonomous (*Diod.* 15.90.2), while Amphipolis was acknowledged once again by the Persian King as an Athenian possession (*Dem.* 19.137). According to Diodorus (15.90.2), the Spartan support for Tachos, the king of Egypt, against the Persians in the period of the Great Satrap's Revolt in 362/1, was due to the fact that the Spartans were estranged from Artaxerxes because the Messenians had been included by the King under the same terms as the other Greeks in the common peace. So, the history of the King's involvement in the Greek arrangements clearly shows that the leading Greek states manipulated him to defend their own interests in the course of the intensive struggle for hegemony in Greece in the 370s and 360s B.C.

(72) BORZA, 1990, p. 187, however, considered that Amyntas III took part at the peace congress in Athens in 371/0 B.C. and supported the Athenian claims to Amphipolis.

(73) See RUNG 2013, p. 35-50.

(74) On Messenian independence, see LURAGHI 2008, p. 209-230.

## CONCLUSION

To summarize, the Persian-sponsored peace treaties in Greece in the fourth century B.C., from the King's Peace of 387/6 to the Peace of 366/5, were a result of the competitive hegemonial policies of the Greeks, and the status of protector of peace was a prize in these competitions. The King's role in peaces was formalized in royal rescripts which, of course, reflected more ideological significance than the King's real participation in Greek affairs. However, a factor of the military and financial strength of the King was used by the Greeks to achieve advantages in peace treaties, and getting the Persian King's support played a leading role in this.

Eduard RUNG  
Kazan Federal University

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